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INTRODUCTION
It used to be that the real and the invented were parallel lines that never
met. Then we discovered that space is curved, and in curved space
parallel lines always meet. (TPB 94)
Real and invented, the world of objects and the human imagination, science and
literature, Jeanette Winterson weaves these apparent oppositions together in an
oeuvre that celebrates the power of love, beauty and language. In an attempt to
remove the barriers between the rational and the poetic, she mixes her opinions
of consumerism with transcendent thought, incorporating brief treatises on such
diverse topics as quantum physics, breast surgery, and communication
technology, while echoing postmodern literary theory and quoting from
Romantic poets such as William Blake and Modernist poets like T.S. Eliot. For
Winterson, her art is a crusade against a predictable and unimaginative reality that
denies that there is more than meets the eye. 
Winterson was born in 1959, and grew up in Accrington, Lancashire, a
Northern-England working class town, where she was raised by her adoptive
father and mother. They were members of a Pentecostal church. Winterson grew
up being told that she belonged to God and had been chosen by God, and that
because he was empowering her, she could achieve anything (cf. Lord 1996). She
was destined to become a missionary, and was already preaching at a very early
age, which may explain the uncompromising tone of much of her writing. When
she was sixteen she left home because her love for other girls was not tolerated.
To earn a living, she worked in a variety of jobs, ranging from ice-cream van
driver and make-up artist in a funeral parlour to domestic assistant in a mental
hospital, experiences that enriched her imagination and provided her with much
of the imagery she would use throughout her work. In 1978, she was admitted
to St. Catherine’s college at Oxford, where she studied English Language and
Literature. It was here that she started reading Virginia Woolf, one of her main
sources of inspiration. After leaving Oxford, she worked in a theatre for a while,
until her first novel appeared, at age 26. Soon she found an enthusiastic audience.
Her work was widely translated, and soon began to appear on syllabi of literature
courses around the world. She earned herself a reputation not only for the beauty
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of her stories but also for her often hostile attitude towards critics and for her
wild lesbian love life. She lived in London until 1997, when she fell victim to a
depression. She moved to the countryside together with her steady girlfriend,
Margaret Reynolds. Since then, her attitude towards critics and academics has
become milder. She started an interactive website and is still writing and
publishing. 
A remarkable side to Jeanette Winterson’s writing is her notorious relation
to the press. Winterson’s debut in 1985 aroused much enthusiasm. The press
were extremely excited. Her work was considered highly original. She won
several prizes, and Gore Vidal called her “the most interesting young writer I
have read in twenty years”, which went a little to her head, as she repeatedly
stated that Vidal was right. This attitude was not appreciated, and many critics
turned against her (Gerrard, 1994); (Wolff, de 1995); (Barnacle, 1997); (Kemp,
1998).
Many literary works can be regarded as vehicles for their author’s
worldviews or political ideas. However, trying to prove that characters’ opinions
are in fact their author’s, is usually a treacherous undertaking – it is easy to slip
from biographical criticism into the biographical fallacy. The next chapters will
show, however, that it is not difficult to see correspondences between the
characters she creates and her own philosophical views. In fact, as Delia Falconer
argues in “Bitter Harvest”, Winterson often makes sure that we do not overlook
them: 
It is her attempts to play the author conspicuously within the books, to
make her readers get their meaning (...) (Falconer 1997)
Her main characters are so forceful and larger than life that they often personify
concepts or qualities, just like characters in allegories. The narrator’s tone, the
outcome of the book and metafictional passages clearly show the author’s
preferences. In that way, she expresses her condemnation of characters and
principles that are unfavourable to her. Winterson’s characters can be seen as
models with an almost emblematic internal coherence. To a certain extent, they
remain flat – they do not develop in the course of events. They are easily divided
in heroes and their foes. In her introduction to Great Moments in Aviation, one of
the few occasions where she openly discusses her literary strategies, Winterson
herself claims that “I wanted to follow the fairytale convention. A heroine, a
hero, a villain and a fairy godmother” (GMA xii). The idea that all of Winterson’s
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fictions are of an allegorical nature is also supported by the way well-known
allegorical and mythical characters function alongside Winterson’s own
characters, suggesting the absence of any categorial difference between them.
We come across a wide variety of biblical, mythical and fairy-tale characters: a
sorcerer, Sir Perceval, Arthur, Artemis, Orion, Orpheus, Bathsheba, an orange
demon, Zillah, Samson, The Queen of Heaven, The Blessed Virgin, Twelve
Dancing Princesses, and so on. These characters always appear to come from a
deeper reality, to have knowledge the other characters have no access to. The
sorcerer, for instance, already knows the protagonist’s name even though she has
not introduced herself; the orange demon knows and travels through all the
books ever written. Fortunata, one of the Twelve Dancing Princesses, functions
as the protagonist’s guide into a transcendent world. These characters just appear
and disappear, dropping an opinion or showing how things ‘really’ are. They just
announce themselves, putting forward an idea needed by one of the characters. 
I believe that most of Winterson’s novels can be read as fairy tales or
allegories, encapsulating discussions about modernity and its countercultures.
What stands out unmistakeably, is that some characters represent a postmodern
worldview, while others are ardently modern. Winterson’s texts in the end
become ambassadors for the imagination, for worlds of subjectivity, freedom
and emotion, forcefully opposing those traditions that seek to establish law,
objectivity, and order. Playfully mixing spheres and narratives, her work
encompasses a thorough Vernunftkritik, an attitude directed against the grand
narratives of the modern era – which would make Winterson a postmodernist.
At the same time, she depicts a world of illusion where trapdoors and sooth-
sayers hint at hidden worlds, which would make her a Romantic. That is why, in
this thesis, I will draw parallels between Winterson’s ideas and the bodies of
thought of Romantic and postmodern thinkers – even though these are not
specifically mentioned in her texts. I do this, nor merely to compare, but to
disclose the underlying level of her allegories. I will thus disclose the hidden
discussion between Winterson’s fictional characters, ambassadors of opposing
worldviews. 
You will find a table outlining the main characters in Winterson’s fiction
and the principles they represent in Appendix I. This includes a description of
their functions in the books, that is, whether they stand out either as heroes,
companions, and helpers, or as adversaries and villains. Appendix II contains an
overview of Winterson’s oeuvre, outlining the main story lines of Winterson’s
novels, introducing the characters and describing their allegorical functions. 
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Winterson’s narrators show an unmistakeable and consistent sympathy for
certain characters, a preference connected to the ideas they represent. Red-
headed women for instance, are always addressed in such a loving tone that they
become emblems of love and passion. Written on the Body contains several
redheads, among them Bathsheba, one of the narrator’s old loves: “Your red hair
is blazing and you are saying, ‘Make three wishes and they shall all come true.
Make three hundred and I will honour every one’ ” (WOB 19). Louise has red
hair as well: “If I were painting Louise I’d paint her hair as a swarm of butterflies.
A million Red Admirals in a halo of movement and light” (WOB 29). In The
Passion, we meet Villanelle, who, when she was born, had “A fine head with a
crop of red hair and a pair of eyes that made up for the sun’s eclipse” (TP 51).
On top of the obvious and recurring approval of red-headed women in
Winterson’s fiction, her book covers and even her website show numerous red-
haired ladies. In Winterson’s feminist aesthetics the colour red is connected to
its connotations in our western culture. Its intensity implies energy and vigour.
It destroys optical calmness and thereby suggests revolutionary struggle. Red is
associated with fire, warmth and blood, and creates a dramatic effect. Combined
with femininity, in Winterson’s work this colour symbolises an intense passion.
In general, Winterson’s heroes are sensitive people, often travellers and
searchers, exploring the world around them. They are on a quest for beauty and
will cross boundaries to find it. They are, in that sense, revolutionary because
they have the desire to go beyond what is already known, the passion to go
beyond what is common. With that, they embrace uncertainty. The beauty they
hope to find there demands a letting go, an escape from old values, as well as an
openness and a passionate determination. The antagonists in Winterson’s work
display the exact opposite characteristics. They do not seek anything except
stability, order, and law-like certainty and in some cases are mainly interested in
power or money. Winterson’s preference for the first set of characters and
characteristics is not only evident from the passionately poetic language and
visionary images with which she describes them in her fiction, but is confirmed
in her non-fiction, essays and journalism. In my interpretation of Winterson’s
novels I have consulted the numerous interviews she gave over the years, and the
essays and other writings that she has published. Also, Winterson’s website,
www.jeanettewinterson.com, proved to be a valuable source of information
about her personal political opinions. 
Winterson’s characters do not necessarily cease to exist on the last page of
one of her books. The Dancing Princesses, for instance, only really fully come to
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life in Sexing the Cherry, but one of them seems to already appear briefly in the
earlier The Passion: “One day he saw a young woman flying past, her clothes flying
out behind her” (TP 97). Although many women in Winterson’s novels are able
to float, only the Dancing Princesses are actually able to fly. This anonymous
single flying female might be one of them. The Passion also introduces Villanelle,
the daughter of a boatman. In Art & Lies, she and her linguistic alter ego, the
poetic form, briefly return: “There is a quatrain at my chin and a sonnet on each
breast, Villanelle is the poise of my hands”(AL 63). Likewise, Louise, an adult in
Written on the Body, spends her childhood in The Passion: “One little girl who
always followed me around pulled at my hand, her eyebrows close together with
worries. ‘Will you kill people, Henri?’ I dropped down beside her. ‘Not people,
Louise, just the enemy.’ ‘What is enemy?’ ‘Someone who’s not on your side’ ”
(TP 8 and cf. TP 79). In this way, Winterson’s seven novels published so far
become a closely knit body of work with a consistent message:
I’ve said that the seven books make a cycle or a series, and I believe that
they do from Oranges to The.PowerBook. And they interact and themes do
occur and return, disappear, come back amplified or modified, changed in
some way, because it’s been my journey, it’s the journey of my
imagination, it’s the journey of my soul in those books. So continually
they must address one another. And you don’t know that at the time. You
only know that when you’ve done enough of them. But that’s why I say it
is a series, and that’s also why I say it’s finished now with The.PowerBook
and there has to be new beginning. Whether or not I’ll go on quoting
myself in this new beginning, I don’t know. (Winterson 2003a)
The appearance of Louise in The Passion is a case in point. In Written on the
Body we encounter Louise as the wife of Elgin. She is having an extramarital affair
with the anonymous narrator, whose sex is undeclared. Elgin is aware of his
wife’s adulterous relationship. When she appears to be ill, Elgin – who is a cancer
specialist – believes that she has cancer of the blood. Indeed, the test results he
comes up with back him up in this. Some readers of the book believe that Elgin
is trustworthy. The text in Written on the Body, however, contains passages that
raise doubts concerning Elgin’s trustworthiness. It is in fact not at all clear if
Louise really is ill, or if she is only declared ill. Elgin’s diagnosis might just
amount to blackmail. It is no coincidence, then, that in The Passion this theme of
‘knowing the enemy’ is also tied up with the character of Louise. 
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We also see how an existential problem, such as uncertainty, can be
experienced by various characters in different novels. Little Jeanette in Oranges
Are Not the Only Fruit feels uncertain: “I wasn’t quite certain what was happening
myself, it was the second time in my life I had experienced uncertainty” (OAF
98). At the end of the novel, she chooses for a life that embraces that feeling,
leaving behind the certainties of the black-and-white binary structured world
created by her mother. Jordan, a boy from Sexing the Cherry, is confronted with
exactly the same turning point in his teens: “Running away from uncertainty and
confusion but most of all running away from myself. (...) And then I saw that the
running away was a running towards” (STC 80). Different characters seem to
converge at similar points, sharing identical insights, which makes them not so
much owners of personal views, but rather, allegorical personifications of
qualities. 
Falling from rooftops without dying is another example of an experience
shared by many of Winterson’s characters. In Art & Lies, Picasso wants to kill
herself that way. She mysteriously remains alive. In Sexing the Cherry, an unnamed
person also survives a fall: 
A young girl coming home along a slippery and frayed line of rope missed
her footing and fell into the blank space below. There was a cry of horror
from everyone who saw it, but the girl did not drop and crack on the
ground, she floated. (STC 97)
Fortunata, one of the Twelve Dancing Princesses in Sexing the Cherry, does not
fall to her death either. “ ‘Do you remember’, said another sister, ‘how light she
was? She was so light that she could climb down a rope, cut it and tie it again in
mid-air without plunging to her death. The winds supported her’ ” (STC 60).
Similarly, in a short story called “The Mistletoe Bride” (2002), the narrator
almost dies when she is locked up in a heavy box, but is miraculously released,
not knowing what “final power” (“The Mistletoe Bride”, page 8) aided her.
Liberated by a strange transformation, she seizes the opportunity to start another
life. These heroes are there for the writer to express the strength of what lies
beyond the reality we know, the strength of what cannot be conceived. Or, as the
narrator explains: “They say that no one can choose the day of their death, but
perhaps there is a day where we can choose life” (“The Mistletoe Bride”, page
8). This often happens in Winterson’s novels: a revolutionary turn in someone’s
life that leads to a kind of rebirth, a new lease on life. 
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To make sure that the reader cannot mistake her intentions, Winterson
includes visionary scenes at the end of each of her novels, intended to emphasise
which ideas have been ‘victorious’ and which have been ‘defeated’. Another of
her strategies involves the insertion of philosophical passages that are not uttered
by any of the characters and do not fit into the narrative. These passages are
almost metafictional at times and, even though they are often unconnected
fragments, they serve as philosophical foundations for the novel. In
The.PowerBook, for instance, we come across the following passage: 
There is always the danger of automatic writing. The danger of writing
yourself towards an ending that need never be told. At a certain point the
story gathers momentum. It convinces itself, and does its best to
convince you, that the end in sight is the only possible outcome. There is
a fatefulness and a loss of control that are somehow comforting. This was
your script, but now it writes itself. Stop. Break the narrative. Refuse all
the stories that have been told so far (because that is what the momentum
really is), and try to tell the story differently – in a different style, with
different weights – and allow some air to those elements choked with
centuries of use, and give some substance to the floating world. (TPB 53)
These poetical opinions do not appear in the book just because one of the
characters in The.PowerBook is a writer. These insights are applicable to all of
Winterson’s fiction and are certainly part of Winterson’s personal poetics.
Breaking the narrative is the very essence of Art & Lies, and ‘refusing the stories
that have been written so far’ is one of the creative forces at work in Written on
the Body, embodied in the recurring phrase “It’s the clichés that cause the trouble”
(WOB 10; WOB 71). In passages such as these, Winterson is both priding herself
on the innovative strength of her writing and revealing her aims to establish a
sense of the unusual and the eccentric, or of the miraculous. 
At times, the metafictional remarks are echoed by characters later on in the
text, or even in other novels. This gives them a meaning beyond the temporal
parameters of a single narrative. In this way, certain ideas are allowed to gain
importance. It makes the reader aware that these ideas are not merely characters’
personal or local beliefs, but that, rather, these ideas are principles on which
Winterson’s work is founded. Principles such as freedom, for instance, as we can
see in The.PowerBook, where Ali explains the potential of cyberspace: “You can be
free just for one night” (TPB 4). This echoes the life style of the Twelve Dancing
Princesses in Sexing the Cherry, who fly to an enchanted city every night (cf. STC
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95). Escaping from the confines of everyday life is what guides many of
Winterson’s characters – Henri, who chooses to exchange a quiet rural life for
adventure in The Passion, Gabriel Angel, who leaves on a boat to start a new life
in England in Great Moments in Aviation, and Picasso, Sappho and Handel “each
fleeing a dead city” (AO 160) in Art & Lies. 
Absolutism is one of the ideas that Winterson wants to emasculate.
Already in an early work like Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, there is a discussion
between an absolutist (Elsie) and a relativist (Jeanette). By seeking to destabilise
the absolute, celebrating the unexpected and the unpredictable, Winterson,
through the characters she uses as her advocates, is continuously seeking to
“undermin[e] our usual way of seeing” (AO 54). Indeed, in Winterson’s novels,
what is absolute should always be regarded with suspicion. 
‘I admire her.’
‘You are an absolutist then.’
‘What’s one of those?’
‘All or nothing.’
‘What else is there?’
‘The middle ground. Ever been there?’
‘I’ve seen it on a map.’
‘You should take a trip.’ (TPB 40)
Some pieces of text are literally repeated in new books. The phrase “In a night,
200,000 years can pass, time moving only in our minds” from Sexing the Cherry
(STC 132) returns in The.PowerBook (TPB 60). The rest of the paragraph that
follows is also copied, but slightly altered. On other occasions, the same idea or
opinion is used in different books – when the idea of marriage is discussed, for
instance. In The.PowerBook we read: “Inside her marriage were too many clocks
and not enough time. Too much furniture and too little space” (TPB 39), a
sentiment that also occurs in a short story entitled “Newton”, describing a
community of conformity where one finds plastic flowers and synthetic animals:
“Why are they married? It’s normal, it’s nice. They do it the way they do
everything else in Newton. Tick-tock says the clock” (TWOP 171). In this way,
the author’s intentions seem to emanate from the body of her work. This also
occurs in the two passages below, where Winterson seems to put forward the
constructivist notion that the acquisition of knowledge of the world is bound up
with the individual existence of the subject. In Written on the Body, the narrator
explains how he/she knows Louise: “That is how I know you. You are what I
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know” (WOB 120). Five years later, in Gut Symmetries, one finds the same idea less
personally formulated: “We are what we know. We know what we are” (GS 18). 
Time and again, the tone of Winterson’s opinions is clearly distinguishable
through the layers of her fiction. Although she turned away from her religious
background, Winterson’s writings do display the didactic tone of the preacher
she once was. Throughout her literary career, Winterson has been guided by a
strong belief in principles such as the freedom of speech, the value of art, or the
anti-linearity and multi-dimensionality of reality, and she uses these principles as
the wire-frame around which she models her characters. 
In Winterson’s world, female values are predominant; the advocates of her
ideas are females rather than men. Although there are some masculine heroes,
Winterson’s unfavourable idea of men in general is unmistakeable in her fictions.
As Gary Krist signals: 
With a few exceptions, the males in the book (STC, AE) are depicted as
cruel, hypocritical and/or insensitive, as little more than obstacles in the
way of the self-realization of women. (Krist 1991) 
Geoffrey Lord writes: 
(...) the novel’s men are disappointing. [OAF, AE] Critics note that the
male characters appear either weak, like Jeanette’s father, who might as
well not be in the story at all, since he is usually kept out of the way, either
at work or watching sports; or they are made to seem ridiculous, like
Pastor Spratt. (Lord 1996:6) 
Only very few men are presented as sensitive and vulnerable. In an interview
with Xandra Schutte, Winterson says that perhaps men need women to provide
them with role models, because they keep hiding themselves behind their macho
images and hardly dare say that they live or feel differently (cf. Schutte 1992). 
With each addition to her oeuvre, the place of science in Winterson’s work
has become more and more prominent. At the beginning of her career as a
writer, in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985), references to science are only
scant. The novels that established her reputation as a dazzling storyteller, The
Passion and Sexing the Cherry, contain quite a number of observations about
modernity and its concepts of time and space. These novels question modern
science, yet without referring to specific theories (with the exception of the Flat
Earth Theory) or names of individual scientists. In Written on the Body, actual
scientific praxis makes its entry in the work in the form of quotes from anatomy
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books and by casting a physician as one of the main characters. This character
allows Winterson to speak out on topics like the validity of diagnosis and medical
intervention as well as medical ethics. Her next book, Art & Lies, stages yet
another physician, and severely criticises not only medical practice but also
contemporary mass media and technology. Art Objects, her collection of essays,
is equally critical of the notion of objectivity underlying the dialectics of science,
and denounces technology and a lot of other aspects of modernity as a whole,
like our capitalist economy, the notion of progress, consumerism, and so forth.
She then moves on to hardcore physics, in a novel where two theoretical
physicists put forward their worldviews based on quantum physics and the
theory of relativity (Gut Symmetries). The World and Other Places, her collection of
short stories (1998), a number of which appeared earlier in various journals,
again addresses the nature of time and space, without directly referring to
scientific theory or praxis. Her latest novel so far, The.PowerBook (2000),
celebrates the potential of highly developed communication technology. The
narrator’s rituals behind her personal computer, weaving a web of e-mail
correspondence, provide that novel’s organisational structure. 
When I started reading Jeanette Winterson’s work in 1995, her opinion of
science seemed quite antagonistic. But when I noticed that Winterson had
quoted some lines from prof. Bradley as an epigraph to Art & Lies, stating that
art conforms to laws, I was baffled. I was then writing my undergraduate thesis,
in which I was trying to explain that Jeanette Winterson was an art lover, an
absolute subjectivist, categorically criticising science and denying the existence of
any (natural) law. Interpreting Winterson’s use of this quotation was
problematic. Either Winterson’s opinions were inconsistent, or she had
overlooked the implications of what she was quoting. Neither of these two
options seemed right. I then started to realise that Winterson’s relationship to
science, and to nature, and to the idea of law, was more complex than I had
thought originally. I gradually began to see that Winterson’s disapproval of
science is not a categorical one. Her rejection of a rationally and technologically
conditioned modernity is akin to some of the Romantics’ rejection of the spirit
of the Enlightenment. Her search for an alternative world leaving behind
modernity can be seen as a Romantic strategy as well as a specifically postmodern
feminist aesthetics. At the same time, Winterson’s aestheticisation of the world
is an instrument for the emancipation of feminine values. Thus, Winterson
combines a historical sense of Romanticism with a feminist postmodernism,
enabling her to infuse a fragmentary worldview with the metaphysics of myth. 
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Winterson’s oeuvre has not yet been studied from within the perspective
of ‘science and literature’. Jeanette Winterson’s lesbian plots have stirred mainly
the interest of feminist academics – so far, her work has mainly been studied
within a feminist theoretical framework. Winterson’s work, however, deserves a
much wider theoretical approach than only the feminist one. A detailed study of
Winterson’s metaphysics, including her use of biblical references, or a study into
her sometimes irregular use of grammar may prove to be fruitful as well. As I
already suggested at the beginning of this Introduction, the discernment (or the
absence thereof) between ‘real’ and ‘invented’ is perhaps the ultimate theme in
Winterson’s work – her notion of the supernatural and her extreme passion for
language are two pendants of that issue. And the division between science and
literature is another. 
In this study, I have looked at Winterson’s treatment of science, and
placed it against the background of late twentieth-century thinking about the
relationship between literature and science. The way I have interpreted
Winterson’s work enables me to explain how different aspects of her worldview
– religious, feminist, scientific, political, technological, and poetical –
interconnect. I have not tried to perform a detailed search for biblical references
nor to extensively annotate Winterson’s textual borrowings from for instance
Romantic or Modernist poets. This study does not pretend to uncover the
intertextual references in Winterson’s work. Instead, I asked myself how a writer
like Winterson, who has often been likened to the magical-realists, contributes
and perhaps intervenes in debates shaped mainly by philosophers and scientists:
the famous (or infamous) ‘two cultures’ discussion, and the (later) so-called
‘Science Wars’. Strikingly enough, although Winterson’s fiction reflects the main
standpoints within the Science Wars, in the end she breaks out of this frame
through the visionary nature of her work. The fact that she chooses for an
emotional worldview without any solid ground or without any stable system,
proves that she, in the end, defends a literary worldview as opposed to a
philosophical or scientific one. Art can be ‘simply’ visionary and ‘just’ evocative;
it needs no ultimate explication of, or justification for, its ideas.
I
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SCIENCE AND LITERATURE
Anyone interested in the contrasts and synergies between the sciences
and the humanities should read Jeanette Winterson’s work. In what
follows I address the question what her writing could mean in a society
where we experience a constant tension between the sciences and the
humanities, not only in the academy but also in a broader cultural
setting. What perspectives does Winterson add to this conflict, and how
do her stories constitute a new position in the ‘two cultures’ discussion?
Before addressing these questions and interpreting Winterson’s work, I
will outline the approach chosen to do so. 
In this book, Winterson’s novels and short stories will be interpreted from within
the paradigm called ‘science and literature’. This paradigm rests on the insight
that the relationships between the disciplines and scholarly specialisms cannot be
characterised as merely hostile, but that various forms of creative interaction
occur as well, ranging from influence to symbiosis. At the same time, the
researchers inside this paradigm examine the concepts that shape the
relationships between the disciplines; they look at concepts such as beauty, truth
and fictionality. As this paradigm amounts to a wide perspective, involving many
discliplines and specialisms, we can find numerous fascinating fields of study
within the paradigm, varying from ‘sculpture and chaos theory’ and ‘genetics and
modern dance’ to ‘cybernetics and African weaving patterns’. In this chapter I
am providing a basic outline of positions inside the paradigm – positions that
illustrate the main issues at stake. In this outline, I have restricted myself to those
positions that entail issues relevant for my interpretation of Winterson’s literary
work. I have therefore only included those analysists and philosophers that
discuss the methodology of ‘science and literature’, and that occupy themselves
with certain branches of physics and medicine. Furthermore, I have
concentrated on the ideas formulated in the eighties and nineties of the twentieth
century – the time in which Winterson wrote her first cycle of novels.
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Tensions and Vistas
Transgressing disciplinary boundaries (...) [is] a subversive undertaking
since it is likely to violate the sanctuaries of accepted ways of perceiving.
Among the most fortified boundaries have been those between the
natural sciences and the humanities. (Greenberg 1990:1)
Western culture has been shaped by a tension between at least two subcultures:
the humanities on the one hand and the natural sciences and technology on the
other. However, in the intellectual history of the west, the study of nature was
not always opposed to the poetic. In Science and Poetry, John Neubauer describes
this premodern unity:
The Renaissance introduced conceptually and methodologically new
approaches to nature, but the wealth of nature-observations in the 14th
and 15th centuries became part of an eclectic worldview with largely
traditional concepts and authorities. (...) Renaissance science aimed at a
reading of nature’s signs in terms of a universal system of similitudes. Its
aim was to bring to light a system of resemblances in which words and
things carried the same weight of evidence. (...) The system of analogies
that linked the microcosm to the macrocosm, the humors of the body to
the four elements, and the Pythagorean cosmos to the harmony of the
faculties was incorporated in the great medieval encyclopedias, which
became a storehouse of poetry until the “breaking of the circle” (...).
(Neubauer 1993:1121)
This “circle” was broken in the seventeenth century, when the existing unity was
challenged by the kind of systematic, rational analysis of the universe that
gradually came to achieve the prestige it now enjoys. The eclectic philosophy
divided into a spirit of progressivist natural philosophy on the one hand and a
classicist aesthetics on the other (cf. Hankins 1985:8). At that point a tension
made itself felt – a tension that we still feel today. 
It cannot be denied that the development of rationalism has brought the
western world longevity and increased prosperity. At the same time, however,
this society has been confronted with new and severe problems that arise from
the growing influence of science and technology. All this time, writers, just like
sociologists, philosophers, politicians, journalists, filmmakers, artists and
musicians, have evaluated the role of science in our culture. Opinions differ
strongly. There are four main attitudes. We can distinguish those who are thrilled
by the new vistas opened up by science and technology. Think of the Futurists
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at the beginning of the twentieth century that celebrated the sounds and speed
of motorised transport; or consider how Edwin A. Abbott absorbed the
mathematics of his time and came up with strikingly early notions of spacetime
and the fourth dimension, in Flatland, A Romance of Many Dimensions. Some writers
have a more complex attitude. In White Noise, Don DeLillo subtly celebrates the
pervasive role of technology like radio, television, cash dispensers and
automobiles in contemporary American culture, while at the same time signalling
the psychological dependence on drugs and the terror of accidents in the
chemical industry. Some writers are very sceptical: Marguerite Duras, in
Hiroshima mon amour, contemplates the allied bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and critically examines the social effects of new military technology,
the atom bomb, and the nuclear age. Other writers, finally, assume an ignorant
attitude towards science. Whether they are silent, simply due to a lack of opinion,
or whether their attitude in fact embodies the strongest disapproval of science’s
presence, is hard to say. A question many people have raised, C.P. Snow most
famously among them, is whether science and literature have grown so apart that
they have developed into ‘two cultures’, without mutual resemblance or
influence. All in all, we can see that literary and philosophical contributions to
discussions about science and culture range from the outright celebration of new
theories, ideas, discoveries, techniques and artefacts to utter technophobia and
scepticism. 
Paradoxically, the very existence of artistic condemnations of science
demonstrates how literary and scientific developments are entwined within
culture as a whole. Even when an author criticises science, culture and science
jointly exist in the mind of the author and therefore in his texts. As George
Levine says: “science and literature are combined in the texture of individual
lives, (...) the ideologies of science help define at any given moment what
constitutes imagination, what lies beyond the margins of social acceptability”
(Levine 1987:27). For example, even though Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus
expresses the need for emotion and not the use of pure reason alone, it is
pioneering experiments with the phenomenon of electricity in Victorian
England that inspired Mary Shelley to write her novel. Victor Frankenstein and
his monster could not have been conceived if their creator had not been
acquainted with the state of natural philosophy at the time, or without at least a
faint awareness of the new phenomenon called ‘galvanism’. That Mary Shelley
was more than faintly aware of the proceedings of natural philosophy we know
from her autobiographical writings, testifying to her presence at discussions
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between Lord Byron and her husband Percy Shelley, who “talked of the
experiments of Dr. Darwin” (Shelley 1994:x). In addition, the choice of words in
Frankenstein reflects the emerging awareness of the presence of electricity inside
the human body. We see this, for instance, when the protagonist, dr.
Frankenstein, describes the way he worked in his laboratory to create his
monster: “I collected the instruments of life around me, that I might infuse a
spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at my feet” [Italics A.E.]. The phrase
“spark of being” reveals the narrator’s fascination with that appearance of ‘the
element of fire’ – electricity – in the generation of post-mortem movement of
the muscles. So this book, which eventually turns into a literary rejection of a
scientific and technological mentality, can at the same time be seen as a text
bridging the gap between the two cultures. Even in cases like this, science and
technology are not in the least sealed off from artistic creativity. 
Fictional appropriations and artistic reconfigurations of scientific material
not only evaluate the progress of science; they might even, when fed back into
the scientific community, contribute to scientific developments themselves,
namely as test cases for the formulation of hypotheses and thought experiments.
Fictional scenarios of possible scientific developments may shape the
imagination of scientists and pave the way for new questions, practices and
hypotheses. Science fiction, as we all know, rests on whole pillars of scientific
invention. However, science fiction is not just a realistic genre. Science fiction
would not be science fiction if it did not also come up with futuristic inventions.
For instance, Star Trek is realistic or mimetic in its use of the idea of black holes.
At the same time, Star Trek also came up with its own inventions such as ‘warp-
speed’ and ‘inertial dampers’ (Krauss 1995:3-9). The writers of this series have
tried to build a coherent story, with ingredients that have a logical unity. In doing
so, writers devise solutions to the problems posed by their narratives. A science
fiction writer, therefore, may explore questions at the forefront of astronomy
much more freely than astronomers can. Thus, fictional writers can co-
determine the direction in which science is heading. A striking example of how
advanced science fiction can be, is the discovery that Peter Tolstoy invented the
laser before the scientists did. He used an older description of a nearly forgotten
machine called the hyperboloid, to come up with a fictional machine that
produced an intensified sort of light much like laser. Scientists invented real laser
only much later. Such are Maria and Elena Kozyreva’s findings in their article
“H.G. Wells and A.K. Tolstoy” (Schenkel and Welz 1999). Another example of
possible progressive imagining in science fiction is Jurassic Park and its sequel The
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Lost World. Its writers explore the idea that the genetic information in the blood
of dinosaurs preserved in solidified amber could be reproduced in order to
revive these creatures in our present age. Who knows, this idea might exchange
its fictional status for a scientific one in the near future. 
Attitudes in the literary field (and also in the arts and the humanities in
general) towards science can be manifold. One specific kind of relationship is
that between precursor and follower, or initiator and imitator. In recent years,
researchers in the field of ‘science and literature’ have come to accept that
science and literature adopt these roles alternatively. It would be a very limited
perspective, therefore, to look upon the arts solely as science’s disciples.
Similarly, it is felt that developments in science never occur completely
autonomously either. In the sections below, I will provide an outline of these
theoretical points of view as they emerged in the field of ‘science and literature’
in the past decades. 
Two Cultures 
A phrase that keeps returning in public debates about disciplinary difference is
‘the two cultures’. Before looking at intersections between the sciences and the
humanities, it is useful to examine the history of their separation, and in
particular  twentieth-century disciplinarian defenses of the supposed existence of
a gap between the two cultures.
Disciplinarians believe that the knowledge produced in a certain specialist
field can only be understood from within that group and believe that this is at
the root of the estrangement between the ‘two cultures’. This phrase emerged
from C.P. Snow’s 1959 lecture “The Two Cultures and the Scientific
Revolution” (Snow 1998). Snow presented an antagonistic model of the
relationship between the two cultural domains in question. He said that there
exists “between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension, (...) hostility and
dislike, but most of all lack of understanding” (Snow 1998:4). He thought it
impossible that scientists on the one hand and artists and people working in the
humanities on the other could assimilate each other’s ideas: these two groups
held irreconcilable worldviews. He argued, furthermore, that incomprehension
leads towards hostility:
It is obvious that between the two, as one moves through intellectual
society from the physicists to the literary intellectuals, there are all kinds
of tones of feeling on the way. But I believe the pole of total
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incomprehension of science radiates its influence on all the rest. That
total incomprehension gives, much more pervasively than we realise,
living in it, an unscientific flavour to the whole ‘traditional’ culture, and
that unscientific flavour is often, much more than we admit, on the point
of turning anti-scientific. (Snow 1998:10-11)
But Snow was of the opinion that the widening gap between science and
literature was alarming. He believed that misunderstanding between scientists
and scholars in the humanities was a major handicap when trying to solve the
world’s problems. “The clashing point of two subjects, two disciplines, two
cultures – of two galaxies, so far as it goes – ought to produce creative chances”
(Snow 1998:16). Some thinkers, however, do not regret the existence of a gap
between the two “galaxies”. In today’s academic world, disciplinary rigour still
exists. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont’s attack upon the French theorists Jacques
Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Jean-François Lyotard and others, made it clear that
disciplinary austerity lives on (Sokal and Bricmont 1997):
Sokal and Bricmont draw out the many contortions and falsifications of
mathematical concepts made by Kristeva in the course of her article. (...)
The assembled intellectuals utilise proven and valued concepts from
natural science in a spurious way in order to prop up controversial
theories in the fields of sociology, literary criticism, linguistics, cultural
studies and a number of other disciplines. (Steinberg 2000)
Like Sokal and Bricmont, I.A. Richards believed that the sciences and the
humanities should not be reconciled. In his Poetries and Sciences, the 1970 re-
edition of his 1926 [1935] Science and Poetry – with some extra chapters – he
claimed that poetry had continued virtually unchanged during the whole of
human civilisation, whereas science had developed enormously. This view hardly
does justice to poetry – a form of knowledge with specific epistemological value.
Richards goes on to mention that Keats thought that the inevitable effect of the
advance of science would be the destruction of poetry. He argues that, in its use
of words, poetry is the reverse of science. Poetry tries to understand the structure
of experience. In poetic thinking very precise thoughts occur, but the poet picks
his words deliberately so as to include all kinds of meanings. The scientist would
rather exclude all meanings but one (Richards 1970:32). Richards thus complains
that the poet is not writing as a scientist. Richards believes in a gap between the
two cultures not only on the basis of their linguistic differences but also due to
the different fields they pay attention to. According to him, facts and their
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description and explanation should be left to the sciences (the intellectual
stream). The emotions are the domain of literature (the emotional stream).
Literary language and scientific language are very different from each other
because literary language lacks descriptive, referential and cognitive uses. Literary
language does not aim to utter truthful descriptions, but to contribute to the
reader’s emotions in that it is able to bring about a complex balance and harmony
between otherwise divergent and incompatible emotive reactions. Literature,
Richards feels, temporarily balances the otherwise chaotic flow of feelings. 
Richards’ position can be criticised in many different ways. I would like to
argue against his ideas about the relationship between world, cognition and
language using George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s widely appreciated book,
Metaphors We Live by (1980). This work uncovered the presence of a vast field of
metaphorical activity in the normal, everyday use of language. Lakoff and
Johnson focused on the fact that apart from the conscious, artistic use of
metaphors in poetry, people habitually use all kinds of metaphors without being
aware of it, and in very creative ways, too. Metaphor is thus not an exclusive
constituent of literary language. As Roald Hoffmann (Hoffmann 1995) and
Gillian Beer (Beer 1983) have shown, science uses metaphors too. Scientific
language and literary language are in many ways very similar, both working in the
same cognitive field. The language of science certainly appeals to many
emotions, and both poets and scientists are seeking for linguistic relations
between (true) knowledge and aesthetics. The Dutch poet Leo Vroman, for
instance, researches the cognitive interconnections between biochemistry and
poetic language (cf. Vroman 1976), while chemists like Roald Hoffman are
looking for the boundaries between truth and untruth in different linguistic
modes used to describe molecular structures (cf. Hoffman 1995). Science can
inspire literary authors, and vice versa.
Richards’ ideas may have become outdated, but similar ideas still mirror
the disciplinary organisation of many universities. It is a sensitivity towards these
old disciplinary structures, a sense of limitation, that accompanies the practice of
much ‘science and literature’ research. In interdisciplinary fields, people are
fighting the disciplinarian spirit that refuses to yield. The proponents of a total
separation are still strong, and among them figure educational institutions and
publishers. Not only ‘science and literature’ researchers make attempts at
reconciliation; New Age writers, too, reject disciplinarian separations and the
power these represent and reinforce. The Aquarian Conspiracy (Ferguson 1980), a
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book that proved to be one of the main catalysts of New Age movement,
contains a chapter on science, where it is said that:
The humanities-oriented sheep and the science-oriented goats are herded
into their respective pens; at many universities, the science and humanities
centers are blocks apart. Most students sidestep any science beyond the
minimum required hours; the science majors are funnelled into their
specialities, subspecialties, and microspecialties. By graduate school, they
can scarcely communicate with each other. (Ferguson 1980:146) 
Beyond this complaint about the present lack of communication and synthesis,
The Aquarian Conspiracy aims to build a bridge between science and what has
come to be seen as ‘other’ forms of knowing. New Age is deeply concerned with
science, because they are seeking to create a new cosmology and seek to ally
themselves with those who rule cosmology now – the scientists. A new religion,
they feel, should not be turning its back upon scientific theory but rather put to
good use the latter’s magnificent aura. Those who are seeking to “explore the
connections between science and spirituality” (Sheldrake and Fox 1997:12) at the
same time complain about the present incompatibility of science and a more
human quality: 
In thinking about the relation of God and nature, much depends on how
we conceive of nature. A change in our view of nature is currently coming
about through science. We are living through a major period of change in
science, a paradigm shift, from the idea of nature as inanimate and
mechanical to a new understanding of nature as organic and alive.
(Sheldrake and Fox 1997:13) 
It turns out there are two traditions or types of science that these New Age
thinkers are concerned with: they fight the mechanical tradition and embrace the
magical tradition in science. They combat the spirit of the Enlightenment which
was aimed at epistemological and physical control over nature through the
method of dissection, and welcome the magical spirit of the Renaissance and of
Romanticism which implies a unification of senses and spheres (cf. page 61). 
This brings us back to the contemporary defenders of ‘the two cultures’.
New Age only endorses the idea that there are two cultures when it speaks of
mechanicist and highly specialised science. New Age considers this type of
science as an estrangement from the human spirit (cf. Ferguson 1980). The new
physics, on the contrary, is taken up – not only by the New Age but also by
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philosophers of science (cf. Collini in Snow 1998) – as akin to the humanities and
their specific epistemology. Towards the end of the twentieth century, we see
New Age writers, literary authors and ‘science and literature’ researchers of all
kinds discover that both separation and unification, ‘two cultures’ and ‘one
culture’, exist simultaneously. Perhaps we can shed some light on this paradox
by regarding the late twentieth century as a door that opens towards another era:
we still feel the presence of two competing cultures, while we are heading for
unification.
Understanding Science
Do literary authors actually understand the scientific theories they refer to? This
question readily comes to mind when talking of the interest that literary authors
bring to bear upon scientific issues. Do they read scientific articles? Did they
receive an education in the branch of science they write about? Do they
understand mathematical formulas, diagrams, and models? If they do not, should
we question the legitimacy of their participation in cultural debates about the
development of science? Is it justified to vent scientific ideas in novels and
poems without a complete understanding of these ideas? This issue is still quite
controversial. 
First of all, this type of question is often based on several territorial
presuppositions: firstly, that thanks to their methodological rigour only
professional scientists can produce truthful knowledge of the world around us;
secondly, that the laboratory is a separate world, isolated from the cultural world
and that scientific knowledge can therefore be distinguished from fiction and
values; and thirdly, that the world of truth is only accessible through the
privileged doors of education.
Concerning the first presupposition it is interesting to look at sceptic
societies that exist all over the world, societies like the British Association for
Skeptical Inquiry (ASKE), the Society for Sensible Explanations in Seattle, the
Philadelphia Association for Critical Thinking, and so forth. Sceptical
organisations aim to critically examine assertions that are out of the ordinary.
They maintain that most claims are not based on solid evidence and that they will
prove to be untrue when tested. Sceptics focus on the border between science
and ‘pseudo-science’ and are proud to unmask impostors. They maintain that
strange phenomena can be explained logically, and are interested in the origins
of ill-founded beliefs. They strongly believe common sense is the best weapon
to combat dangerous fictions. The strength of their conviction results in a
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dismissive attitude that discourages anyone outside science to look at topics that
are thought to be the prerogative of scientists from a different perspective. The
first presupposition mentioned above, then, is a potent one: all around the world,
sceptics actively guard the boundaries between the disciplines. 
Bruno Latour convincingly undermines the second notion in We Have
Never Been Modern. The neat categorising of epistemic systems that characterises
and constitutes what he calls ‘the modern project’ is blown away in the twenty
minutes it takes to read our daily newspaper. In this small timespan we witness
the multiplication of all the realms of “science, politics, economy, law, religion,
technology, fiction” (Latour 1993:2). According to Latour, our contemporary
society is one big, buzzing confusion of mixed-up affairs. Still, he says, our
culture – like the newspaper – works with the appearance of categorical order
because people experience that order as peaceful. Academic activities are
separated into small specialisms and departments, and “analysts, thinkers,
journalists and decision-makers” (Latour 1993:2) split up society’s hybrid
mixture into neat compartments. 
The third notion has been examined by John Limon. He explains that one
of the differences between science and literature is a discrepancy between
discipline and professionalism. Scientists might object to ‘literary interference’
with their work by pointing out that anyone who wants to publish results
achieved in their discipline has to meet with the high standards set by
authoritative educational institutions. In literature, the quality of a publication is
to some extent guarded by editors and critics, but no one will ask a writer for his
or her qualifications and diplomas. The difference may be explained on the basis
of the degree in which each discourse appeals to a certain level of truth. Physics
explains the way in which the world is put together – which requires the highest
degree of intellectual capacity, while literature is looked upon as merely seeking
to enchant, thus making it less relevant to question the sources of their
knowledge. It is only when literature touches the highly esteemed and protected
realm of science that (the absence of) a scientific background becomes an issue. 
When writers deal with science – regardless whether they have had a
training in the particular scientific field or not – it is often assumed that they do
so because they have been enchanted by particular ideas in such a way that their
writings are influenced by it. We should be aware, however, that ‘influence’ is
only one of many possible relationships between science and literature. John
Limon also lists some other possible relationships between science and literature:
“symmetries, homologies, influences, antagonisms, skews” (Limon 1990: xii). 
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The key issue is, whether or not complete understanding of this kind of
material is indeed required. One might worry that science is misinterpreted,
misrepresented and used in inappropriate contexts, but in all probability, this will
not produce any adverse effects. In cases where the influence from science on a
text cannot be doubted, the material that literary authors write about has been
interpreted and taken out of its original context. The scientific ideas that these
writers are incorporating can no longer be confused with the science that
originally captured their imagination. As John Limon writes: 
But science is never absorbed by writers, it is always co-opted; it serves as
a source either of objective correlatives or of solutions to their own
dilemmas. (Limon 1990:24) 
and 
A writer with a personal, aesthetic, political, or religious problem is sure
to find at least one version of science that responds to it, serves as a straw
man for it, settles it, or, more likely, dignifies it, seems to give the dilemma
a philosophical point. (Limon 1990:25) 
But do appropriations, misreadings of science’s barren knowledge with the goal
to ‘fertilise’ it in a fictional setting, in any way dethrone the scientist? Is (mis-)
appropriation a blemish on the intellectual abilities of the literary author? Hardly
so. Yet this is the very reason literary authors are sometimes accused of
‘disciplinary trespassing into private property’. But why do we dread
misappropriation? Or, to get back to Latour’s point: is it not a denial of our
culture’s hybridity to keep on defending these borders and maintaining artificial
separations between disciplines? 
The Influence Model
(Mis-)appropriation presupposes influence, in this case a flow of ideas from
science to literature. The history of academic debate on this topic shows how the
notion of influence has been under attack for many years and indeed still is. I
would like to argue, however, that this notion is still a useful one. 
Theories developed in non-literary discourses, or in those discourses that
position themselves as the very opposite of literature (for instance: theoretical
physics), often influence literary writers. George Rousseau, in “Literature and
Science: The State of the Field” (Rousseau 1978), describes how academics
quarrelled over this principle in the nineteen-seventies, quarrels that mainly
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concerned methodology. One of the pioneers of ‘science and literature’, Marjorie
Hope Nicolson, implicitly started from the assumption that poets are simply
influenced by the intellectual vanguard of scientists, whose ideas they then either
beautifully render or strongly oppose. Nicolson’s work on science and literature
presupposes a one-way influence of science on literature. In Newton Demands the
Muse (Nicolson 1946), Nicolson traces Enlightenment and Romantic receptions
of Newton’s Opticks and shows that some poets, like Thomson, praised
Newton’s findings, while others, like Blake, damned Newton’s method. Implicit
in her description is the idea that literary authors are merely at the receiving end
of the relationship with the scientific discourse. 
Nicolson’s work did not escape criticism: Michel Foucault severely
attacked it in his L’archéologie du savoir (Foucault 1969). Her insights, he argued,
were based on too narrow a concept of influence. It assumed an influence in one
direction only: from science to literature. In this way, it subscribed to the main
claim of positivism: that science goes forth in its heroic search for truth,
autonomously generating concepts and theories, ungoverned by any ‘soft’
cultural influence, and that literature is always one step behind, adopting the
concepts and theories created by scientists. This is now called ‘the trickle-down
model’. It is regarded as underestimating the imaginative abilities of creative
writers and has not survived the critique of Michel Foucault, Thomas Kuhn and
others. We already saw how John Limon suggested a way out of this pitfall (the
difference between absorbing, or adopting, and co-opting). Later, I will describe
a comparable adjustment to the trickle-down model by Wolf Lepenies. 
Now, well into the third millennium, another phase in the development of
methodology in science and literature studies announces itself: the flourishing of
critical pluralism. Once the influence model lost ground, the field rapidly
diversified. All sorts of methodologies and philosophies sprang up. Traditional
literary historians, historians of science, philosophers of science, biographers,
structuralists, Marxists, Latourians, field theorists, people studying metaphor,
neo-Freudians, evolutionists, deconstructivists, cynics as well as enthusiasts
about cybernetics and information technology, ‘trekkies’ and other science
fiction addicts, and feminists of all kinds ventured into the field. In the article
mentioned before, George Rousseau argues that, due to the “uncontrolled”
diversification within the humanities, ‘science and literature’ will never become
an acknowledged field of research (Rousseau 1978:590). The reason for this, he
feels, is that the notion of influence still is the only valid way to study the
interconnections between science and literature, whereas everyone at the same
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time agrees that ‘influence’ is rightly dismissed by the structuralists on behalf of
its reductionist nature. Rousseau therefore considers this explosion of methods
as detrimental to the field (Rousseau 1978:588). 
Now, more than two decades later, in the field of science and literature
methodological pluralism is continuing strong. And the field is still very much
alive. It is easy to be very derogatory about ‘influence’, but the question is, must
we really do away with the entire notion of influence? Can we do without it? As
Lies Wesseling notes in her “Nosferatu: Over Literatuur, Wetenschap en
Historische Traditie” (Wesseling 1996) [Nosferatu: On Literature, Science and
Historical Tradition, A.E.], writings in science and literature studies often let out
a theoretical blare of trumpets against the influence model while at the same time
they continue to make use of it. Perhaps influence is simply one of the ways in
which science and literature are interacting and perhaps this explains the
impossibility of leaving behind this concept for good. 
There are ways to work around the reductionist nature of the model. More
refined revisions of the model have indeed emerged, revisions that prove to be
quite fruitful. Wolf Lepenies’ model of influence is one of these. In “Der
Wissenschaftler als Autor” (Lepenies 1978), “Transformation and Storage of
Scientific Traditions in Literature” (Lepenies 1983), and “Über den Krieg der
Wissenschaften und der Literatur” (Lepenies 1986), Lepenies conceives of the
interaction between different discourses as a traffic of ideas between separate
storehouses. He thinks that a description of interdisciplinary relations can best
be rendered through the concept of storage. In his theory of storage he uses
three categories: storehouses, floors and rooms. A storehouse represents a
collection of related disciplines, while a floor represents one scientific discipline,
one literary genre or one branch of art. A room stands for a specialism within a
discipline, genre or branch. 
Lepenies distinguishes three storehouses: the storehouse of science, the
storehouse of literature and the storehouse of art. The dynamic processes can be
ordered, first of all by distinguishing between inner-scientific storage and extra-
scientific storage: there are processes within one specific building (inner) and
processes in which more buildings are involved simultaneously (extra). Secondly,
we see intra-disciplinary and interdisciplinary storage. ‘Intra-disciplinary’ refers
to storage of ideas on one floor. An example of the transport of an idea between
two rooms on the same floor is the exchange of ideas about interpretation
between deconstructivists and hermeneutics. A transportation of the concept of
evolution from biology to social science, a movement of the notion of relativity
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from strange literary notions of time to the new physics, or simply the
transportation of terminology such as the word ‘quark’ from literary modernism
to quantum physics can be taken as examples of ‘interdisciplinary storage’.
To ensure a good understanding of the storage model, several remarks
must be made. To begin with, storage is always a three-part phenomenon. There
is a place of origin, a storage place and a new environment. Secondly, storage is
most likely combined with the transformation of the original concept. Thirdly,
the concept of storage is devised to describe and analyse relationships between
disciplines. Fourthly, remembrance and oblivion are part of the storage process.
Fifthly, storage, transformation and revival are most important for periods in
which disciplines are forced or inclined to remember, to recover or to invent
their disciplinary past.
In this way, Lepenies provides us with a way out of the trickle-down
model; he shows that scientific traditions can be stored and transformed in
literature and that they can be re-invoked into science. Literature thus not only
follows and receives; it also transforms and changes. So, the storehouse of
literature is considered to have its own historical development, to be able to
formulate a self-supporting historical problem-solving discourse, and to have a
profound influence on science in certain debates. This idea does not alter
Nicolson’s trickle-down model in a revolutionary way, but it does present
literature as an independent epistemic system.
Lepenies signals, however, that when scientific traditions are stored and
transformed in literature and subsequently re-invoked from the literary field into
science, this process gives science a bad reputation. For a nineteenth-century
scientist, the abandonment of literary discourse was a prerequisite to protect his
good reputation. For this reason, emerging disciplines such as sociology and
psychology rejected their literary past and imitated the disciplines of a ‘higher’
order, the natural sciences, to achieve academic respectability. Lepenies signals
that whenever literature is used as a storehouse from which to take ideas, the
scientific project is doomed to fail. He shows for instance that when Freud
refused to conceal the literary history of psychology, he was denied access to the
university. His theory of psychoanalysis did not get much academic respect at the
time, due to his refusal to claim (as experimental psychology did) that his work
belonged to the natural sciences. Although the storage of scientific ideas in
literature obviously has its handicaps, Lepenies pleads for a recognition of the
important role literature can play in scientific development: “It might be useful,
and not only for the sociological imagination, to remember a literary past for the
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better understanding of a sometimes illiterate present” (Lepenies 1983:63). So,
we see that Lepenies is able to use the concept of influence in a more refined
methodology. 
Be that as it may, Lepenies does not succeed in shaking off the
presupposition that “scientific problem-situations” are formulated by science
first, and subsequently find their way into literature. He may refine the model and
redirect the arrow of influence, but in his model too, literature never comes up
with anything really new. Can we find examples of literary authors who do
predict or even inspire scientific developments? John Tyndall certainly
appreciated the importance of the literary mind to science: 
It is thought by some that natural science has a deadening influence on
the imagination... But the experience of the last hour must, I think, have
convinced you, that the study of natural sciences goes hand in hand with
the culture of the imagination. Throughout the greater part of this
discourse we have been sustained by this faculty. We have been picturing
atoms and molecules and vibrations and waves which eye has never seen
nor ear heard, and which can only be discerned by the exercise of
imagination. (Tyndall 1865:60-61)
Likewise, Gillian Beer sees literary structures of thought – narrative
patterns, myths and metaphors – moving to and fro between the literary and the
scientific domain, “though not without frequent creative misprision” (Beer
1983:7). In Darwin’s Plots, Beer describes how scientists in the nineteenth century
drew openly upon literary, historical and philosophical material. She mentions
amongst others Lyell, who referred to Ovid’s Metamorphoses in his account of
proto-geology. She holds that in the nineteenth century, as opposed to today,
there was nothing hermetic or exclusive about the writings of scientists.
Scientists and non-scientists alike shared a literary, non-mathematical discourse;
they shared a common language with other educated readers. Nowadays,
scientific knowledge is presented as theoretical rather than discursive, and tends
to reach the wider public merely by processes of extrapolation and translation.
In the nineteenth century, Beer argues, scientists did not yet have the presentday
aura of a ‘priestly class,’ as opposed to the herd of common ‘laymen’. Beer
believes that the humanities influence science and vice versa. She mentions for
instance that evolutionary theory had particular implications for narrative and for
the composition of fiction. She argues that Darwinian theory “will not resolve to
a single significance nor yield a single pattern” (Beer 1983:9) and that it does not
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“allow either interruption or conclusion” (Beer 1983:11). These features, she
argues, seeped into a broader cultural discourse and triggered new forms of
narrative in literature and philosophy. 
Beer describes the two-way traffic in a very convincing way. In her second
chapter of Darwin’s Plots, “Fit and Misfitting: Antropomorphism and the Natural
Order”, she shows how Darwin used words and ideas that circulated in society,
for instance in the poems of the Romantics. Beer provides us with an example.
Wordsworth’s line “the external world is fitted to the mind” from “The
Prospectus”, she claims, expresses “notions of just proportions, exact
craftmanship, sexual harmony, [and] healthful mutuality.” Also, Beer argues,
“the vocabulary of biological science depended on unregarded metaphors drawn
from human tools and mechanisms.” According to Beer, Darwin’s Origin of
Species was a polemical book, designed to persuade and convince (Beer 1983:52),
and drew deliberately on metaphors of selective breeding, avoiding creationist
language (Ibid. 70). For the same purpose, Darwin chose to personify nature as
female, placing himself in Ovid’s tradition (Ibid. 71). Her historical analysis
shows how literary authors take up scientific problem-situations as the basis of
their literary work, and that scientific authors are immersed in cultural fields. It
is only sane to conclude that influence works both ways and that the flow of
ideas is too turbulent to speak of autonomous art or of autonomous science. An
example of a book that recognises this and embraces the notion of ‘influence’ is
J.A.V. Chapple’s Science and Literature in the Nineteenth Century, which is based not
only on the awareness that science functioned as an obvious source of
inspiration but also leaves room for the possibility that literary writers
“philosophically renew” scientific investigations (Chapple 1986:17). 
Influence studies sometimes are necessary to map the traffic, to complete
the picture. Many scholars have indeed done interesting and useful research on
specific authors having been influenced by twentieth-century physics (Rubino
1983); (Hayles 1984); (Pearce 1985); (Bohnenkamp 1989); (Porush 1990);
(Argyros 1990). Alexander Argyros, for instance, argues that
(...) deconstruction has extensively, if often implicitly, incorporated many
of the principles of modern physics and mathematics. Such ideas as
relativity, uncertainty, paradox, irony, undecidability, indeterminism,
virtuality, and retroactive causality have seeped into the culture and have
subsequently been adopted by the literary world, especially by the
modernist, deconstructive and postmodernist critical perspectives.
(Argyros 1990:34)
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Meanwhile it has become justifiable to map interdisciplinary influences, as
long as we bear in mind that the influence model is not the only viable model
that can be used. If we could make a blueprint of the processes of the emergence
and transportations of ideas within a particular period of time, we might see that
there can be clear cases of influence from science to literature, such as in Mary
Shelley’s case, of influence from literary to scientific texts as was the case when
for instance Milton’s “Paradise Lost” influenced Charles Darwin (cf. Beer
1983:34-36), and that there can at the same time also be cases in which similar
ideas emerge spontaneously and independently from each other in
geographically and disciplinarily remote texts (cf. Hayles 1987). The relationship
between the disciplines consists of all these processes taken together. I do feel,
however, that researchers should be encouraged to study the influence of
literature on science, because such a line of thought is seldomly pursued. 
Deconstructing Difference
An approach that radically breaks with the notions of two cultures and of
influence, is deconstructivism. Deconstructivism is a way of reading and
interpreting initiated by Jacques Derrida that aims to find and unravel concepts
that have served as axioms for intellectual movements, or as rules for thought.
Deconstructivism casts suspicion on any construct that presents itself as unified,
harmonious and overarching. Instead, it empasises difference, complexity, and
non-self-identity. A deconstructivist reading of a text, or a deconstructivist
interpretation of philosophy generally tries to show how a seemingly unitary idea
or concept (like ‘woman’ or ‘science’) contains different or opposing meanings
within itself (cf. Allison 1973:xxxii). An important aspect of Derrida’s reading
praxis is the attempt to displace traditional oppositions of speech and writing –
oppositions like ‘science/literature’ or ‘man/woman’. The history of the field of
‘science and literature’ shows that researchers have become increasingly
interested in deconstructing the opposition between the two cultures, which
culminated in the view that the two epistemic systems are fundamentally
identical. 
This conception of deconstructivism echoes Thomas Kuhn’s insight that
science and literature cannot be categorically separated on account of a rigid
distinction of fact versus value, objectivity versus subjectivity, or induction
versus intuition. It reaches full fruition in Paul Feyerabend’s Against Method
(Feyerabend 1979[1975]), and borrows from Michel Foucault the central notion
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of ‘episteme’ (épistème). But, as Catherine Goldstein asks in “Mathematics,
Writing and the Visual Arts” (Goldstein 1999), 
Why should we want to think that art and science, art and mathematics,
are the same? It might seem at first a paradoxical way of speaking,
because we have been for long accustomed on the one hand to perceive
them as distinct and on the other to conceive it our duty, our hope, our
dream, our task, to bring them closer together. (Goldstein 1999)
Similarly, in George Levine’s article “Why Science isn’t Literature: The
Importance of Differences” we encounter the following rhetorical questions:
“Does anyone really think science is literature? Do students in Physics 101 ever
think they are really in Freshman Comp., or Intro. to Lit?” (Levine 1991:365).
His earlier preface to One Culture (1987) aptly formulates an interesting task for
constructivist researchers in the field: if they believe in similarity, what, then,
constitutes their being different? 
And even if we accept now the view that it [science] is merely one of
many competing discourses, that it is no more grounded in a foundation
of reality that gives special authority to its language than the language of
literature, we need nevertheless to consider the nature of that discourse in
great deal, to understand the ways in which the “and” genuinely connects
science and literature, genuinely marks difference. (Levine 1987:24-25) 
And if science and literature cannot be distinguished on the basis of their truth
value, what differences is Levine thinking of? 
The advantage of thinking in epistemes (Foucault 1969) or paradigms
(Kuhn 1962) is that these concepts can help explain how literary authors can
come up with certain ideas without any direct influence from the scientific realm
at exactly the same time as, or even before, the emergence of similar or
comparable scientific ideas: because writers and scientists find themselves in the
same paradigm or episteme. Researchers working from the notions of paradigm
or episteme hold that science is not a special, privileged culture, but just one
among many contending narratives, representing reality largely in the same way
as literature does. All domains in which knowledge is construed produce fictions,
the fiction of the one domain not necessarily being any better than that produced
by another. The emphasis on constructivism produced some useful
methodological insights: to work in the field of science and literature does not
mean just to find out whether or not the author has thoroughly understood
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scientific theory (or whether the scientist absorbed his or her newspapers and
novels well enough), nor to trace all kinds of ‘borrowings’ back to their source,
but to reflect upon the ways in which literary writers develop ideas that are
similar to scientific ideas emerging in the same historical period. Constructivism
makes it possible to study the implications of subconscious intertextual practices
for the communication between different domains. All in all, the main effect of
deconstructivism in the field has been the erasure of the epistemological primacy
of the sciences, thus setting free the literary narrative from disciplinary
oppression.
Defining and Demarcating
The issue of constructing and deconstructing differences and boundaries
between the two cultures immediately calls for reflection upon how to define the
two categories. Defining the words ‘science’ and ‘literature’ is not easy, nor
without hazard. History shows that the definitions researchers give to these
terms reflect their personal philosophical standpoints. Matthew Arnold gives an
expansive definition of literature: “All knowledge that reaches us through books
is literature” (Arnold 1882). Northrop Frye’s definition is more restrictive. For
Frye, literature is everything that has been written in the language of the
imagination, i.e. by means of associative language – figures of speech like
metaphor and simile (cf. Frye 1964:38). This position in fact resembles Richards’
in Poetries and Sciences (Richards 1970). At first much energy went into the
definition of boundaries between science and literature, and thus in enumerating
reasons why literature is not science and vice versa. The traditional positivist
attitude results in the following oppositions: literature was thought to be
subjective, contextual, emotive, imaginative, and fictional; whereas science ought
to be objective, specialised, rational, factual, and truthful. Mary Hesse describes
the assumptions that underlie the traditional conception of science as follows:
There is an external world which can in principle be exhaustively
described in scientific language. The scientist, as both observer and
language-user, can capture the external facts of the world in propositions
that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not.
Science is ideally a linguistic system in which true propositions are in one-
to-one relation to facts, including facts that are not directly observed
because they involve hidden entities or properties, or past events or far
distant events. These hidden events are described in theories, and theories
can be inferred from observation, that is, the hidden explanatory
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mechanism of the world can be discovered from what is open to
observation. Man as scientist is regarded as standing apart from the world
and able to experiment and theorize about it objectively and
dispassionately. (Hesse as quoted in Levine 1987:15-16)
By analogy, we can construe a similar, though oppositional, definition of
literature. The traditional conception of literature would then be that the poet
describes ideas, feelings, dreams, hallucinations, fictions, and idiosyncratic
experiences in poetic language. The author, as an extremely sensitive person,
writes about these experiences in words that exploit ambiguous structures of
meaning. The texts he or she produces cannot be true since they are the utterly
personal expression of utterly personal experiences. The author cannot be
separated from the things he perceives in the world, since he or she is
emotionally involved in the subject.
It was Thomas Kuhn who first denied these differences. In his The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962), and later in The Essential Tension (Kuhn 1977),
he denies that science proceeds by ever more accurate descriptions of the world
external to the observer. If there are differences between science and literature
at all, they cannot be found in oppositions such as objectivity versus subjectivity,
imagination versus observation, or fiction versus fact. Since 1960, researchers
exploring the relationship between science and the humanities have agreed that
this relationship is not one of cognitive difference, as the above enumeration of
differences would seem to indicate. On the contrary, they point to affinities and
similarities. Contrary to Snow’s belief in a huge gap dividing both cultures, or
Richard’s belief that poetry uses vague ideas while science sticks to precise
descriptions, such scholars uphold the view that not only literature but also
science function within culture at large, and that both are therefore for the
greater part the result of parameters shaping culture as a whole. At the same time,
scientific and literary language are equally rhetorical and metaphorical. Under the
influence of Kuhn, the traditional positivist separation of science and literature
has come under revision. 
In “The Order of Discourse” (reprinted in Rice and Waugh 1996:239-
251), Michel Foucault argues that in every society there exist mechanisms of
control over the production of discourse. In western society, this control is
exerted by means of three procedures of exclusion. First of all, there is prohibition:
whether or not we are free to discuss a topic is determined by taboos, exclusive
rights with regard to who can discuss the particular subject in question, and rules
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of conduct. Especially in the fields of sexuality and politics prohibition is
dominant. The second procedure of exclusion involves the opposition between
reason and madness. Since the Middle Ages, the madman’s word has been
considered “null and void, having neither truth nor importance, worthless as
evidence in law” (Foucault in Rice and Waugh, 1996:240). [His words] “were
never recorded or listened to. No doctor before the end of the eighteenth
century had ever thought of finding out what was said” (Foucault in Rice and
Waugh 1996:240). 
The relation between science and art reflects this opposition: science
institutionalised itself as the exclusive domain of rational analysis and rational
language. Art remained the domain of fiction, untruth, lies, nonsense and even
madness. Many artists, with Vincent van Gogh and Friedrich Nietzsche as
outstanding examples, were thought of as psychiatric cases. 
Thirdly, Foucault holds that the opposition between true and false should be
regarded as a mechanism of exclusion as well. He argues that the will to truth is
rooted in institutional structures and that it exerts a power over other discourses.
As a consequence, other discourses, such as literature and law, have tried for
centuries to assume a mode of rationality to avoid exclusion. The will to truth is
a machinery designed to exclude, a machinery hidden by what it produces, by
what we perceive to be reality: an image of ‘truth’ that was only questioned by
some. 
Foucault names many other procedures that control and delimit discourse.
For instance, in every society there is a constantly shifting hierarchy of narratives:
there are those that vanish as soon as they have been pronounced, and there are
those that have recurrent ritual functions. Foucault works towards the idea that
the discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse. The
discipline fixes limits for discourse and formulates rules to preserve its identity.
Another example is the rule upheld in many discourses that no one is allowed to
enter the order of the discourse if he or she does not meet certain requirements,
or if he or she is not qualified to do so. Science, education, literature, medicine,
and the judiciary system all involve ritualisations of speech, qualifications and the
fixing of roles for speaking subjects, the institution of doctrinal groups, and
systems of subjection of and by discourse. Foucault contributes to the upheaval
of epistemological hierarchy between science and literature. He dismantles
science’s claims to objectivity and stresses similarities between the two cultures.
To him, science proceeds by means of rules and procedures, just like any other
system, including the literary system. 
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Kuhn and Foucault gave birth to constructivism. This theory maintains
that in science, what is regarded as a fact is actually determined in the light of a
theoretical interpretation, i.e. facts are dependent on the theoretical framework
of which they are a part. In science, theories are not models that match nature
objectively. Rather, they are ways of seeing facts. Theories are not adequate
reconstructions of nature but the glasses through which we look at nature.
Furthermore, the language used by science is of necessity metaphorical and
inexact. Science is determined by cultural developments. Its language is
therefore, just like literary language, intrinsic to the linguistic practice of the
paradigm. Finally, in science meanings are determined by the governing theory;
meanings are understood because certain theories cohere rather than because
they correspond with facts (cf. Levine 1987:16).
After Kuhn, the field of science and literature studies for a while was
mainly preoccupied with the search for similarities between science and
literature. Dennis Bohnenkamp, for instance, thinks that: 
theories of physicists and literary fictions have much in common. Both
posit hypothetical worlds. Both are judged at times by their degree of
verisimilitude to what we regard as the real world. Some scientific
hypotheses are valued to the degree that they can be verified, while
fictions are frequently valued to the extent that they conform to a reader’s
experience of what is real. Both literary and scientific fictions can be
esthetically pleasing; both can be disturbing. Much modern fiction is anti-
realist as is much modern science [the new sciences, A.E.]. Both describe
worlds that often defy the logic of common sense. Modern literature is
often nothing like life, and quantum mechanics tells us that life, the
universe, reality are nothing like we think they are. (Bohnenkamp
1989:20)
As Valerie Greenberg puts it:
The questions scientists ask and choose to pursue are no less products of
a cultural context than those with which artists choose to deal. The terms
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ have been re-examined, and we are learning to
deal once again (as in earlier centuries) with science as one of many
coequal discourses. (Greenberg 1989:49) 
In the phase of ‘science and literature’ research described above, the search for
differences and definitions seemed to have become irrelevant. Still, abandoning
the epistemic hierarchy between the two cultures does not imply that the two are
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identical. At this point, scholars such as Levine and Goldstein are trying to grasp
the best of both worlds, refusing to make science and literature coincide totally,
but also to refusing to distinguish them on epistemological grounds (cf. page 18).
The distinction is no longer sought along epistemological lines, but rather with
an eye to institutional and historical differences. 
Pragmatic definitions of science and literature seem to offer the healthiest
alternatives. Science will then be defined by practical, perhaps contingent
characteristics, for instance as a type of knowledge based on the gathering of
information with the aid of measurement instruments, as a praxis taking place in
a laboratory or as a praxis in which the practitioners are trained to build up a
stock of fact on the basis of a belief in the relative trustworthiness of
measurement and the use of calculation. Scientists generally believe they work on
the falsification of a theory. Literature would then be all writing that is staged as
fictional. Literature is published by specific publishers and can be found in the
bookstore under the heading ‘literature’, ‘fiction’, or ‘poetry’. Literature is the
content of a syllabus on literature, or the content of a literary journal. If one puts
a text on neurology such as Oliver Sacks’ The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat,
or on biology like Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, in the literary section,
they become literary texts. Texts can therefore be scientific and literary at the
same time. Some texts are more likely to end up in more than one category than
others. Psychological texts, for instance, often appear to be disciplinarily hybrid. 
A great number of books and articles aims to show the existence of
similarities between science and literature. To look for instances in which science
and literature run parallel, show analogies, consonances or correlations, does in
fact mean that a belief in fixed categorical definitions of ‘science’ and ‘literature’
no longer exists in the field concerned. People want to investigate their interplay
– and so the question of boundary is fading. One of the theorists responsible for
shaping this type of research is N. Katherine Hayles. She explored the usefulness
of concepts like the ‘field’ and the ‘feedback cycle’. Writings by Greenberg,
Bohnenkamp, Carl Rubino (Rubino 1983), James Curtis (Curtis 1983), and
Richard Pearce (Pearce 1987) belong, with Hayles’, in the constructivist camp.
They all presuppose that science and literature are related activities, embedded in
over-all cultural development. Their models are theoretically related to the works
of Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault. As mentioned on page 18, they argue
that in the history of art and science certain paradigms or epistemes can be
found, and that within any such framework, the arts and the sciences are actually
working on the same kind of problems.
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Between 1984 and 1991, Hayles wrote three books in which she developed
several models for the description of the relation between science and literature.
In The Cosmic Web (Hayles 1984), Hayles designs and applies a model that refines
the influence model by introducing the notion of the ‘field’ or ‘cosmic web’: 
One of the many ideas that the field view revises is the notion of a one-
way chain of reaction between the event labeled as the cause and that
labeled the effect. Although I spoke earlier of the influence of the field
view on modern literature, I do not mean to imply that the literature I
discuss is caused by scientific field models. Rather, the literature is an
imaginative response to complexities and ambiguities that are implicit in
the models but that are often not explicitly recognized. Thus a
comprehensive picture of the field concept is more likely to emerge from
the literature and from science viewed together than from either one
alone. In this sense literature is as much an influence on the scientific
models as the models are on literature, for both affect our understanding
of what the field concept means in its totality. (Hayles 1984:10)
Hayles believes that isomorphic characteristics can be discovered in various
discourses since science and literature are both essentially involved in culture as
a whole. Certain common characteristics can therefore be found in domains that
appear to be quite dissimilar. Hayles singles out ‘the field concept’ as the
structure shaping the revolution she believes we are witnessing. She examines its
various manifestations in the models of physics and mathematics, the theories of
the philosophy of science and linguistics, and the structure and strategies of
literary texts. The field concept is construed from features from various
isomorphic models, features that Hayles believes to be characteristic of
twentieth-century thinking in general. 
Most essential to the field concept is the notion that things are
interconnected. The field view of reality pictures events and objects as belonging
inextricably to the same field. The state of one thing within the field is changed
by a change in the state of another thing. Things, people, events and language are
inseparable; the world, science, and literature are functioning as one seamless
web. 
In the first chapter of The Cosmic Web, Hayles reviews the theories of a
number of twentieth-century mathematicians and physicists: Gödel, Heisenberg,
and Bohr. In the rest of the book, she demonstrates how similar ideas surface in
the work of authors such as Pirsig, Lawrence, Nabokov, Borges and Pynchon. It
is evident that she is not interested in the question whether these authors were
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actually acquainted with developments in physics. She maintains that the
independent appearance of the same idea in different disciplines proves that
developments in the field are intricately wired up with movements within
disciplines. In this way, she avoids Nicolson’s pitfall of one-way causality.
In Chaos Bound (1990), Hayles has left quantum physics and relativity
theory behind. These theories originated in the first half of the twentieth century.
Chaos theory emerged in the second half of the century: “the paradigm of
orderly disorder may well prove to be as important to the second half of the
century as the field concept was to the first half” (Hayles 1990:xiii). Chaos Bound
considers the relationship between disciplines engaging in chaos theory
(nonlinear dynamics, irreversible thermodynamics, meteorology, and
epidemiology) on the one hand and literature on the other. Chaos theory deals
with the question whether or not one can make valid long-term predictions
about the behaviour of complex nonlinear systems. In physics the complete
connection between cause and effect in nature has been upheld for centuries.
Until quite recently, one of the cornerstones of scientists’ belief in progress was
the philosophy of determinism. This philosophy assumes that, so long as one
knows the initial conditions, it is possible to make accurate long-term predictions
of physical systems. This led to scientific hubris – after all, soon, all conditions
of our physical systems would be known and man would be able to predict and
control the future. But chaos theory shows that the relationship between cause
and effect is much more complex than was assumed – so complex that physical
systems are inherently unpredictable. Together with the awareness of the
uncertainty of measurement (quantum mechanics), this leads to the assumption
that there must be dynamic instabilities inside every system. At the same time,
chaos theory holds that these small scale instabilities can give rise to large scale
ordered structures. These theories are also relevant to ‘science and literature
studies’. According to Katherine Hayles, concepts of chaotics do not merely
exist in physical systems, but also in intellectual systems or fields. The use of a
single word in a novel could have great effects on the development of physics,
for instance. The model Hayles employs in Chaos Bound is actually quite similar
to the one she proposes in The Cosmic Web, but Chaos Bound provides more
concrete images that explain how the field is shaped, as the following quotations
show: 
Especially notable is the increased emphasis in Chaos Bound on locating
science and literature within contemporary culture. The recurrent image
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[and this is new, A.E.] I used to explain the complex interconnections of
theory, technology, and culture is a feedback loop. (Hayles 1990:xiii)
Thus the feedback cycle connected theory with culture and culture with
theory through the medium of technology. Literary texts and theories
were also involved in this cycle, for they too were affected by technology
at the same time that they were affecting it. It should be no surprise, then,
that many of the presuppositions that underlie the literary texts are also
embedded within the scientific models and theories of the period. (Hayles
1990:xiv)
In Chaos and Order; Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science (1991), the emphasis
shifts from the idea of ‘one culture’ towards the structure of the feedback loop
itself. Also, the subtitle of the book suggests that the model is assuming the form
of a very energetic, turbulent movement: 
The question of how such isomorphisms arise is not easily answered. Let
me say at the outset, however, that I do not assume they are the result of
direct influence between one site and another. In particular, I am not
arguing that the science of chaos is the originary site from which chaotics
emanates into the culture. Rather, both the literary and the scientific
manifestations of chaotics are involved in feedback loops with the culture.
They help to create the context that energizes the questions they ask; at
the same time, they also ask questions energized by the context. (Hayles
1991:7)
Just like Katherine Hayles, George Levine believes that “developments in
science are closely related to developments in the culture at large” (Levine
1987:24). In this sense, he advocates the study of similarities between science and
literature. But he also wants to draw attention to their differences. Levine’s main
point in his introduction to One Culture is that the emergence of a new view of
science, originating from the transition from realism to constructivism,
encourages a richer and more complex reading of interchanges between
discourses. “It is obvious”, Levine says, “how this kind of analysis
[constructivist, anti-realist, A.E.] moves into the literary fold, particularly because
of some significant effects” such as the idea that the separation of subject and
object – of observer and observed – is no longer valid. The observer cannot
comment on the world objectively and dispassionately. Secondly, the observed
world is infused with the consciousness of the observer and the constraints of
that observer’s culture. Thirdly, science’s claim to authority over fact is
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undermined through the destruction of the correspondence theory of truth.
Science, just like poetry and fiction, achieves its status through internal
coherence rather than because of any supposed correspondence to external
reality. Fourthly, science does not involve a systematic and cumulative process
of increasing knowledge, but rather engages the creative imagination. Finally,
scientific language, just like literary language, is essentially metaphorical.
There are many more researchers who look for isomorphisms rather than
differences. David Porush carries this position to its extreme. Though they are
both published in the same volume of Modern Language Studies, David Porush’s
article “Eudoxical Discourse” (1990) and Alexander Argyros’ “Deconstruction,
Quantum Uncertainty, and the Place of Literature” form a great contrast.
Whereas Argyros thinks that science develops notions such as indeterminacy and
evolution, and that literature and criticism follow science’s lead, Porush believes
that we are now living in a post-postmodern time, and within a new paradigm that
he labels “Eudoxical discourse” – named after Italo Calvino’s “Eudoxia”, a city
where the world itself, human knowledge, fiction and metaphor are woven into
a carpet – a single representational and self-reflexive epistemological method.
Porush explains that, from a neurological point of view, 
even the basic operations of the mind are not mechanical but
metaphorical. Our goal is to go even further in this direction, to follow
the route it implies to an entire epistemology based in metaphor, a
Eudoxical discourse which assumes that the best empirical model we have
of any phenomenon is metaphor itself. That is, in effect metaphor
constitutes an alternative system of knowing, rivalling and surpassing the
formal-logical discourse of science as it is presently constituted. (Porush
1990:50) 
Attempts to reduce metaphor to formal, mathematical description have failed,
according to Porush. According to him, the most potent discourses are not
logical but metaphorical. This is an axiom of Eudoxical discourse.
Then he suggests something that I cannot completely agree with, namely
that “the natural sciences have rid themselves of a conception of objective reality
that implied that novelty and diversity had to be denied in the name of
innumerable universal laws”. To my mind, the natural sciences are not doing
away with the existence of objective reality nor with their realist aims (to predict,
to cure, to map) at all – they merely refuse to make ‘grand’ philosophical claims
about reality and stick to explanations at a mathematical level. However, Porush
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continues with an observation I can relate with: that the new physics has
abandoned classical physics’ traditional stance, involving the denial of instability
and locality, notions that literature has always upheld. So, literature can 
(...) lay claim to superior epistemological potency or at least to (...) the
veracity of hyper-evolved discourse which reflects the time-bound,
fluctuant, unstable growth of human activity and imaginings. (Porush
1990:55) 
Thus, physics now incorporates aspects of reality such as the personal
point of view, interpretation, the unconscious, and metaphoric creativity, that
long since have been put forward by literature. This is another characteristic of
Eudoxical discourse: statistical thermodynamics and chaos theory demonstrate
that the personal and creative aspects of human discourse are not necessarily
antagonists of the reality that scientists aim to describe. Science and literature are
now both seen to express the irrational. Eudoxical discourse is self-reflexive,
demonstrating and exemplifying its own principle, which means that metaphor
is simultaneously a discursive and an epistemological method. In Porush’s
Eudoxical discourse, metaphors and deterministic formalisms become
indistinguishable twins, or at least collaborators in the undetermined, complex
and fertile process of describing our experience of reality. 
In this way, David Porush attempts to show that the idea of the two
cultures is steadily dissolving, and that the two cultures will be inextricably united
in a new paradigm called “Eudoxical discourse”. However, in the nineties, the
Sokal Affair made clear that scientists are not ready to accept such
interdisciplinary cross-breeding. 
The Sokal Affair
The so-called Sokal Affair of 1996 and 1997 illustrates science’s reluctance to
accept anything like Porush’s Eudoxical discourse. The physicist Alan Sokal
wrote an article about the symbiosis of ideas in modern physics and postmodern
philosophy, entitled “Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity” (Sokal 1996). This article was deliberately
larded with overly blunt conclusions and all-too-radical statements. Sokal
submitted the article to Social Text, and it was accepted for publication. Later, in
a short essay called “A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies”, Sokal
argued that it was ludicrous that such a bad article had been accepted by the
editors of a journal of such stature. The article should never have been published,
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he opined, but the clever use it made of the established terminology of science
and literature studies, as well as the fact that it “flattered the editor’s ideological
preconceptions” (Sokal 1997:1), made the editors of Social Text overlook its
stupidities. The editors in question defended themselves by saying they asked
Sokal to revise certain paragraphs and later excused his bluntness because he
supposedly was not used to certain ways of writing in the humanities.
Sokal maintains that it was his aim to show what happens only too often
in recent vogues within the humanities: the proliferation of nonsense and sloppy
thinking, i.e. a way of thinking that denies the existence of objective realities, or
admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. However, we can
also consider his deed as a defense against science studies’ interference with
science. Sokal clearly has a problem with people who interpret scientific texts in
a way that fits their political and social agenda. But if quantum mechanics can be
used in a work of art or in a political manifesto – why not use it? I would like to
argue for a certain interpretive flexibility. To a scientist, quantum mechanics might
not raise philosophical questions at all; but what is the problem if researchers in
science and literature studies see isomorphisms between specific scientific ideas
and some philosophical ideas? Likewise, if a literary writer thinks that Einstein’s
General Relativity Theory boils down to the insight that there are no objective
values, he or she would not be respected in physics. But the question is, whether
that is at all necessary or desirable in literary studies. In a public letter he wrote
about the subject, Levine says that what Sokal’s hoax reveals is his anxiety as a
scientist about his own empire of knowledge (Levine 1997). Sokal must fear the
fact that the boundaries between these two heavily defended disciplines now
begin to become blurred by interdisciplinary studies.
Jeanette Winterson, Science and Literature
How do the ideas about science and literature discussed above relate to the work
of Jeanette Winterson? Anyone familiar with her writings must have recognised
the anger towards the sciences they exude. Even so, readers will also recognise
that Winterson aims to eventually erase the boundaries between science and
literature. Her work suggests that magic, fairy tales, and science are merely
different aspects of a single epistemology. Winterson’s world dismantles
disciplinary categories and therefore breathes a deconstructivist position. The
deconstructivist model will prove to be a valid context within which to analyse
the function of scientific theories in Winterson’s stories, or her utopian and
dystopian images bristling with both scientific and literary metaphors. However,
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we will see that, although her work suggests that poets and scientists work on
one and the same project, Winterson is not a full-blown deconstructivist.
Deconstructivism entails a critique of binary concepts, that always involve a
superior and an inferior concept. The actual deconstruction is effected in two
stages: first, the hierarchy (in Winterson’s case: male/female; science/literature;
fact/fiction) must be inverted, so that the inferior concept will become the
privileged one. Only then can one begin to conceive a conceptual domain that
lies outside these oppositions. We will see that Winterson never fully reaches this
second stage: her work only tentatively explores this new, post-hierarchical
domain.
With this in mind, it is easier to understand that both the notion of ‘two
cultures’ and the notion of ‘one culture’ figure in Jeanette Winterson’s novels. In
her fiction, the polarity of the two cultures continues to be emphasised, while at
the same time an interpretation of the new sciences promises the emergence of
‘one culture’. 
From Jeanette Winterson’s earliest publications onwards, traces of
relativity theory and quantum mechanics have found their way into her fiction.
Winterson appropriates these scientific ideas and transforms them in order to fit
them to her own artistic, religious and political vision. Winterson is undoubtedly
a receptor of popularised science. This study therefore partly rests on the
influence and appropriation model. She reads newspapers and follows new
developments in the field of science. She incorporates scientific ideas, phrases
and theories into the literary realm. Yet, she incorporates them in a way that
transcends disciplinary thinking. She discards all distinctions between true and
false, fact and fiction, and displays a firm belief that scientific ideas – in fact all
ideas – belong to the same amalgamous world of ideas. In her eyes, there is no
hierarchical order as to the purity or the truth-value of ideas, no separating
artistic from scientific ideas.
 It is obvious that a mere study of Winterson’s (ab-)use of science is a
limited project. I do not deny that influence also flows from literature to science.
However, such a study can not be done right now. Once the parallels between
contemporary writers and the scientific field have become more clear, and the
scientific field has moved on, we will be able to see the effects that Winterson’s
writing - and the writing of others - may have had. Only then can it be established
whether, and if so how, contemporary literary ideas have had an effect upon the
development of science. 
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Following Alan Sokal’s reaction against philosophers ‘tampering’ with
science, it would be very interesting to see how physicists or physicians would
respond to literary appropriations of ‘their knowledge’. So far, I have not found
any publications by scientists expressing the (un)desirability of Winterson’s
appropriation and interpretation of the new physics, even though the occasional
literary critic does find Winterson’s use of scientific language disturbing from a
stylistic point of view (Barnacle, 1997). Perhaps literary writers are not such a
threat to the castle of science, as their work is regarded as ‘mere’ fiction. But
Sokal’s work and that of the aforementioned sceptic societies certainly are the
embodiments of the hostile ghost that Winterson challenges. 
Winterson’s feelings towards science vary considerably. Although a fusion
of science and literature eventually does come about in Winterson’s novels, it is
a marriage on her terms. Whereas she seems to argue that neither the literary nor
the scientific can lay claim to superiority (as being more truthful, objective, or
universal), she also voices the idea that the artistic domain has suffered from
science’s pretensions of superiority. Looking at the co-existence in Winterson’s
work of a critical evaluation of scientific practice and a condemnation of the
attitude of scientists towards literary and philosophical discourses, we become
aware that the notions of field and influence do not suffice to explain all the
complications of Winterson’s view. In Winterson’s novels we recognise the
frustration of a writer who feels her work will not be taken seriously because it
belongs to the realm of literary tradition, a tradition that always has had to cope
with an inferior cognitive status. In her books, science’s exclusive strategies are
experienced as an injustice. Therefore, we also want to keep an eye on Foucault’s
poststructuralist model that both posits the idea of the common episteme and
provides an explanation for the antagonist feelings that surround science and
literature. 
Winterson’s grudge is directed against the idea that scientific knowledge is
considered to be important, life-saving, and serious, whereas literature is
regarded as a marginal activity meant to ward off the boredom of a leisurely
Sunday afternoon. She ironically says:
If, in the comfortable West, we have chosen to treat such energies
[passionate artistic experience, A.E.] with scepticism and contempt, then
so much the worse for us. Art is not a little bit of evolution that late-
twentieth-century city dwellers can safely do without. Strictly, art does not
belong to our evolutionary pattern at all. It has no biological necessity.
(AO 20)
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The frustration that Winterson expresses here can well be explained in the light
of Michel Foucault’s theory of the dominance of science over literature as
explained above (cf. page 20). The relevance of Foucault’s theory to Winterson’s
work is evident, as the power structures between discourses form a recurring
theme in Winterson’s writing. She knowingly violates the disciplinary order by
appropriating scientific texts into her own – literary – discourse. This means to
transport islands of truth into the sea of untruth, to equal reason with madness.
In Foucault’s terms, she can be considered as one of those people that dodge the
will to truth. At the same time, she detests scientific discourse for always having
excluded the literary from the stage where texts became audible, influential, and
powerful. She bears a grudge against science’s strong intellectual protectionism.
This is a grudge with a long history, as John Limon convincingly
demonstrates in The Place of Fiction in the Time of Science (Limon 1990). His
approach to the relationship between science and literature is unlike any other in
the field. He disapproves of Foucault’s idea that contemporaneous intellectual
domains are merely linked together by a common episteme because it cannot
explain why disciplinary antagonism is still widespread. He also dislikes activities
that blur the boundaries between the two, such as rhetorical analyses of scientific
texts. Naïve studies of influence, like those performed by Nicolson, do not find
favour with him either. He does not share the belief that scientific ideas could
move through different disciplines and remain unchanged. Nor can he accept
literature as ‘art for art’s sake’. Limon resists the autonomy idea by pointing out
that literature, unlike other disciplines, has not gone through any process of
professionalisation. Literature, ‘the most undisciplined of all disciplines’, has no
fortified boundaries in the form of educational demands, and is therefore open
to many outside influences. In literature any topic can be discussed – also
scientific issues. It hardly needs pointing out that Winterson agrees with Limon.
She joins and crosses disciplines, disregarding all protectionism. 
Limon urges us to pay attention to the historical divergences of the
different disciplines. Unlike Michel Foucault and Katherine Hayles, Limon
believes that science and literature do not proceed along parallel paths. Nor does
literature obediently follow the developments in science. Instead, Limon argues,
literature hampers science. To explain this strange behaviour, Limon argues, we
need a kind of history that concentrates upon “the incompatibilities of the
histories of disciplines”. Literature is always set against science’s unilinear
progression, Limon thinks, because writers have been outmaneuvred by
American culture “which institutionalised science’s slash-and-burn approach to
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history”. In the nineteenth century, writers could only stand by and witness other
disciplines acquire a professional status, while literature remained an activity for
amateurs. Writers try to get their revenge by constantly hindering science’s
progress. Instead of embracing powerful scientific theories, writers sabotage
them by putting their own feeling of the ‘presentness of the past’ against the
linear idea of time of science. Readers of Jeanette Winterson’s work will
immediately recognise this. Progress is not something she is interested in: she
incorporates textual ingredients from all kinds of historical periods, disregarding
chronology.
Like Kuhn, Limon does not think the difference between science and
literature is caused by oppositions such as observation versus imagination, fact
versus fiction, or objective versus subjective. The principal difference, he feels,
is that science, unlike art, continuously destroys its own past. A scientific
revolution automatically implies the end of the theory that precedes because the
latter now no longer explains natural phenomena in a satisfactory way. An
aesthetic innovation is built upon, and in fact requires, the continued presence
of its predecessors. There is no need to take old masters off the wall or to stop
printing the literary classics. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed whether literary texts can
adequately render scientific ideas. If we take Limon’s point of view, this question
is meaningless. When dragged into this ‘most undisciplined of disciplines’,
literature, scientific concepts become contaminated with a variety of cultural
connotations, which fundamentally changes their meaning. Limon’s ideas also
provide a useful perspective for an analysis of Jeanette Winterson’s work. In the
following chapters, I will not aim to find aspects in Winterson’s work that
indicate understanding or ignorance of the scientific ideas she invokes. Neither
will I examine whether she uses scientific ideas legitimately or intelligently.
Instead, I will show how a scientific concept changes when transported into the
literary text; how it becomes coloured not only with literary or philosophical
connotations, but also by Winterson’s political aims. These changes in meaning
will not be regarded as damaging or confusing. Neither will they be regarded as
a threat to the disciplinary order.
In what follows I will use the theoretical models and notions mentioned
to discuss Winterson’s wonderful blend of discourses and disciplines:
It is my nativity, my astrology, my biology, my physiognomy, my
geography, my cartography, my spirituality, my sexuality, my mentality, my
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corporeal, intellectual, emotional, imaginative self. (...) There is no mirror
I know that can show me all of these singularities, unless it is the strange
distorting looking-glass of art where I will not find my reflection nor my
representation but a nearer truth than I prefer. (AO 150) 
I
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ENCHANTMENT AS RESISTANCE
Jeanette Winterson’s work can be read as a complaint against the
strongest characteristic of modernity – faith in reason. Winterson’s
fiction resists rationality and empiricism, which to her are synonymous
with narrowness and inflexibility. To understand why Winterson so
vigorously defends an artistic, mystical and passionate worldview, we
must go back to the Enlightenment, when modernity began to take
shape. The distinctive characteristics of the Enlightenment are a wish to
exert control over nature and to regulate the passions, an upgrading of
science at the expense of the epistemological status of the poetic and a
quest for certainty and objectivity in experience and experimentation.
The Enlightenment sought to elucidate what was mystical, and to dissect
what was whole. By opposing both historicist and mystical traditions, it
initiated a profound quarrel that has continued until this day, when we
are trying to come to terms with the twentieth-century opposition
between modernity and postmodernity. By subscribing to the goals of
the Romantics, while at the same time using postmodern strategies,
Winterson re-enacts this old quarrel and places her work in the centre of
the contemporary struggle between the legacy of positivism and the
Vernunftkritik of postmodernity.
An Outline of Historical Periods
Contemporary western culture is the product of a continuous battle between two
opposing worldviews or mentalities. On the one hand we find the project of
modernity, which aspires to progress and rationality (cf. Harvey 1989:12); on the
other hand we find an anti-modern counter-culture characterised by an aesthetic
and historicising attitude (cf. Welsch 1991:72-74). 
Modernity was forged in the days when Enlightenment thinkers such as
René Descartes and Francis Bacon formulated their treatises about the scientific
method. Their ideas were soon widely accepted in the international intellectual
community, resulting in England for instance in the establishment of the Royal
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Society for the Advancement of Learning. The same scientific spirit still reigned
when, a century later, the French Encyclopédistes sought to gather all human
wisdom in one great book. And modernity will continue as long as its projects
maintain their vitality. Modernity is characterised by the pursuit of mathesis
universalis or universal science. This universal science was modelled after the
experimental natural sciences and was thought to enable us to understand and
describe the whole of reality. Language was treated as a transparent medium.
Philosophers tried to build a corpus of knowledge which would unify all
knowledge in one grand scheme. Scientists and philosophers pretended to be
able to offer final solutions that included not only nature, but also politics and
ethics. The construction of a rational epistemological system of reality in its
entirety was accompanied by what we could call ‘the pathos of a radically new
beginning’ (cf. Welsch 1991:70). This pathos was related to a strong belief in
progress. The Enlightenment mode of research, called the ‘new’ or experimental
philosophy, deliberately set out to liberate thought from the obscuring influence
of the church. In what is called the ‘Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns’,
which took place around 1688, the Moderns agreed that it was useful to
investigate the world in a new way. They tried to be empirically objective and
rational, and to avoid established ways of thinking and religious influences. By
doing so, they opposed themselves to the Ancients, who embraced the
overwhelming legacy of classical antiquity and the Christian tradition.
Romanticism was the first counter-movement able to compete with the
scientism that characterised the Enlightenment. The Romantics acted against the
heritage of Enlightenment in that they criticised attempts to grasp reality as a
totality. They believed in the inevitably fragmentary nature of the human
knowledge of the world. The idea of a clear correspondence between reality and
its linguistic representations was abandoned. Instead, poets worked from the
notion that language is highly evocative. To them, language was filled with
ambiguous structures of meaning. They thought that reality could not be
apprehended directly. Rather, it had to be deciphered from coded messages in
nature (cf. Wellek 1963:179). The highest reality, they assumed, is hidden behind
the seemingly-obvious. In this way, the Romantics reacted against the empiricist
worldview of the Enlightenment.
Around 1900, Romanticism made way for another phase in the modern
project, that I, following Wolfgang Welsch, will call ‘twentieth-century
modernity’ (cf. Welsch 1991:77). This cultural period was in many respects
ambiguous. On the one hand, artists and scientists started embracing notions like
Enchantment as Resistance
37
“Pluralität und Partikularität” (Welsch 1991:77) – but on the other hand,
philosophers were obsessed with the universalistic promises of positivism.
Except in a single footnote, Welsch does not pay any attention to logical
positivism. In its broadest sense, positivism is a rejection of metaphysics. Logical
positivists saw science as the way to achieve truth, to understand the world so
well that we would be able to predict and control it. According to them, the
world and the universe were deterministic, operated by laws of cause and effect
that we would only be able to discern if we held on to scientific method. Science
thus became a system of mechanistic laws. Furthermore, like the Enlightenment
scientists, positivists believed in empiricism, the idea that observation and
measurement were the necessary condition for all good scientific inquiry. In
psychology, this led to the belief that behaviour, and not emotions and thoughts,
were the legitimate objects of study. In art, we see that clarity and directness met
with more and more appreciation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
arts were primarily motivated by rational thinking. Movements like Cubism,
Constructivism and De Stijl preferred clear structures and abstract forms, and
sought to present reality as having an underlying framework. Abstract art forms
of this period sought to touch the intellect, whereas Romantic and post-
Romantic movements like Impressionism and Expressionism addressed the
emotions. Likewise, the formalist approach to literature attempted to isolate and
define the formal properties of poetic language. In architecture, Rationalism – an
initiative of Berlage’s – inspired the Neue Sachlichkeit, that strove to avoid the
voluptuous and dramatic influences of the architectural currents in the Romantic
period. One could say that logical positivism made itself felt not only in the
sciences, but also in the arts. I would like to incorporate the strong voice of
logical positivism into Welsch’s rather one-sided concept of twentieth-century
modernity, and present this period as an era of sharp contrasts.
The end of World War II is generally seen to mark the beginning of
postmodernity. The war testified to a loss of values and marked a crisis in
humanity: the death camps and the atomic bomb revealed the destructive
potential of science. Postmodernists were sceptical of the belief that grand
overarching projects could continue to guarantee the achievement of human
welfare and well-being. An utter loss of cultural coherence made itself felt, and
the sense of direction that had long been present in the development of western
culture was lost. The grand narratives of modernity such as the Enlightenment,
socialism, and Christianity, had failed to deliver on their promises of progress. A
crisis of knowledge and understanding led to differentiation (the awareness that
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knowledge is always intrinsic to a specific subculture) and pluralisation (the
dispersion of truth into multiple independent truths) – elements of thought that
now began to be celebrated as art forms and life styles. As ideology had become
suspect (and, with that, any form of language and image that pretended to offer
political solutions), an over-all crisis in representation made itself felt. Different
subcultures and their languages were seen to construct worlds instead of
representing one and the same world, knowable by all. People began to realise
that not only concepts and values, but objects too, could not be represented
disinterestedly or objectively. Knowledge was regarded as socially and
historically constructed. Thus, the borders that used to separate truth from
fiction, faded. This, postmodernists claimed, opened the door to an almost
utopian world, free from constraints. 
Welsch discerns two subsequent movements within modernity. Firstly, the
Neuzeit – the Enlightenment, characterised by an unbridled desire for unity and
universality; secondly, the Neuzeitliche Moderne – Romanticism seen as a period of
reflection upon Enlightenment thinking and as a continuation of a specifically
modern desire for unity and universality (cf. Welsch 1991:75). These two
movements are followed by the Moderne des 20. Jahrhunderts, meaning twentieth-
century modernity, characterised by a celebration rather than a rejection of
plurality and the particular, and finally by the Postmoderne, in which unity and
universality make way for fragmentation and pluralisation. Welsch describes the
difference between twentieth-century modernity and postmodernism as follows:
Die Postmoderne realisiert in der Breite der Wirklichkeit (exoterisch), was
modern zunächst nur spezialistisch (esoterisch) erprobt wurde. (Welsch
1991:83)
As Welsch’s model does not account for the notions of fragmentation and ruin
in Romanticism, does not pay enough attention to the continuities between
Romanticism and postmodernism, and does not account for the re-emerging, at
the beginning of the twentieth century, of a mentality that aimed at objectivity
and universality, I propose to adapt his model so that it includes logical
positivism. Also, I will take from Patricia Waugh (Waugh 1992) and Jos de Mul
(De Mul 1991) the notion that Romanticism and postmodernity emerge from
one and the same worldview or mentality. 
Waugh and De Mul argue that twentieth-century modernity is a
continuation of the Enlightenment just like postmodernity is a continuation of
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the Romantic worldview. This would divide our culture into two opposing
forces. Despite, or perhaps due to, their forceful opposition, both the
characteristics of modernity and those of its counterculture keep on determining
our culture interchangeably, in cyclical booms and depressions. Likewise,
twentieth-century positivism considers itself heir to the Enlightenment tradition.
Postmodernity, however, is less self-consciously a continuation of Romanticism.
Despite their differences, Romanticism and postmodernism can be regarded as
part of a single tradition: not only an anti-modern tradition, but also a tradition
geared towards the aesthetic and the historical. On the whole, modernity has
held more and longer power in the western world than its counterforce, witness
the construction of contemporary common-sense reality and the scientific and
technological domination of our surroundings. I have schematised this as
follows:
Of course, the clear-cut delineations between historical periods and the
uncompromising dates in this model are mere abstractions. The distinctions
between periods are not this abrupt. Modernity is often accompanied by critique,
also during the periods in which it manifested itself most strongly. During the
Enlightenment, thinkers such as Giambattista Vico already fought René
Descartes’ Discourse on Method as a method of invention, and his reduction of
physics to mathematics. Also, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work can be regarded as
an early critique of the primacy of rationality. At the beginning of the twentieth
century, for instance, when positivism ruled the day, Max Weber complained
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that modern life was disenchanted, too rationalised and too disciplined. He
observed his contemporaries, who were arguing
(...) daß es also prinzipiell keine geheimnissvollen unberechenbare Mächte
gebe, die da hineinspielen, daß man vielmehr alle Dinge – im Prinzip –
durch berechnen beherrschen könne. Das aber bedeutet: die
Entzauberung der Welt. Nicht mehr, wie der Wilde, für den es solche
Mächte gab, muß man zu magischen Mittel greifen, um die Geister zu
beherrschen oder zu erbitten. Sondern technische Mittel und Berechnung
leisten das. Dies vor allem bedeutet die Intellektualisierung als solche.
(Weber 1922:538)
Weber believed, furthermore, that man was caught in a process of
depersonalisation that had a profound negative influence on ethics. The more
rational the world became, the less chance one had to lead an ethical life. The
impact of modern reason on social conditions and human experience would
dissolve traditional forms of life, including the personal and ethical relations. He
thought that the traditional unity of the pre-modern world had been scattered by
the divisive impact of modern reason. So, while Enlightenment thinkers and
logical positivists were making a lasting imprint, counter-movements were
continuously present. All through modernity, such anti-modern voices have
manifested themselves. 
If this is the case, what is the point in using a model like that above? It
explains the emotionally charged outbursts of these countering voices – voices
like Winterson’s. A model like this helps to visualise how the modern and the
anti-modern traditions have battled for ages, and how the anti-modern uprisings
were regarded as separate counter-cultures. I want to use the model above to
argue that the continuities between these counter-cultures should be stressed.
Only by doing so, can we understand why Jeanette Winterson so passionately
rejects the core traits of modernity. Jeanette Winterson clearly rejects the rational
mentality that characterises our culture to such a great extent. Her position can
be called at once Romantic and postmodern. This fact concurs with Waugh’s and
De Mul’s idea that postmodernism is a late manifestation of Romanticism. In
this chapter we will take a closer look at Winterson’s disapproval of the
Enlightenment scientific worldview and her Romantic poetics. We shall also
have a closer look at her rejection of the positivism of the early twentieth
century, and examine where she stands within the period and styles of
postmodernism. 
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Winterson and the Enlightenment
Enlightened man believed in the power to correct past errors in knowledge
through a renewed application of human reason. René Descartes’ project, for
instance, sought to abandon the illusions created by tradition and to establish a
radically new way of thinking. The use of the human faculty of reason is crucial
to his method, as described in the fourth part of his Discourse on Method: “whether
we are awake or asleep, we should never let ourselves be persuaded except on
the evidence of our reason” (Descartes 1968:59). Descartes believed that truths
produced by “example and custom” should be left behind, that the knowledge
obtained in the past had been obscured by faulty methods and that our
intelligence had therefore been ‘darkened’. He tried to find a new method so that
we would be able to start thinking in a new way:
I learned not to believe too firmly those things which I had been
persuaded to accept by example and custom only; and in this way I freed
myself from many errors which obscure the light of our understanding
and render us less capable of reason. But after spending several years
studying thus in the book of the world, and seeking to gain experience, I
resolved one day to study also myself and to use all the powers of my
mind to choose the paths which I should follow. In this I was more
successful, it seems to me, than if I had never left either my country or my
books. (Descartes 1968:34)
Descartes’ condition for the attainment of certainty is the separation of the
subject (res cogitans) from the world surrounding it (res extensa). Descartes built an
epistemological system from the sole certainty he had: the reality of his own
thinking, as expressed in the famous phrase “I think therefore I am”. This
principle enabled Descartes to deduce a complete epistemology. He sought to
prove that we need not doubt the veracity of “our clear and distinct ideas”
(Sutcliffe in Descartes 1968:20). This principle, he felt, brought all knowledge of
the world within the reach of man.
Through the voice of Sappho, the erotic poet in Art & Lies, Winterson
ridicules Descartes’ Cogito. Sappho says: 
After loss of Identity, the most potent modern terror, is loss of sexuality,
or, as Descartes didn’t say, ‘I fuck therefore I am.’ (AL 69) 
Through Sappho, her advocate for the eroticism of cognition, Winterson affirms
radically different parameters for defining existence. While for Descartes, the
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proof of true existence is located inside one’s rational being, for Winterson, the
only way to prove true existence is to share one’s being with that of another.
While for Descartes undeniable existence can be found at the border between
self and world, for Winterson existence is irrefutable only when the borders
between self and world fade away. In contrast to Descartes, Winterson maintains
an erotic epistemology. We can also see this in Art Objects: “Art is not a private
nightmare, not even a private dream, it is a shared human connection” (AO 117),
a “connection to (...) one another” (AO 13). It is the notion of experiencing a
border between the sensitive self and the ‘other’ that has come to govern the
modern western worldview. Winterson, however, questions the validity of the
Cartesian separation between ‘self’ and ‘other’, ultimately claiming that science
should not be disembodied, but rather, incarnate. In Art & Lies, for instance, we
see that the abused Picasso’s defence against the outside world – a forced
separation of self and world – takes shape through metaphors of science. The
elements of the periodic table, emblems of the hard and systematic
organisational principle of chemistry, are the instruments that aid this separation:
What can pierce the thick wall of personality; your voice, your hand, a
picture, a book, the sweet morning air? Myself imprisons me. The lead
shield of my habits, that heavy, soft bluish-grey dead defence. pb No 82
of the Periodic Table, that useful list of contents that includes at no 26,
Fe, the iron in my soul. (AL 87)
Thus, Winterson considers science as one of the strongest forces sustaining this
shield between self and world, and declares that this is at the root of the loss of
interested, personal or even amorous relationships between self and nature.
Indeed, the order that the sciences have brought, disables the emotive forces
brought forward by “your voice, your hand, a picture, a book, the sweet morning
air” (Ibid.). 
Winterson’s rejection of Cartesian dualism also emerges in Gut Symmetries
where Jove, a quantum physicist, describes his philosophy of life and death.
Although Jove at the end of the novel proves to be one of Winterson’s
antagonists, he at first functions as an advocate of Winterson’s philosophy of
multidimensional reality. It is he who applies quantum mechanics to the question
of the existence of an after-life. By fusing ‘hard’ theoretical physics to religious
questions, he disqualifies the Enlightenment idea that reason and intuition are
antithetical. While Jove is expounding his philosophy of ‘quantum metaphysics’,
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he attacks Descartes and with that one of the main foundations of
Enlightenment thought. 
Moreover, ‘we’ and the sum universe cannot be separated in the way of
the old Cartesian dialectic of ‘I’ and ‘World’. Observer and observed are
part of the same process. What did Paracelsus say? ‘The galaxa [sic, A.E.]
goes through the belly.’ (GS 162)
Jove’s dismissal of Descartes is reinforced by the reference to a figure as anti-
rational as Paracelsus, who lived at the beginning of the sixteenth century and
who defended the idea that the small and transient world of the human body
(microcosm) corresponds with the universal and eternal order of the stars
(macrocosm). Here, Jove argues that the world can only be known through the
belly, the place that hermetic philosophers considered the locus of intuitive
knowledge, and that was later seen as the locus of (gut) feeling. The passage
above expresses the idea that sense impressions from the ‘outer world’ are not
apprehended by the independent faculty of reason; instead, they shape and are
shaped by human intuition. The fact that Jove refers to Paracelsus is illuminating.
Paracelsus believed that he who lives for reason, lives against the spirit, a thought
that could just as well have been one of Winterson’s aphorisms favouring a
separation between the science of the Enlightenment and religion. 
The philosophical tradition that Paracelsus belongs to is generally
considered to be diametrically opposed to the Enlightenment worldview. The
historian of science Charles Webster, however, disagrees with the customary
strict division between late medieval and early Enlightenment thought. On the
basis of extensive historical research he concludes that there are important
similarities as well. In From Paracelsus to Newton: Magic and the Making of Modern
Science, he stresses that the gap usually observed between the two periods is no
more than a mere academic convention: 
One of the chief effects of the history of science as the subject has
developed in the present century has been to drive a wedge between the
cultures of Paracelsus and Newton. It may even seem like an act of
perversity or lapsed historical judgement to bracket together the names of
Paracelsus and Newton in the title of a book. By convention the two are
regarded as inhabiting entirely discrete intellectual worlds. Our image of
Newton is firmly associated with the values of the Enlightenment and the
modern world, whereas the name of the enigmatic and inaccessible
Paracelsus conveys alien associations of a tortured mind wrestling
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unsuccessfully to escape from the labyrinths of the dark ages. (Webster
1982:1)
According to Charles Webster, Newton was as much a mystic as he was a man
of science, an opinion that is shared by Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs (Teeter Dobbs
1975). Her historical study makes clear that Newton searched for the
philosopher’s stone and devoted considerable amounts of time to the study of
hermetic correspondences. Jeanette Winterson, however, holds on to the
convention that regards the worlds of pre-Copernican Paracelsus and the
Enlightened Newton as separate ones, and she uses the figure of Newton to
establish her position in this debate. In The World and Other Places, the inhabitants
of a village called ‘Newton’ are caught in the deadly embrace of what Winterson
calls ‘clock-culture’ – they live in a dire repetition; day in, day out, time passes in
an unvarying linear process towards an inevitable end. They are governed by
deterministic processes. Determinism implies that, given a set of initial
conditions and a set of natural laws, the world will develop according to fixed
patterns, and that future states of being can therefore be predicted. By picturing
this village as such, she criticises the concept of determinism implicit in the
Newtonian mechanical idea of the cosmos. In Art & Lies, she portrays Newton
as a silly old fool trying to explain gravity (cf. AL 168), while characters like
Picasso and Sappho regard gravity as a preposterous phenomenon emerging
from a depressing worldview. Winterson deliberately chooses to make a
caricature out of Newton, using him for her own ends, ridiculing his rationalism
and determinism and ignoring his mystic side. 
By adhering to this duality between Paracelsus and Newton, Winterson
establishes a sharp division between a worldview based on mysticism and
associative, creative thinking on the one hand and a worldview governed by
rationality and a need for objectivity on the other. Winterson’s interests are
served by maintaining this opposition. When we look at the way Winterson deals
with Newton’s idea of absolute space or concepts like universal gravity or light,
it will become clear that she uses Newton as an emblem for all she dislikes about
modern science. At the same time, we will see that the era of Paracelsus to
Winterson is not only a glorious past, it is also the inspiration to restore
mysticism to its rightful place in our postmodern world: 
In this enchanted city all things seem possible. Time stops. Hearts beat.
The laws of the real world are suspended. (TP 76)
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The Newtonian ordering of space (i.e. subject to measurement, regularity and
prediction) is brushed aside by Jeanette Winterson when she describes the city
of Venice in The Passion: 
The city I come from is a changeable city. It is not always the same size.
Streets appear and disappear overnight, new waterways force themselves
over dry land. There are days when you cannot walk from one end to the
other, so far is the journey, and there are days when a stroll will take you
round your kingdom like a tin-pot Prince. (TP 97) 
Winterson’s fluid map of the city is unlike any we know, and she refers only
indirectly to a Newtonian ordering of the universe. At other times, however, she
directly addresses Newton’s ideas, as in Gut Symmetries: 
The tenacity of the model should not be underestimated. Newton made it
the basis for his Mechanics in the seventeenth century and rested his
clockwork universe firmly in the principles of Euclid. Firming up Greek
thought, it was Newton who realised concepts of absolute space and
absolute time. Newton who regarded the Universe as three-dimensional,
solid, massy, hard, made up of the motion of material points in space, a
motion caused by their mutual attraction, that is, the force of gravity.
(GS 11)
In her crusade against the Enlightenment philosophy, Winterson also targets
Newton’s concept of universal gravity. Newton argued that there is a centripetal
force directed to the centre of every planet (Newton 1969:11) and that all bodies
in the universe have gravity, which is proportional to the quantity of matter in
each (Newton 1969:42). This concept of universal gravity aims not only to
explain earthly phenomena like the weight of objects and tidal movement but
also extends to the movements of the planets. In Art & Lies Winterson
undermines the concept of universal gravity, when she describes Picasso’s
attempt at suicide. She jumps off a high building but miraculously survives the
fall. She conquers gravity, and defies Newton’s scientific, deterministic
worldview:
She opened her eyes. She did live. Consciousness returning to the
accelerated body. Her body, that in the spinning seconds had resolved to
finish its work. Her body, that had travelled trough gravity, through light,
its own mission of inner space. (AL 134)
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A way of thinking that avoids the problems of gravity. The world won’t let
me down. The single word that can release me from all that unuttered
weight. (AL 136-137)
In Sexing the Cherry, Winterson yearns to be free of gravity. 
(...) I’d want to feel the stars round my head. I’d want them in my hair the
way they are in paintings of the gods. I’d want my whole body to feel the
space, the empty space and points of light. That’s how dancers must feel,
dancers and acrobats, just for a second, that freedom. 
Even if you were free from gravity it wouldn’t feel good in a space suit.
Wouldn’t you want to be naked? Naked and turning your body in slow
somersaults through a new atmosphere? (STC 120)
The anachronism between Jordan’s seventeenth-century life and his use of
twentieth-century knowledge of space travel denies the idea of linear history. In
this passage, Winterson not only undermines the everyday experience of space,
but at the same time she dissolves the distinction between narrator and author,
tempting us to conclude that these are actually Winterson’s ideas. She shows us
that the liberation from the determinism of Newton’s law of gravitation
produces miraculous experiences:
The city, being freed from the laws of gravity, began to drift upwards for
some 200 miles, until it was out of the earth’s atmosphere. (STC 97)
Not only gravity, but light, too, was a topic of methodological discussion among
Enlightenment scientists. Winterson explores this theme to express her hostility
of rationalism and mechanicism and to boost her assault on the Enlightenment
as a whole. Often, when discussing ‘light’ in her fiction, Winterson not only
refers to the physical phenomenon, but also to its philosophical connotations, as
in ‘Enlightenment’, in French the Siècle des Lumières, and in German Die
Aufklärung. In the next passage, ‘light’ becomes a metaphor for all she dislikes
about the eighteenth century:
In the dark places that do not need light, where light would be a lie,
overstating what is better understood invisibly, it is possible to resist
Time’s pull. The body ages, dies, but the mind is free. If the body is
personal, the mind is transpersonal, its range is not limited by action or
desire. Its range is not limited by identity. 
I need the dark places to get outside of common sense. To go beyond the
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smug ring of electric light that pretends to illuminate the world. 
‘Nothing exists beyond this,’ sings the world, glaring at me from its yellow
sockets, ‘nothing exists beyond now.’ 
I challenge the stale yellow light to a duel. (AL 62-63)
In this passage in Art & Lies, she ‘challenges’ the artificial light, calling it “smug”,
“glaring” and “stale”. She wants to show us that the light of reason did not so
much enrich and enlarge our world, as that it robbed us of the understanding and
freedom we can only find in darkness.
In 1704 Newton published his Opticks, which contained his theory of
refraction, the division of light into prismatic colours. Nearly a century later
Goethe formulated his doctrine of colours (Farbenlehre, 1810), which is directed
against Newton’s Opticks. Goethe believed that light was an indivisible unity and
that the colours come into being from the cooperation between the bright and
the dark. Although Goethe conducted experiments himself, he differed from the
empiricists in that he believed that experiments ought not to be interpreted
quantitatively. They ought to be interpreted qualitatively. Instead of
mathematical abstraction, which he despised, what should be sought for was an
intuitive insight in the coherence of nature. Moreover, he believed that good
scientific research happened in a unity between the researcher and the object
researched (Blumenfeld 1986:102-104): the observer, being emotionally
involved, was not to be separated from the object that he studied. Goethe’s
disapproval of Newton’s mathematical method emerged from his preference for
specifically human, emotional experience, and with the attachment of symbolical
meaning to experience, as we can see a letter to the painter Philipp Otto Runge: 
Die undurchsichtigen Farben stehen wie Blumen dagegen, die es nicht
wagen, sich mit den Himmel zu messen, und doch mit der Schwachheit
von der einen Seite, dem Weißen, und dem Bösen, der Schwarzen, vor der
andern, zu tun haben. (Goethe in Runge 1983:184)
The way Winterson describes the experience of light is often strongly
reminiscent of Goethe. Art & Lies is full of marvellous synaesthetic experiences
of light, that echo Goethe’s methodology:
In its effect the light was choral. Harmonies of power simultaneously
achieved, a depth of light, not one note but many, notes of light sung
together. In its high register, far beyond the ears of man, the music of the
spheres, vibrating light noted in its own frequency. Light seen and heard.
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Light that writes on tablets of stone. Light that glories what it touches.
Solemn self-delighting light. (AL 26)
Goethe’s interest not only concerned the physical colours (cf. Burwick 1986:17)
but also extended to what he called the ‘physiological colours’ – i.e. so-called
‘after-images’, colours that originate in the eye itself, for instance after looking at
bright light. Again, it shows how he looked upon nature as an organic whole. To
Goethe, the experience of light in the human eye is a result not only of outside
impulses, but also of inner processes. In Winterson’s work similar experiences
are described; impressions of light whereby human responses, i.e. the
physiological aspects of the sensation of light, are included:
The image stamped upon the retina, repeated behind the eyelid, stored in
the rhomencephalon, returned to the body in injections of emotion. The
power of the image through the unforgetting brain. (AL 132)
The sun on my spine brings colours to my eyes, blue and blood vermilion.
(AL 143)
By emotionalising light, and by ‘infecting’ it with personal and cultural
connotations, Winterson breathes new life into the controversy between
Newton and Goethe. Rejecting Enlightenment disenchantment, she supports
Goethe and other Romantic poets, who believed that Newton “had destroyed all
the poetry of the rainbow by reducing it to the prismatic colours” (Abrams,
1953:303). In this controversy, we recognise the contrast between on the one
hand the conception of nature of the Romantic poets, rejecting the division into
subject and object while emphasising the innere Gefühl, culminating in
Naturphilosophie, and on the other hand the mathematical and empirical tradition
of the Enlightenment. Winterson creates a sharp contrast between the scientific
ideals set by the Enlightenment scientists, and the poets of the Romantic era.
Indeed, Sappho’s complaint that “the spirit has gone out of the world” (AL 65),
recalls John Keats’ criticism of the “cold philosophy” of Newton’s Opticks in
“Lamia”:
Do not all charms fly
At the mere touch of cold philosophy?
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven:
We know her woof, her texture; she is given
In the dull catalogue of common things.
Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings,
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Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, and gnomed mine – 
Unweave a rainbow, as it erewhile made
The tender-person’d Lamia melt into a shade.
Abrams comments that “the familiar passage on Newton’s rainbow
demonstrates that in part it signifies the poet’s vision, in opposition to the
scrutiny of ‘cold philosophy,’ which, Keats says, will ‘empty the haunted air’ and
‘unweave the rainbow’ ” (Abrams 1971:304). Keats believed that science was not
only the opposite, but also the enemy of poetry. He even imagined the possibility
of a war between the two cultures, and predicted the downfall of poetry (Abrams
1971:303).
In Keats’ days, poetry was suffering from marginalisation. In his book
Science, Technology, & Society in Seventeenth-Century England, Robert K. Merton
explains how the century leading up to the Enlightenment shows a gradual
decline of the epistemological prestige of poetry. This was partly due to realism
being the pervading mode of thought of the new scientific movement.
According to Merton, Puritanism has been one of the guiding influences in this
shift towards utilitarianism and realism. A leading spokesman of the Puritans was
Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), Bishop of Rochester and historian of the Royal
Society. He pleaded on behalf of a “close, naked” style of speech and writing,
bringing language as near as possible to what was called “mathematical
plainness”. As Merton says, “Sprat rejects poetry as involving undesirable
ornaments of speech, as elevating the specious at the cost of the real and speaks
of poets as a ‘pleasant but unprofitable sort of men’ ” (Merton 1970:18). It is
probably no coincidence that one of the characters in Oranges Are Not the Only
Fruit is the preacher Spratt. This semi-autobiographical book tells the story of
Jeanette, a girl that struggles to break free from her Puritan background. 
Merton finds another example of the Puritans’ attitude towards the poetic
in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: “Hobbes would tolerate the innocent
pleasure of poetry, but urges that ‘this isn’t the serious employment of words
which are properly signs for real things and their connections’ ”(Merton
1970:18), a position comparable to I.A. Richards’ (cf. page 6). Hobbes was
convinced that reason governs the passions and that everyone ought always to
act rationally. In his Leviathan (1651 part I. ch. 4), he argued that passions breed
reprehensible emotions like partiality, pride and revenge, and that metaphors
corrupt not only the empirical tradition, but also language as a whole.
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Winterson often fulminates against such notions of style, a style so highly
praised by Thomas Sprat in the language used at the Royal Society in his days. 
They have therefore been most rigorous in putting in execution, the only
Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance: and that has been, a
constant Resolution, to reject all amplifications, digressions, and swellings
of style: to return back to the primitive purity and shortness, when men
deliver’d so may things, almost in an equal number of words. They have
exacted from all their members, a close, naked, natural way of speaking:
positive expressions, clear senses, a native easiness, bringing all things as
near the Mathematical plainness, as they can: and preferring the language
of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants before that, of Wits, or
Scholars. (Sprat 1667:113)
The “extravagance” that Sprat rejects here is precisely the kind of language that
Winterson uses to describe lesbian love all through her oeuvre. It is exactly this
extravagance that provides a way out of and an antidote against Puritanical ways
of thinking and the Pentecostal community that Winterson grew up in. In
The.PowerBook we see how the use of metaphor produces a wealth of associations
and gives the language a highly emotional impact: 
Sex between women is mirror geography. The subtlety of its secret –
utterly the same, utterly different. You are a looking-glass world. You are
the hidden place that opens to me on the other side of the glass. I touch
your smooth surface and then my fingers sink through to the other side.
You are what the mirror reflects and invents. I see myself, I see you, two,
one, none. I don’t know. Maybe I don’t need to know. Kiss me. (TPB 174) 
That Winterson locates the notion of self-control and the control over language
in the centre of our intellectual history, becomes clear in her introduction to
Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple Story: 
During the Eighteenth century, science and philosophy were working
together to provide a picture of man as a rational self-controlled creature,
not subject to the winds of fate or any earlier idea of spooks and spirits.
By means of his intellect he was supposed to be able to control his
emotions (...) (Winterson 1986:vii) 
For Winterson, poetic language, with its artistic amplification and poetic
extravagance, is the ultimate vehicle for the expression of a highly sensuous,
embodied way of experiencing and knowing the world – a world remote from
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Puritanical notions of austerity. She uses the poetic to defend her world, which
is pervaded with love and poetry, against philosophies that claim the supremacy
of disinterested knowledge and exact language. This battle between the arts on
the one hand and the Puritan austerity on the other continues throughout her
oeuvre.
In Sexing the Cherry Winterson portrays a city where love is forbidden in
order to prevent the crimes passionels that had earlier repeatedly decimated the
population. Marriages are arranged and sex is allowed only for procreation.
Winterson seems eager to ensure that we do not miss the point: Jordan, the
narrator of this section, asks the inhabitants if these rules have anything to do
with Puritanism: 
I questioned them about their strictness, likening them to the Puritans
holding sway in my own country. They had not heard of Puritanism, but
found the idea of bandaging up the male member so as to leave it
immovable very appealing. (STC 75)
Although any knowledge of Puritanism is denied, the analogies are
obvious. However, although they have learned to abhor the ability of art to
arouse their passions, the inhabitants cannot escape from its force. Musical
instruments are outlawed and displayed in a museum with the sign:
“INSTRUMENTS OF LUST AND FURY”. When the narrator takes one of the
guitars off the wall and starts to play, the listeners are touched by his music, and
later that night the ‘plague of love’ breaks out again. All through the book, the
attitude of the Puritans with regard to love and the arts is depicted not only as
nonsensical but also as totalitarian. Playfully criticising their banishment of
emotion, setting it against the background of scientific endeavour and voyages
of discovery, Winterson, too, links the Age of Reason to the rising influence of
Puritanism, and points them out as the origin of our modern-day separation of
intellect and emotion.
So one of the ideas we are supposed to take away from Sexing the Cherry is
the historical awareness that with the advent of science, lamentably, a cold and
bloodless mentality took hold. We find this same point of view expressed in Art
& Lies, when Sappho rejects the worldview of none other than Thomas Hobbes:
Do I look like Hobbes? I hope not. (...) I’ve never had much patience
with Hobbes. I can work with a man that is a) an atheist, b) a monarchist
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c) a nominalist, d) a materialist, but I can’t work with a man who is all of
these things at the same time. (AL 12-13)
No, in the dreary Hobbes world, where religion is superstition and the
only possible actions are actions of self-interest, love is dead. (AL 13)
In this book Winterson, through Handel’s narrative, fights the idea that science
ought to be clean, cool and devoid of passion. In fact, she expresses an opinion
similar to Bruno Latour’s in “Do you Believe in Reality? News from the
Trenches of the Science Wars”. Latour says:
Instead of stuffed scientists hanging on the walls of the armchair
philosophers of science of the past, we have portrayed lively characters,
immersed in their laboratories, full of passion, loaded with instruments,
steeped in know-how, closely connected to a larger and more vibrant
milieu. Instead of the pale and bloodless objectivity of science, we have all
shown, it seemed to me, that the many nonhumans mixed into our
collective life through laboratory practice have a history, flexibility,
culture, blood. (Latour 1999:2-3) [Italics A.E.]
Like Winterson, Latour tries to incorporate emotion, passion and gut feeling into
our cognitive system. The upgrading of reason and science, Winterson claims,
ended up in the downgrading of the emotional energies within our cognitive
potentials. This becomes clear for instance in Gut Symmetries, where science and
poetry clash and compete, and where the scientist (Jove) disdains the poet’s
(Stella’s) worldview. 
Fabulation dropped to the bottom of the epistemic hierarchy. As M.H.
Abrams puts it in The Mirror and the Lamp, since the Enlightenment “the
representation of the truth, and nothing but the truth, is non-poetry” (Abrams
298), and “to some writers, it seemed that if science is true, poetry must be false,
or at any rate, trivial” (Abrams 299). His observations on the Benthamites are
also interesting in this context: 
Bentham represents a culmination of a tendency of the new philosophy in
England, empirical in pretension and practical in orientation, to derogate
poetry in comparison with science. (Abrams 300) 
In the Benthamite philosophy, physical science is the role-model as far as
truthfulness is concerned, whereas poetry is considered to be troubled by the
emotions and the imagination. In fact, one of Bentham’s aphorisms was: “all
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poetry is misrepresentation” (Abrams 301). It is clearly this spirit that Winterson
is fighting against when she says in her introduction to Elizabeth Inchbald’s A
Simple Story: 
The eighteenth century [had a] mania for solid ground beneath their feet.
(...) Once theology and prejudice met up with science (of a kind) many
more doors were closed than were opened. (Winterson 1986:ix) 
So we can see that Winterson strongly rejects the scientific worldview of
the Enlightenment. She opposes the Cartesian belief that we should be
persuaded by the evidence of reason rather than that of tradition, and rejects its
programmatic separation of subject and object. She uses metaphors of classical
science to portray a cold and detached kind of science. The Enlightenment’s
determinism, its fixity, its rejection of mysticism, its emphasis on dissection and
the mechanical are regarded by Winterson as a negation of the notion of a natural
harmonious unity. In her eyes, Enlightenment scientists have overlooked the
human aspects of knowledge gathering processes. She feels that the
Enlightenment is to blame for the advancement of science at the expense of the
prestige of poetry. In her work, she pays attention to the Puritan aspect of this
process. A Puritanical view towards the passions – their dismissal of ‘swellings
of style’ – has, according to Winterson, led to the erroneous idea that poetry is
not a valuable form of knowledge, not, at least, in comparison with scientific
knowledge. 
In chapters 3, 4, and 6, I will look at specific aspects of Enlightenment
science (space and place, time and history, medicine) in more detail, expanding
on Winterson’s hostility towards the Enlightenment by showing how she
expresses this grudge in ideas that are both Romantic and postmodern. 
Winterson and Romanticism
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that it makes sense to see the
intellectual history of the west as a process of cyclical movements and
consequently to regard the Romantic period as a reaction to the Age of
Enlightenment and a return older cultural values. The description that René
Wellek uses to define Romantic poetics confirms this point of view. First of all,
the Romantic poets gave the imagination pride of place in their poetry. Secondly,
organic, evolving nature was fundamental to their view of the world, and thirdly,
symbol and myth were essential in their conception of poetic style (cf. Wellek
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1963:161 and 174). Symbol and myth are crucial to the Romantics’ sense of
longing, because they provide “glimpses of fulfillment” (McFarland 1981:10).
The Romantics were pervaded with a sense of longing for a realm that “could be
removed in space, in time, and in reality as well” (McFarland 1981:8). In
Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin, which focuses on brokenness and
fragmentation, McFarland argues that for the Romantics “incompleteness is at
the very center of life” (McFarland 1981:5). The Romantics trusted their
imagination to provide true knowledge, as they had a “metaphysical intuition
which discerns, behind the complex outward appearance of things, the
permanence of a unique essence” (Praz 1970:212). The worldview of the
Romantics is therefore almost diametrically opposed to that of Enlightenment
thinkers, who combined reason with empiricism. 
William Blake was one of those who, unlike Descartes, believed that
experiences of something beyond the empirically verifiable are not illusionary. In
“Proverbs of Hell”, he wrote: “Every thing possible to be believ’d is an image of
truth” (Blake 1975:xix). Unlike other poets in his time, he would not copy, study
and translate other texts: “I will not Reason & Compare; my business is to
Create”, Blake writes in his “Jerusalem” (Blake 1972:629). He looked back not
only to the Dark Ages, “his settings soon reached further, into yet remoter and
darker ages – outer space, or eternity” (Butler 2000:15). Blake was inspired by the
painter and illustrator Henry Fuseli, who “favoured ancient epic, the sublime,
and allegory (‘the sensible presentation of what cannot be seen with the naked
eye’)” (Butler 2000:17) – precisely what Descartes dismissed as ‘tradition’. In that
line of thinking, reason only served to limit man’s potential, as we can read in
“The Marriage of Heaven and Hell”: “Those who restrain desire, do so because
theirs is weak enough to be restrained; and the restrainer or Reason usurps its
place & governs the unwilling” (Blake 1975:xvi). It is obvious that Descartes and
Blake had radically contradicting worldviews and often Blake seems to comment
directly on the ideas of this Enlightenment French thinker: “Man has no body
distinct from his soul” (Blake 1975:xvi). In her writing, Winterson sides with the
Romantics in their reaction against the age of the Enlightenment, and she often
shares Blake’s ideas on the visionary powers of art and the imagination.
For both the Romantics and Winterson, the role of art is crucial in the
attainment of a harmonious ideal. Wellek describes this harmonious ideal as “a
monism which arrived at an identification of God and the world, soul and body,
subject and object” (Wellek 1984:165). In Romanticism, the artistic mentality
was considered the cognitive instrument par excellence through which that ideal
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could be sensed. This is what Winterson means when she says in Sexing the Cherry:
“Artists and gurus are, in the language of science, superconductors” (STC 91),
an expression that installs scientific terminology into her aesthetics, and also
echoes Coleridge’s idea that “symbols are conductors” (McFarland 1981:31).
Moreover, Winterson, like the Romantics, pleads for an aestheticisation of the
world. In Art & Lies, for instance, we see that art can be regarded as the
redeeming feature of an otherwise cold and loveless world. Picasso, a girl who is
abused by her brother and disowned by her parents, decides to paint herself a
way out of there – in a miraculous manner:
In the morning, it was raining, and the rain fell in orange points on her
cream flesh. They were spotted with guilt, each could see in the other, the
patterns of infection. (...)
My mother poured the tea with trembling hands. Concentrate,
concentrate, one cup, two cups, safe, safe. She dropped the pot. The
white china shattered on to the white tablecloths and spread the tea in a
five-pointed star of plum. 
‘Why is the tea that colour?’ demanded father. 
‘There is no colour there father, no colour, just tea.’ She dabbed at it with
the corner of her white handkerchief. She might as well have dipped it in
blood. (AL 46-47)
In Picasso’s house, and in fact all through Winterson’s oeuvre, there is a conflict
between those who acknowledge the power of art and those who prefer not to
see it. With Winterson, those who believe in an aestheticisation of the world in
the end always win. The importance of such an aestheticisation was already
expressed by Friedrich von Schiller in Briefe über die Ästhetische Erziehung des
Menschen (1795), when he said that “civilisation itself brought about a division in
man” (Adams 1971:417). Man’s united sensibility was gradually divided into
intuition and imagination on the one hand and speculation and abstraction on
the other. As practical or theoretical reason came to dominate the human
intellect, the aesthetically sensitive side of human nature was repressed, a process
which alienated man from himself and the world he lived in. He argued that only
when man started trusting the aesthetic side of his intellect, would he be restored
to his original harmonious state. In Art Objects, Jeanette Winterson develops a
similar argument: 
This denial of imaginative experience happens at a deeper level than our
affirmation of our daily world. Every day, in countless ways, you and I
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convince ourselves about ourselves. True art, when it happens to us,
challenges the ‘I’ that we are. (AO 15) 
Winterson here in fact argues that an egalitarian society seeks to deny the
imagination in order to be able to maintain status quo, while the goal of the arts
is to challenge and contradict. 
Both Schiller and Winterson consider the aesthetic as that dimension
which harmonically unites all other aspects of life. By doing so, aesthetics
becomes their primordial philosophy. Novalis (1772-1801) had a comparable
worldview: 
Die Welt muß romantisiert werden. So findet man den ursprünglichen
Sinn wieder. Romantisieren ist nichts anders als eine qualitative
Potenzierung. Das niedere Selbst wird mit einem besseren Selbst in dieser
Operation identifiziert. So wie wir selbst eine solche qualitative
Potenzenreihe sind. Diese Operation ist noch ganz unbekannt. Indem ich
dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewöhnlichen ein
Geheimnisvolles Ansehen, dem Bekannten die würde des Unbekannten,
dem Endlichen einen unendlichen Schein gebe, so romantisiere ich es. –
Umgekehrt ist die Operation für das Höhere, Unbekannte, Mystische,
Unendliche, – dies wird durch diese Verknüpfung logarythmisiert – es
bekommt einen geläufigen Ausdrück. (...) Wechselerhöhung und
Erniedrigung. (Novalis 1910:117)
In this passage, Novalis expresses his belief that, in order to recover a more
fundamental or higher truth, an operation on or artificial transformation of the
world should be performed. He calls this operation or transformation
“Romantisierung”. This operation is twofold: it makes the commonplace
mystical, and makes the mystical more common. The world is alternatively
upgraded and downgraded. The finite is made infinite, the known is made
unknown, and at the same time, the secret, the infinite, deeper reality is presented
as finite and common. 
One could interpret Novalis’ method as linked to the Romantic wish to
enchant the world, as a contrast to the Enlightenment aim to make phenomena
transparent. In this enchantment, the subject is engaged both actively and
passively. The subject at once transforms dull reality into a mystical whole, and
at the same time it is passionately intensified by what remains secret, and is thus
transformed into an other, deeper self. The Romantics’ notion of unity of subject
and object clearly runs parallel with this epistemological procedure: in
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transforming the dull reality into a meta-reality, the division between the ‘I’ and
the ‘outer world’ collapses. 
I believe Winterson would agree with Novalis’ procedures of
‘Romantisierung’. She signals that “the spirit has gone out of the world” (AL 64)
or, as it is said in an authorial intrusion in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit: “I miss
God who was my friend” (OAF 165). To fight this problem, and the mentality
that caused it, the daily should be made “winged”, as she puts it. The train that
carries Handel, Sappho and Picasso in Art & Lies is described right away as an
“horizontal angel, trumpet out on a hard bend” (AL 3), and as the story unfolds,
we see that an ordinary train journey becomes an extraordinary vehicle for the
transportation of these three characters into a mysterious new reality. Likewise,
in Great Moments in Aviation a touch of the divine is added to the first successful
flight of the brothers Wright: 
(...) Orville, lying on the bottom wing, gave the signal for release. Wilbur
ran alongside, steadying the machine down its long trolley towards
infinity. Can you see the plane rising up like an angel? Immortality for
twelve seconds. And how many years of faith and work for everyone of
those twelve seconds? (GMA 47)
The last sentence of this passage expresses the complementary, reversed
transformation wherein the divine is linked to many years of common hard
work. Another expression of the reversed aestheticisation we find in Oranges Are
Not the Only Fruit:
[She] fixed her gaze on the picture of the Lord hung about the oven. (...) 
It was called ‘The Lord Feeding the Birds’ and my mother put it over the
oven because she spent most of her time there, making things for the
faithful. It was a bit battered now, and the Lord had a blob of egg on one
foot, but we didn’t like to touch it in case the paint came off too. 
(OAF 22)
Winterson not only mystically upgrades the world; at times, she presents the
divine as something extremely commonplace, using Novalis’ reverse operation
of aestheticisation. Although Winterson shows herself to be a Romantic, at the
same time the passage above contains a postmodern literary strategy. By saying
“the Lord had a blob of egg on one foot” rather than “there was a blob of egg
on the painting” Winterson deliberately confuses ontological layers, mixing
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sacred and profane levels of reality, and displaying a tendency towards
ontological anarchy (cf. McHale 1987:34-37).
Another telling example of Winterson’s application of Romantic poetics
can be found at the beginning of Sexing the Cherry, where two apparently
unrelated paragraphs follow one another. 
(...) cutting the air like a bright sword.
   The fog came towards me and the sky that had been clear
was covered up. It was bitterly cold, my hair was damp and 
I had no hand-warmer. I tried to find the path but all I found 
were hares with staring eyes, poised in the middle of the field 
and turned to stone. I began to walk with my hands stretched 
out in front of me, as do those troubled in sleep, and in this 
way, for the first time, I traced the lineaments of my own face 
opposite me.
Every journey conceals another journey within its lines: the 
path not taken and the forgotten angle. These are journeys 
I wish to record. Not the ones I made, but the ones I might 
have made, or perhaps did make in some other place or time. 
I could tell you the truth as you will find it in diaries and maps 
and log-books. I could faithfully describe all that I saw and 
heard and give you a travel book. You could follow it then, 
tracing those travels with your finger, putting red flags where 
I went.
   For the Greeks, the hidden life demanded invisible ink. 
They wrote (...) (STC 9-10) [original typography]
In the first paragraph Jordan gets lost during a walk in the fields. All his attempts
to find his way fail until he changes his strategy. His journey then becomes
dreamlike and surreal: when he stops relying on visible reality he learns to
recognise another, deeper reality. The second paragraph tells us that the journeys
worth recording are not the actual, factual ones, but the virtual, imaginative ones
which were made in a hidden life. Surreal, fantastic journeys are far more
interesting or important than those that are logged in travel books. Here
Winterson clearly discards the rational perspective in favour of imaginative
experiences of deeper reality, giving us a clear view of the fantastic or perhaps
even magic realist aspects of her work – her Romanticism. 
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Again we see that Winterson uses postmodern, metafictional techniques to
support her argument. The extra space dividing the two paragraphs seems to
indicate a transition to a new topic. However, this visual impression is
misleading. The interpretation of each paragraph is reinforced by the other.
Winterson plays with the idea that visible and immediately evident impressions
are less interesting than invisible, hidden phenomena. In fact, the decision to
ignore the visual form supports the interpretation that can be derived from the
interrelated paragraphs. In the text, Winterson leaves firm clues for this
interpretation: a hidden journey is concealed “within its lines”, and the “hidden
life demanded hidden ink”. Both are clear references to the extra space between
the paragraphs. 
Another striking aspect of this passage is the metaphor of petrifaction. As
Jos de Mul indicates in his book Het Romantische Verlangen [Romantic Desire, A.E.],
the rhetorical representation of reality as dominated by what de Mul calls
‘Conceptual Rationality’ has often been described using the metaphor of
petrifaction. De Mul argues that against the petrifying discursive power of ‘The
Concept’, we can set a poetic thinking in images that does more justice to man’s
primal metaphoric capacity. In this passage from Sexing the Cherry Winterson uses
this metaphor in the same way. Jordan used to discover reality by direct sense
impressions, most of all visual ones. This method resulted in a petrified reality.
A reality that is researched by empirical and rational means only will not only turn
out to be shallow and static but also frightening and cold. 
By placing truth outside the directly accessible world of the senses,
Winterson opposes the Cartesian method. In Art Objects, her collection of essays,
she says:
It is through the painter, writer, composer, who lives more intensely than
the rest of us, that we can rediscover the intensity of the physical world. 
And not only the physical world. There is no limit to new territory. The
gate is open. Whether or not we go through is up to us, but to stand
mockingly on the threshold, claiming that nothing lies beyond, is
something of a flat earth theory. (AO 151)
Whereas Descartes believes that the use of reason alone can provide us with
realistic knowledge of the world, Jeanette Winterson believes that 
The realist (from the Latin res = thing) who thinks he deals in things and
not images and who is suspicious of the abstract and of art, is not the
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practical man but a man caught in a fantasy of his own unmaking.
(AO 143)
It is clear from these two passages that Winterson opposes the artist and the
realist. She maintains that unlike the realist, the artist is able to understand that
“there is more around us than the mundane” (AO 136) and that therefore the
artist is able to understand reality in a more profound way. Indeed, Stefan Welz
says in his article “Das Pfropfen als Sünde”: 
Phantasie ist für sie nicht nur Rückzug aus einer kruden, heillosen Welt
und Gegenentwurf zu einen widerlichen Wirklichkeit. Phantasie ist in
ihren Romanen ein Mittel, um näher zum Wirklichen vorzudringen und
die Lügen dessen, was sich als Wirklichkeit gebärdet, aufzudecken.”
(Welz 1997:97)
Winterson’s Romantic “Wirklichkeit” also entails a monist view of nature.
Not unlike Romantic poets and scientists, Winterson holds that objects, events
and the observer belong inextricably together. Wellek says the following about
this Romantic intellectual attitude: 
This new view emphasizes the totality of man’s forces, not reason alone,
nor sentiment alone, but rather intuition, ‘intellectual intuition’,
imagination. It is a revival of Neo-Platonism, a pantheism (...), a monism
which arrived at an identification of God and the world, soul and body,
subject and object. (Wellek 1963:165) 
Handel, a character in Art & Lies who voices Winterson’s critique of modernity
(cf. page xiv), displays just such a monist philosophy, when she argues:
(...) no matter how meticulous the scientist, he or she cannot be separated
from the experiment itself. Impossible to detach the observer from the
observed. A great deal of scientific truth has later turned out to be the
observer’s fiction. It is irrational to assume that this is no longer the case.
(AL 30)
This monist view is echoed in the following description of Mrs. Munde, who
appears in Boating for Beginners and who is, like Handel, a character guided by
intuition: 
(...) she had wanted more than anything to be an astronomer; indeed she
had spent nearly all her youth gazing out of the window, wondering about
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the nature of the cosmos and how she could truly be part of it. As she grew
older and her ambitions remained as distant as their object, she persuaded
herself that this early impulse was really a metaphor for something else,
and when she heard about the Unpronounceable she knew her instinct
had been correct. She was an Astronomer without Telescope. Now the
cosmos loomed larger and more definable, and she belonged to it. (BFB 19-
20) [Italics A.E.]
Mrs. Munde’s motivation to be an astronomer does not arise from the ‘will to
know’ but from a desire to experience a transcendent unification between the
self and the universe. That explains why she does not need any scientific
instruments, like the telescope. In this passage, the telescope is regarded as an
instrument of rationality, and as an instrument that literally stands between the
self and the world. The narrator suggests that for Mrs. Munde, it is not through
scientific instruments that one needs to understand the cosmos; it is one’s love
for cosmic coherence that is prerequisite for any real understanding. As I showed
earlier, the philosophy of the Enlightenment sought to abandon this Medieval
type of mysticism: such was their goal in the Quarrel of the Ancients and the
Moderns. In fact, a stance like Mrs. Munde’s is not only a pre-modern type of
reasoning; it also fits into a Romantic conception of nature. As Wellek explains
in The Concept of Romanticism, the Romantic view of nature entails a “view of
nature as a language, as a concert of harmonies. The whole universe is conceived
of as a system of symbols, correspondences, emblems, which at the same time is
alive and pulsates rhythmically” (Wellek 1963:172).
Winterson and Twentieth-Century Modernity
In her collection of essays, Winterson draws attention to the fact that the
Romantic poetics in its turn gave rise to an oppositional reaction, which shows
her awareness of the competitive forces at work within the history of aesthetics:
The reaction against Romanticism was a very serious one, and if the
Romantics were emotional, introspective, visionary and very conscious of
themselves as artists, then the move against them and their work was
bound to be in opposition: to be radical, extrovert, didactic, the writer as
social worker or sage. (AO 29)
Where Romanticism reverted to pre-Enlightenment philosophies and aesthetics,
it was itself subsequently brushed aside by a mentality that in many ways
constituted a return to the aims of the Enlightenment. 
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This return – or perhaps we should say resurfacing – of Enlightenment
values is exemplified by the logical positivists, who formed one of the dominant
philosophical movements of twentieth-century modernity. Ernst Mach, member
of the Vienna Circle and a prominent advocate of the ideas of this movement,
tried to study and eradicate errors that stood in the way of attaining absolute
objectivity. Science was proposed as the model for all knowledge and truth. To
that end, subjectivity should be eliminated from science, and rules had to be
established for objective experiment. In this respect his project was comparable
to that of the early Wittgenstein, who wrote his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in
part “to mark the limits of thought by setting the limits of language” (Kenny
1973:21). Mach’s work also displayed similarities with Bertrand Russell’s, who
was of the opinion that the scientific view of the world is largely correct and who,
believing that the language we use should describe the world unambiguously,
found that language had to be brought down to its minimum requirements – its
atomic facts – in order to avoid untrue phrases and inexistent elements of the
world. Basically, Mach, Wittgenstein and Russell were trying to free physics from
metaphysics. They held that the language used in science ought to be sober and
should avoid excess as well as any reference to non-visible things. 
Mach formulated requirements that good theories should meet. Laws and
theories had to represent facts that were generated from experience. Theories
had no other function than to order the chaos of the impressions our experience
leaves us with. This ordering was distinctly restrictive: experiences of and words
referring to entities and phenomena that could not be observed were excluded.
In his Erkenntnis und Irrtum he explains that humans experience a boundary (‘U’
– for “Umgrenzung”) between their body and the world outside. To him, sense-
impressions either came from outside that boundary, in which case they were
empirically verifiable, or they originated within that boundary. Psychological
experience, as he would call the latter, can be mistaken for physical experience,
but in fact are the product of our memory or imagination. For instance, when we
dip a straight stick in the water, we see a bent stick, yet we know it is still straight.
Our mind corrects the experience, adding extra information. Mach declared that
what goes on outside the boundary U can be called physics in the broadest sense.
In order to describe external occurrences in a pure state (which is the objective
of science), it is necessary to eliminate the influence of the observer, that is, of
those elements that lie within U. What then, should a scientist do in order to
distinguish between objective information and information from fantasy?
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Firstly, Mach believed that the scientist should base his conclusions upon
experiments in which the physical experience and the psychological experience
are identical. Only when there are no differences between the subjective and the
objective experience, “die Frage nach Schein und Wirklichkeit” loses its
importance. Secondly, the progressive development of science, Mach thought,
would accumulate so much knowledge of psychology and physics that in due
course people would be able to discriminate between “die Elemente der Realen
Welt” and “die Elemente des Ich” (Mach 1905:10).
Knowing her views on the Enlightenment, it is obvious that Winterson
dislikes this return to Cartesian duality and a belief in an empirical verifiable
reality – and the shadow it casts on our modern-day science and society. In her
worldview, it is undesirable and even impossible to make a difference between
objective and subjective experiences. In the following passage from Art & Lies,
the discrepancy between the ideas of Winterson and Mach is obvious:
Even science, which prides itself on objectivity, depends on both
testimony and memory. Scientific theory has to be built up from previous
results. Scientists must take into account what others have recorded and
what they themselves have recorded previously. Science deduces and
infers from past explanations, past explorations, the investigative
technique that tests its theory against all known facts. 
But not all facts are known and what is known is not necessarily a fact.
(AL 29)
When Jove, at the end of Gut Symmetries, betrays his earlier metaphysical
musings and shows himself as the patriarchal and rationalist scientist he really is,
as his astrological data already revealed him to be at the beginning of the book.
He starts to judge his wife as unhealthy because she fails to distinguish between
object and subject: 
Unhealthy individuals understand their dreams and fantasies as something
solid. An alternative world. They do not know how to subordinate their
disruptive elements to a regulated order. My wife believed that she had a
kind of interior universe as valid and as necessary as her day-to-day
existence in reality. This failure to make a hierarchy, this failure to
recognise the primacy of fact, justified her increasingly subjective
responses. She refused to make a clear distinction between inner and
outer. She had no sure grasp either of herself or of herself in relation to
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the object. At first I mistook this pathology as the ordinary feminine. 
(GS 190-191)
Winterson suddenly turns Jove into the typical villain, breaking his word, using
people for his own goals. His philosophical position – which carries strong
echoes of logical positivist thinking – becomes unsympathetic as it is embedded
in an extremely narrow, selfish view of the world. Later, Jove is even willing to
cut up his wife in order to empirically disprove the mystery of the diamond
embedded in her hip (GS 190-196). Jove’s rationalism leads to a cruel ‘will to
knowledge’, to use Nietzsche’s phrase. In this way, Winterson condemns the
Cartesian bifurcation Mach and many of his contemporaries tried to establish. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, Winterson finds an ally in Max Planck, even though
he is a scientist: “ ‘Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature because
we ourselves are part of nature and therefore part of the mystery we are trying to
solve.’ (Max Planck)” (GS 82). By quoting Planck, Winterson targets the conflict
between objectivist science and the Romantic spirit – not between science and
art per se. We will see more evidence of this in the next chapters. Mach’s aim to
eradicate the mystery of nature by separating observations and sense impressions
from memory and feeling, stands in complete opposition to Winterson’s. It is her
ultimate goal to create room for mystery and what Wittgenstein called “what we
cannot speak about” (Wittgenstein 1961:151). The final lines of Gut Symmetries
represent one of many places in Winterson’s work where this becomes clear:
They were letting off fireworks down at the waterfront, the sky exploding
in grenades of colour. Whatever it is that pulls the pin, that hurls you past
the boundaries of your own life into a brief and total beauty, even for a
moment, it is enough. (GS 219)
In passages such as this, Winterson’s magic realist philosophy of meaning –
attaching value to visionary moments rather than to tangible reality – sets her far
apart from the logical positivists and the rational worldview they represent:
The earth is not flat and neither is reality. Reality is continuous, multiple,
simultaneous, complex, abundant and partly invisible. The imagination
alone can fathom this and it reveals its fathomings through art. (AO 151)
The faith in science as a truth-finding instrument that characterises the early
decades of the twentieth century went hand in hand with a firm belief in the
progress of human civilisation through the development of science and
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technology. Mach and his contemporaries were convinced that through this
progressive development the difference between fact and fiction would become
clear. Winterson believes nothing of the kind. Instead of being preoccupied with
building up a better collective future, Winterson situates the attainment of
meaning in a shattered complexity shaped by (a Romantic sense of)
fragmentation and (a postmodern acceptance of) dispersion. She talks about the
inevitably fragmentary notion of the self, and the role of fiction in the attempts
to understand the broken pieces. 
Piece by piece the fragments are returned; the body, the work, the love,
the life. What can be known about me? What I say? What I do? What I
have written? And which is true? That is, which is truer? Memory. My
licensed inventions. Not all of the fragments return. (AL 136)
Winterson locates cognising subjects within a framework of disruption much like
Derrida’s. She is interested in the sensibility that allows us to reach those
moments of truth in a world where meaning is so unstable that it seems to be in
a state of quantum fluctuation. Subject, like physical phenomena, to the
indeterminacy principle, meaning seems to be always on the verge of collapse. In
her world, therefore, there is no place for a positivist sense of progress. In Gut
Symmetries, the jigsaw is used as a metaphor for the impossibility of complete and
successful attainment of meaning. The narrator, Alice, however, fears that “there
is no picture, only fragments”. Still, she says, “perhaps [there is] a beauty, if it
were possible to find it” and “if there is beauty it will surprise me.” And then she
rephrases: “I said I suspect that there is no picture. I should have said that
whatever the picture is, it will not be the one on the box” (GS 113). As we see in
the next passage, Winterson’s doubts about the possibility to attain complete
meaning and successful correspondence causes narrative to be seen as a
‘nightmare’ rather than a fairy tale. That is why, although we need to tell stories,
actually, ‘no story can be told’. 
Walk with me. Hand in hand through the nightmare of narrative. Need to
tell a story when no story can be told. Walk the level reassuring floor
towards the open trapdoor. (GS 157)
Transcendental meaning or beauty, can, however, be grasped if we look beyond
the pieces and the fragments. This experience, however, is not a certainty, and if
it is found at all, it is transient. Therefore, the modern view of human history as
an “unvollendetes Projekt” (cf. Habermas 1990), a programmatic outline that
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holds a promise of progress, would be too deterministic and too restricted a
worldview for Winterson. Instead of positing a collective fiction as a guideline
for humanity, Winterson creates imaginative or even visionary characters that
live in a world of uncertainty and surprise – they cannot predict if or when they
will be able to break through the constructs of that collective reality. Winterson’s
world encourages such transitions or escapes to other states, as we can see in Art
& Lies, where Picasso becomes conscious of her desire to escape: 
It is giddy, this fluid geometry, the points, solids, surfaces and lines that
must undergo change. I will not be what I was. (AL 93)
As I will argue in chapter 5, Winterson feels that a visionary escape from a flat
world of solid geometry is restricted to passionately inspired people – mostly
artists, and mainly women. Such individuals can be guides for other people (like
Fortunata is Jordan’s guide in Sexing the Cherry) – but the way ahead, the way to
lead one’s life, is not a singular way – Winterson’s ways are multiple and open-
ended.
The influence of positivist schools such as the Vienna Circle and
Frankfurter Schule lingers on until this day. If we look at the efforts of the
sceptics societies (cf. page 9) or the work of scientists like Alan Sokal
(cf. page 28), it is not surprising that Jeanette Winterson feels the need to keep
reacting against the Enlightenment’s heritage. It is not difficult to diagnose our
own era as struggling between the legacies of both Enlightenment and
Romanticism. Winterson firmly chooses the Romantic side in these
philosophical riots, siding with all those that posit themselves within the
metaphysical tradition. Anyone subscribing to positivist ideas, then, will be her
opponent. “She had never heard of mixed feelings. There were friends and there
were enemies” (OAF 3).
Winterson and Postmodernism
There are many aspects of her writing that allow us to call Jeanette Winterson a
postmodernist, yet at the same time her work abounds with evidence to the
contrary. Which aspects of her work lead us to conclude that she is, and when
do we have to conclude that she is not? 
At the root of the postmodern debate is the problematisation of ‘fact’ and
‘fiction’. Brian McHale, the author of Postmodernist Fiction, argues that while a
collective fiction, a so-called ‘socially constructed reality’ (cf. Berger and
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Luckmann 1966) “constitutes the common ground of interaction among the
members of society, these same members also experience a multiplicity of
private or peripheral realities: dreaming, play, fiction, and so on. But these other
realities are felt to be marginal; it is the shared reality that is ‘paramount’ ”
(McHale 1987:37). It is precisely the marginalisation of these other realities that
postmodern writers, like Winterson, object to. In the following passage from Art
& Lies, we see how Handel’s juvenile alter ego (Frederick) balances private and
collective realities against one another:
Fire water, dissolving mirage of the moving solid, aqua vitae. Truth or the
image of truth? 
The boy in the boat dragged his hands though the drowned city. At his
motion the houses burst apart, only to reunite again, whole, in another
patch of water. He looked up from the water at the steady copies of the
images he saw (...) What should he trust? Their world or this other in his
hands? Actual life or imaginative life. The world he could inherit or the
world he could invent? (AL 198-199)
In the next passage Winterson shows us to which side she thinks the scales will
tip:
The world of everyday experience is a world of redundant form. Form
coarsened, cheapened, made easy and comfortable, the hackneyed and
the clichéd, not what is found but what is lost. Invention then would
return to us forms not killed through too much use. Art does it. (AL 199)
Winterson’s fictions abandon the collective construction and radically opt for
personal inventions. In Art Objects, Winterson repeatedly argues that, in today’s
society, we are in need of the kind of reality that only art can offer. At the same
time, however, we have become afraid of the risks involved in changing our
reality. We should overcome this fear, she strongly feels, and find the courage to
plunge into invented worlds of our own making: 
In search of this truth, beyond the fear of the consequences of this truth,
are the flight-maps of art. When truth is at stake, and in a society that
desperately needs truth, we have to be wary of those side-tracks to
nowhere that mislead us from the journeys we need to make. (AO 117) 
In this respect Winterson is very much a postmodern writer. As Theo D’haen
indicates in his article “Postmodernisms: From Fantastic to Magic Realist”, “the
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postmodern fantastic is not just symptomatic of, but literally identical with the
postmodern freedom for the imagination to endlessly create.” (D’haen
1997:283). The postmodern is fantastic, because it is “cut loose from any
ascertainable reality” (Ibid.) and is used as a “liberation of the mind” from the
“functionalizing and dehumanising influences of an anonymous society that can
only offer stereotypes and clichés” (Hoffman in D’haen 1997:283). 
The notions that man is cut loose from any ascertainable reality and that
there is no real world behind our (re)presentations of it, are central to
postmodernity. As Hans Bertens formulates it: “postmodernism rejects the
empirical idea that language can represent reality, that the world is accessible to
us through language because its objects are mirrored in the language that we use”
(Bertens 1995:6). This belief, often referred to as relativism, first started to take
hold in the days when such discoveries as quantum physics made scientists
realise that reality is in part shaped by human expectation, and when frictions
between the different horizons of race, gender and class proved insoluble. The
notion took hold that truth is culturally and linguistically determined. Due to this
loss of consensus about what is ‘real’, postmodernists started to question the
meaning of the images we produce, feeling that images present rather than
represent a reality. Philosophers like Jacques Derrida and literary theoreticians
like Paul de Man took this idea one step further by saying that texts – but this
holds true for any form of postmodern art – must acknowledge their own
performativity, their own self-referentiality. Postmodernism is very much
concerned with the problematic relationship between text and its referent. To
postmodernists “language constitutes, rather than reflects, the world, and (...)
knowledge is therefore always distorted by language, that is, by the historical
circumstances and the specific environment in which it arises” (Ibid.). 
Winterson shares with these postmodern thinkers a problematisation of
the relationship between signifier and signified. To her, knowledge and art
exceed mere mimetic functions. Winterson does not want “real paintings, real
words. All of us are subject to this bombardment, which (...) deadens our
sensibilities” (AO 15-16). Not unlike philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and
Paul de Man and contemporary writers like John Fowles and Angela Carter,
Winterson wants to remain “resolutely outside the mimicry of Realism” (AO 72).
For Winterson, language is the medium through which we can shape and
understand an ‘Other’ reality: “Matisse’s distortions are not faulty Realism, they
are a different kind of reality”(AO 49). 
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The question is, however, whether or not she thinks that the relationship
between sign and world is completely lost – whether she believes in the
breakdown of ‘correspondence’, the way Derrida and De Man do. In the
following passage from Art & Lies, the poet Sappho discusses her art, especially
the relationships between words and their meanings:
The wingèd word. The mercurial word. The word that is both moth and
lamp. The word that rises above itself. The word that is itself and more.
The associative word light with meanings. The word not netted by
meaning. The exact word wide. The word not whore or cenobite. The
word unlied. (AL 137)
It is clear that Sappho, ventriloquizing Winterson’s poetics, believes that words
are more than mere representations of the real. Words are associative, and
through their ‘wingedness’ they are not bound or heavy, but free and light. They
connote more than they denote. The narrow meaning can widen. As Winterson’s
advocate of passion and art, Sappho believes that language is creative, revelatory.
But does this mean, in Bentham’s words, that ‘all poetry is misrepresentation’?
Are words, then, so loosely connected to their referents that they cease to mean
anything definite? Have they utterly come loose from their functions as
signifiers? No. Winterson calls the word “not whore or cenobite” – words are
neither promiscuous nor chaste. She feels that words must be “unlied” – the
word must be stripped of the lie. She does not think, therefore, that words always
misrepresent the world. Although they are associative, Winterson feels that texts
are, in a way at least, faithful to an idea or meaning behind the text.
This may seem contradictory. How can a word be exact and associative at
the same time? Winterson here assumes a position that transcends the binary
opposition between realism and constructivism. Before explaining Winterson’s
escape of this binarism, I want to stress that contemporary philosophers like
Bruno Latour and Hans-Georg Gadamer too, attempt to overcome this
bifurcation. We find it hard to escape from these oppositional pairs due to the
way in which modern subjects have learned to think. Both Latour and Gadamer
argue that, in the course of time, the modern mind was binarily shaped. We are
used to consider opposites like subjective/objective, relative/absolute or fact/
fiction as exclusive disjunctions. Something is either true or false. Something is
either a personal fantasy or a generally recognised fact. Latour as well as
Gadamer attempt, through their work, to deflate this oppositional thinking. 
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Latour’s philosophy is a reaction against the dichotomy between radical
subjectivism on the hand and a strong belief in objective knowledge on the other,
a dichotomy that helped shape modernity. He re-establishes the objective nature
of the object, without excluding the social shaping of it. In the opening
paragraphs of “Do You Believe in Reality. News from the Trenches of the
Science Wars” he sneers at linguistic (and social) constructivism: 
Yes, we have lost the world. Yes, we are forever prisoners of language. No,
we will never regain certainty. No, we will never get beyond our biases.
Yes, we will forever be stuck within our own selfish standpoint. Bravo!
Encore! (Latour 1999:8)
But Latour is not aiming at the total eradication of the notion of ‘social shaping’.
His philosophy denounces both subjectivism and objectivism. The following
passage neatly sums up his position. Here, he describes the mutually exclusive
points of view that have brought forward a division within the western mind. He
firstly talks about social constructivism, and secondly, he addresses objectivism:
In the first denunciation, objects counts for nothing; they are just there to
be used as the white screen on to which society projects its cinema. But in
the second, they are so powerful that they shape the human society, while
the social construction of the sciences that have produced them remains
invisible. (Latour 1993:53)
In his attempt to overcome this division, Latour introduces the notion of
hybridity. He argues that people have never been able to distinguish between
value, truth, and myth, and that they can only learn to understand the world if
they abandon these categories. For as long as people believe that hybridisation is
undesirable and seek for purity, they are subscribing to what he calls the ‘Modern
Constitution’. Hybridity is a taboo within modernity’s self-image. Only when
people begin to accept the entangledness of objects, ideas, constructs, aims, facts
and fantasies, can they start to understand the social processes that weave these
things together, and begin to understand their cultural identity as ‘non-moderns’.
Another way to overcome the bifurcation between subjectivity and objectivity,
similar to Latour’s ‘meeting in the middle’, is proposed by the German
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. When discussing Gadamer’s hermeneutic
method, R.J. Bernstein says:
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(...) philosophic hermeneutics contributes to overcoming the Cartesian
Anxiety [the separation between subject and object, A.E.] and helps us to
move beyond objectivism and subjectivism. (Bernstein 1983:114) 
Gadamer mostly speaks about the relationship between the world of art and the
cognising subject, but this discussion can easily be extended to the relationship
between the world in general on the one hand and on the other hand any human
being trying to understand this world. When I use the phrases ‘on the one hand’
and ‘on the other hand’, this is in fact inaccurate, because it is precisely this
fabrication of oppositions Gadamer’s project seeks to end. In his account of
Gadamer’s philosophy, Bernstein explains that 
A work of art is not to be thought of as a self-contained and self-enclosed
object (something an sich) that stands over against a spectator, who, as a
subject, must purify himself or herself in order to achieve aesthetic
consciousness of the work of art. (Bernstein 1983:123)
Instead, we should
Recognize (...) the primacy of the play itself, the to-and-fro movement of
play, the sense in which play has a rhythm and structure of its own – then
we may begin to realize that to analyze play in terms of the attitudes of
subjects toward what is objective or ‘out there’ distorts the very
phenomenon that we are trying to describe. (Bernstein 1983:122) 
And,
Understanding must be conceived as a part of the process of the coming
into being of meaning, in which the significance of all statements (...) is
formed and made complete. (Bernstein 1983:125)
The notion of play within the process of coming into being of meaning,
therefore, is not considered to be detrimental to understanding. The formation
of significance in fact consists of the to-and-fro movement between what the
world has to offer to the subject and how the subjects tries to match his horizon
of interpretation with the object. These attempts at convergence are, for
Gadamer, the essence of understanding. Summing up, both Latour and
Gadamer are trying to define that middle ground between the Welt an Sich and
the solipsistic subject, attempting to escape from the bifurcation between
objectivism and relativism they both experience as a dead end. 
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Winterson, too, refuses to accept this bifurcation, and in the next passage,
taken from Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, she unequivocally rejects both
objectivism (‘true things to be found’) and relativism (‘all kinds of things can be
proved’): 
Some people say there are true things to be found, some people say all
kinds of things can be proved. I don’t believe them. (OAF 91)
Winterson believes that words can be exact and associative at the same time. By
saying so, she diminishes the opposition between mimesis on the one hand and
creation and expression on the other, in an effort to overcome what Bernstein
calls the ‘Cartesian Anxiety’. In one of the essays in Art Objects, where she
displays her admiration for Virginia Woolf’s work, she expounds her views on
this topic:
Exactness allows intimacy. The exactness a poet seeks is not the pedantry
of the grammarian or the pile of dead bodies to be found in any technical
manual. It is the same inspiration of relationship that the painter seeks,
that the architect seeks, that the musician seeks. It is a harmony of form.
A closed balanced series of weights and measures and proportions that
agree with one another and that agree as a whole. Poets and cathedrals
sing. 
The language of The Waves is the language of rapture. For some people
this is embarrassing. The twentieth century, in the footsteps of the
nineteenth, has difficulty with the notion of art as ecstasy. Yet that is the
traditional notion and I believe it is the right one. It is quite easy to live at
a low level of sensibility; it is the way of the world. There is no need to ask
art to show us how to be less than we are. It is heightened, grand, an act
of effrontery. It is a challenge to the confines of the spirit. (AO 93-94) 
To Winterson, exactness does not stand in the way of rapture and intimacy. Her
words are not exact in a mechanical or mathematical sense. What she refers to is
an organic and monist form of understanding, that does not exclude the use of
emotion from the attainment of truth. This in fact allows words to evoke worlds
that transcend everyday reality, yet always to be connected to reality. The
experience of a dull and dreary reality is the experience of a reality of badly
chosen words, of words used carelessly. Winterson adds:
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There is no fight between exactness and rapture. The Waves is carried away
by its own words. The words in rhythmic motion in and out,
preoccupying, echoing, leaving a trail across the mind. 
Rapture is a state of transformation. Woolf lifts up the veil of words that
filmy or thick hides myself from the moment, you from me. These are not
words to pad me against emotion or to be chanted as a prayer to make life
safer than it is. These are words that cut through the semblance of the
thing to the thing itself. Against the blunted days of approximation comes
the clarity of the Word. This is frightening, this is a relief. This is what I
have been hoping for and what I fear. (...) Reality of language, rapture of
language, exactness of words that has found me out. Words than wipe
clean the dirt on the window-pane leave me with an unexpected view.
(AO 94-95) 
In this passage Winterson not only describes what art and language should do,
she also succeeds in meeting her own demands: her words have a cutting
precision and yet carry us away, move us in their furious amorousness.
Winterson both argues and shows us that exactness and passion do not exclude
one another. Through this heightened state of emotional sensibility, she feels, we
can reach an unmistakeable truth. This poetics is in fact Romantic – or perhaps
Neo-Platonic – but not postmodern. By holding on to ‘exactness’ and by
believing in the possibility of a precise understanding of the ‘thing itself’,
Winterson’s poetics resists Derrida’s idea that “the absence of the transcendental
signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely” (Derrida in
Rice & Waugh 1996:178). Indeed, Winterson holds that signification is finite.
She will not let go of the “transcendental signified”, which limits the domain and
play of signification. Winterson won’t let go of reality as a presence: 
To suggest that the writer, the painter, the musician, is the one out of
touch with the real world is a doubtful proposition. It is the artist who
must apprehend things fully, in their own right, communicating them not
as symbols but as living realities with the power to move. (AO 145) 
Yet, where Derrida and Winterson share a desire to free words from their
mimetic harnesses, they do so with different goals in mind. They both stress the
freedom and play of rhetoric, but Derrida ends up as a relativist, whereas
Winterson holds on to the ‘exactness’ of the word. This exactness is an
emotional mimesis, and in that sense, a transcendental or visionary mimesis. For
instance, when Monet tried to capture the different faces of Rouen Cathedral, his
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personal emotions of the moment and the handicap of his impaired eyesight did
not prevent him from creating an image that feels ‘true’ to many people. To
Winterson, this aspect of personal distortion (subjectivity) is an essential part of
her idea of representation (of objectivity). 
So we see that Winterson clearly opts for a ‘middle ground’, much like
Latour and Gadamer. She fuses objects, ideas, memories, facts and fantasies into
a new reality, beyond, yet not unconnected to, the Ding an Sich. 
If the true artist is connected, then he or she has much to give us because
it is connection that we seek. Connection to the past, to one another, to
the physical world, still compelling, in spite of the ravages of technology.
A picture, a book, a piece of music, can remind me of feelings, thinkings,
I did not even know I had forgot. (AO 13)
Although Winterson makes use of postmodern techniques (notably open-
endedness, fragmentation, and alternative history writing), Winterson is not
utterly sceptical about the breakdown of meaning, truth and reality. The
fragmentation of her narratives is omnipresent, fluid transitions between
paragraphs are often lacking, and her characters often express opinions that
appear to favour the dispersion of meaning (cf. page 67). Yet, Winterson always
presents an all-encompassing, comforting unity – an almost transcendent
experience suggesting the presence of eternal value and beauty, celebrating a
visionary mimesis, and exactness in a state of rapture.
Winterson feels that a postmodern liberation from clichéd and collective
constructions of reality, a liberation from grand narratives and the dominance of
reason, does not justify a relativist philosophy, but offers us instead a non-
postmodern opportunity to become more real:
If we can fictionalise ourselves, and consciously, we are freed into a new
kind of communication. It is abstract, light, changeful, genuine. It is what
Wordsworth called ‘the real solid world of images’. It may be that to
understand ourselves as fictions, is to understand ourselves as fully as we
can. (AO 60)
To Winterson, the fictionalisation of the self, the enchantment of the world and
the abandonment of traditional objectivity does not lead to the idea that there is
no extra-linguistic reality. The human imagination and our language shape the
world and only through a poetic sensibility we can begin to understand ‘other’
realities, but that does not mean that the world does not thrust itself upon us.
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The most telling passage in which she addresses this, is the passage already
quoted on page 72, which is taken from the three-page chapter called
‘Deuteronomy’, in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit: 
Some people say there are true things to be found, some people say all
kinds of things can be proved. I don’t believe them. (OAF 91)
In the Bible, Deuteronomy is the lawbook of truth; it appeals to divine authority.
The special status of ‘Deuteronomy’ in Oranges arises from the fact that it has an
unknown narrator, speaking in a philosophical tone that is not found in any of
the other story-lines that make up the book. This separate piece of writing thus
gains a general, impersonal credibility. The voice, paradoxically enough, appears
to abandon ‘truth’ and ‘authority’; it installs the postmodern notions of
subjectivity and play into the heart of epistemology. Although she grants that
subjectivity disables objectivity, Winterson in the end does not equate
subjectivity and play to the kind of relativism that we find for instance in the
work of Paul Feyerabend. His phrase ‘anything goes’ indicates his belief that, in
principle, all forms of scientific theories are worthwhile. He argued for
theoretical pluralism, whereby scientists are invited to construct as many
different theories about the same thing as possible. Unlike the positivists,
Feyerabend believed that theories give meaning to facts, not the other way
around. Winterson, however, rejects such relativism. Moreover, she abandons
the uncompromising either-or distinction between objectivism and relativism.
Winterson dismisses both extremes. Instead, Winterson favours the subjective
authority of the subject and its true will to grasp the ‘other’. Although she often
plays with postmodern abandonment of a knowable world, in the end, she does
not abandon reality as such – because the subject cherishes ardent passions for
objectivities like beauty and love.
The invocation of fantastic realms and the attachment of an objectivity
status to those realms does not have mere aesthetic motivations. Such
‘otherwordliness’ is infused with political meaning. To Winterson – and other
feminine authors of the late twentieth century – it is necessary to overthrow the
established order and to decentralise what has become centralised over time. In
the way in which it voices the opinion of squatters, bums, murderers, coloured
refugees, whores and other non-‘white Anglo-Saxon protestant males’,
Winterson’s work is strongly geared towards the centralising of the ex-centric.
She aims to restore those values that have been marginalised by the strength of
Jeanette Winterson’s Enchanted Science
76
the modern voice – the feminine irrational, the unstable and uncertain nature of
knowledge, the epistemological value of art, and the necessity of mysticism and
intuition within the human epstemic system. The modern worldview held in
place by the concepts ‘man’ and ‘reason’ is destabilised and replaced by the
otherness of ‘woman’ and ‘emotion’. This leads me to conclude that Winterson’s
work – like other postmodern art “cannot but be political, at least in the sense
that its representations – its images and stories – are anything but neutral,
however ‘aestheticised’ they may appear to be in their parodic self-reflexivity”
(Hutcheon 1989:3). Winterson marginalises the established order, resting on the
massive pillars of essentialism, universalism, and patriarchy, and establishes an
almost utopian new world made up of elements that escape these categories. 
Jeanette Winterson’s utopia, however, is different from that of most other
postmodernist writers, who consider the privileging of one set of values above
another as inherently totalitarian. Winterson returns to the Romantic (and
originally Platonic) idea that the artist is the guide of mankind in sensing and
showing which set of values is the right one for the liberation of mankind. In
Percy Shelley’s philosophy, the poet plays the central part in showing man the
world anew. Shelley found that if there would be no more poets, “language will
be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse” (Adams 1971:500). He
says that poets are the ‘legislators of the world’ because they create new linguistic
possibilities: the poet governs the way reality is depicted in language, and can
thus reveal reality, since by no other way than through language can reality be
understood. The poet re-creates the world by changing the forms by which the
ordinary man sees the world: 
Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors
of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words
which express what they understand not; the trumpets which sing to
battle, and feel not what they inspire; the influence which is moved not,
but moves. Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.
(Shelley in Adams 1971:513)
Winterson’s idea of the cultural function of the poet fits in very well with
Shelley’s ideas:
When we say ‘I haven’t got the words’, the lack is not in the language nor
in our emotional state, it is in the breakdown between the two. The poet
heals that breakdown and not only for those who read poetry. If we want
a living language, a language capable of expressing all that it is called upon
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to express in a vastly changing world, then we need men and women
whose whole self is bound up in that work with words. (AO 35-36)
In Winterson as in Shelley, the poet’s work is indispensable for the creation of a
changing language. In their poetics, language is regarded as the only means by
which reality can be understood, a reality that both writers regard as utopian.
Towards the end of the sixth chapter of his Unsere Postmoderne Moderne,
Wolfgang Welsch discusses the question whether there is a relation between
postmodernism and utopian thinking. He concludes that postmodernism is
neither purely defeatist nor purely visionary and that, despite its “Begrenztheit
der eigenen Perspektive” one utopian idea remains implicit in postmodernism –
and that is “die Utopie (...) der Vielheit” (Welsch 1991:183). A pluralist utopia
has become the substitute for the grand narratives that dominated modernity
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Jean-Francois Lyotard’s project
is a blueprint for such a pluralist utopia. He feels society should be founded on
respect for the differences within societal life. To him, a utopian society is one
where the search for justice and the search for the unknown are equally
respected. Lyotard’s ideas, therefore, show that postmodernism and utopian
thinking are not mutually exclusive and can be integrated in a single philosophy.
Characteristic of this postmodern longing for a utopia, is the fact that any shared
and broad view of reality is linked to discontentment. Postmodern man does not
feel comfortable in the world, but is yearning for an ideal of plurality, where he
hopes to find a new “Begeisterung” (Ibid. 184). In this respect Winterson cannot
be called a postmodernist. She does not reject the vision of unity as a mono-
utopia. She strongly believes in the Romantic idea that this “Begeisterung” can
be brought about by another Unity; by Oneness.
If we look at Winterson’s fiction, it appears to embrace pluralism and
seems to echo a pluralist philosophy. Her “Vielheitsinteresse” can be found, for
instance, in her treatment of ‘self’, such as in Gut Symmetries, where the traditional
notion of ‘self’ as a coherent entity dissolves as Stella describes how her self is
dispersed through time:
The point that I am, the definite bounded thing in time, is beginning to
break up. I am dispersing myself through my known past and my
unknown future. The present is without meaning. (GS 185-186)
The sense of who I am is strengthening and weakening simultaneously.
(GS 186) 
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Even the most intimate knowledge, the knowledge of one’s own being, one’s
own identity, is lost in confusion. Winterson often attaches such rich imagery of
fragmentation to moments of crisis. We saw something similar happen to Jordan
in his search for himself (cf. page 58). However, the sense of fragmentation that
emanates from Winterson’s work, is always overshadowed by a much stronger
sense of prophetic certainty powered by a strong belief in art. And although this
position undermines – as postmodern art tends to do – the dominance of reason,
it is not a postmodern stance at all. Although it is clear that Winterson reacts
against modernity, her work is not vintage postmodernism at all. But it must
certainly be placed right at the heart of modernity’s countercultures, as they have
been emerging and re-emerging over time.
Enchantment as Resistance
What is crucial to Winterson’s work is an affirmation of the values of art. She
denounces the Enlightenment worldview of Descartes, Hobbes and Newton as
utterly rational and economic (and therefore distorted), and contrasts it with the
world of art, where visionary power and imaginative freedom produce true
knowledge of the world. This true knowledge, however, should not be confused
with objective knowledge. Winterson’s revelation of true knowledge lies in a
subjective experience – by which the fantastic becomes an integral part of the
material world. She would say that knowledge of the world is inevitably personal,
which does not make it any less trustworthy. Winterson dismisses the idea that
disinterested knowledge would be free from any cultural ‘infection’, and combats
the idea of fiction as a noxious brew of chaos. She does this with a fervour not
unlike that of freedom fighters, heroes in a struggle for a better world. As Theo
D’haen says in his article “Postmodernisms: From Phantastic to Magic Realist”
(...) magic realism is a form of resistance. (...) Joined to the increasing
preeminence awarded to the discourse of reason, ratio, especially from the
eighteenth century on, this western sense of history [or science; A.E.]
allowed for the marginalization of all non-Europeans and of large groups
within Europe itself [poetry; A.E.]. The realist novel, in the guise of as if
history [as-if science, A.E.] quite “naturally” celebrated the faith in reason
(...) (D’haen in Bertens and Fokkema 1997:289)
Jeanette Winterson’s creation of enchanted, fairy tale worlds is an act of
resistance; they emerge from a grudge against those forms of science that sought
to enlighten our world, that are the institutionalisation of common sense and
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rationalism. Again, Winterson’s attitude is both postmodern and Romantic.
Romantic art is directed against the superficiality of society and sought to escape
to different times, exotic places and into the more mysterious workings of the
mind. It is escapist and directed against the dull life devoid of imagination. This
description will fit Winterson’s work equally well. Winterson’s depiction of the
world is postmodern in the sense that it can be considered directed against those
realistic discourses that represent the dominant cultural order. As we will see in
chapter 3, Winterson’s imaginative representations of the world (and space in
particular) can be seen as a revolt against the domination of a metanarrative that
overpowers and censors alternative discourses that subsequently become
marginalised. In Jeanette Winterson’s novels, the Newtonian worldview is
regarded as the overpowering regime. In her work, a fantastic, or even magic
realist concept of space, challenges the Newtonian mechanical representation of
the universe.
We can conclude that Jeanette Winterson opposes the ideas of universality
and fixity, and that she positions herself as an enemy of modernity. Her love of
fragmentation and her interest in the subjective entail a disapproval of the
universal, the objective and the power of metanarrative. Winterson rejects the
Enlightenment belief in the mechanical (and therefore predictable) nature of the
world, its trust in scientific method and a detached objectivity, and its belief in
the progress of science. Winterson’s anti-mechanical attitude is partially inspired
by the pre-modern world of magical thinking, partly inspired by Romanticism as
the counterculture against Enlightenment methods of understanding, and at the
same time it shows parallels with anti-rational trends within our age, i.e. the New
Age movement. Yet, at the same time, Winterson is a metaphysic and a magic
realist. She interweaves everyday reality with dreams, fairy tales and myth. Her
work is, all in all, firmly rooted in the anti-modern tradition. Winterson allies
herself with all the manifestations of this tradition, varying from postmodernism
and Romanticism to hermeticism and sometimes even Neo-Platonism:
I hope. And the hope that is in me is from the soul is for the soul. Not
present, actual, superficial life, but the real solid world of images. I hope
that the real solid world of images will prevail. (AL 143)
Winterson’s fiction shares many characteristics with other postmodern
literature. On the most fundamental level, however, Winterson refuses to fully
accept the central tenet of postmodernism – its linguistic turn. Winterson refuses
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to accept art’s presupposed inability to reach beyond the merely self-reflexive, as
to her, art connects us to a metaphysical reality. But Winterson’s metaphysical
world is unstable and unpredictable – which would again make her a postmodern
writer. Indeed, in Winterson’s works, the attainment of meaning is wound up in
its own unique historicity and is not universally present. Winterson rejects all
constant and unchangeable physics and metaphysics. Moreover, as we will see in
chapter 5, Winterson’s politics of centralising the ex-centric partly fails, as her
work keeps on inscribing the modernist dualities, especially the one between
masculinity and femininity. 
The duality between science and literature deserves extra attention, here.
As we can see in the following passage, the dichotomy between science (‘Time’)
and literature (‘poem’) is caught up in a political struggle like the one described
above. In the following passage, Sappho proclaims herself a warrior against
science, defending the value of poetry. Her words reveal Winterson to be a
postmodernist and especially an anti-modernist. But two dualities that have
shaped modern thinking remain forceful: science versus literature and
masculinity versus femininity:
I have raided my own body and made my poem out of his. Split Time’s
metre and snapped his smooth rhythms. I have learned his forms and
mastered them and so become mistress of what is my own. I am a warrior
and this is the epic of my resistance. (AL 64)
In the following two chapters, I shall look at the ways in which Winterson
attempts to bridge the gap between science and literature. I will argue that she
neither rejects nor celebrates science categorically, but that she only rejects
science when it enforces pure notions of masculinity and rationality. Winterson
embraces the foundations and imaginative potential of the new sciences, as they
seem to sustain her Romantic as well as postmodern aesthetic world – a world in
which fiction is no longer equalled with untruth and a world in which feminine
values are respected. In the next chapters, I shall therefore interpret her literary
strategies as attempts to produce a fusion between the two cultures.
I
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PLACE, SPACE AND UNCERTAINTY
In her writings, Jeanette Winterson refuses to accept the conventional
concepts of place and space produced by the realistic discourses of the
dominant cultural order. For Winterson, that dominant order is the
Newtonian mechanistic model of the universe, postulating a stable and
deterministic world. Winterson’s hostility, based on her Romantic and
postmodern anti-realism, leads her to construct alternative realities,
referring to current theories in physics, metaphysical concepts and
literary orders. What metaphors does she borrow from physics to create
these alternatives? How does she construct these fantastic, or even
magic realist images of place and space? And how do these images serve
her political goals? 
Aesthetic Antidotes 
Winterson makes use of alternative ideas of space to describe our daily
environment, the universe, and our inner world. She disrupts the modes of
ordinary linguistic discourse to tear her readers loose from their commonplace
ideas of place and space, and to renew their lost capacities for fresh experiences.
She also blames the mechanistic worldview for the loss of enchantment, and for
marginalising myth. To her, mechanistic and empiric science is depressing. In her
short story “A Green Square”, for instance, the narrator accuses science: “Deep
space is a litter-garden of clapped out rockets and abandoned probes. We’ll be
going there ourselves soon. Human detritus on its final adventure” (TWOP 197).
By means of various literary strategies, Jeanette Winterson constructs alternative
ideas of space as antidotes to the gloom of the commonplace. She leaves behind
the dominant uncompromising worldview of fixity and immobility, and creates
postmodern spaces that embrace dynamic developments and fictional worlds.
Current scientific ideas, borrowed from quantum physics and the Grand Unified
Theory, are used to ‘fertilise’ those macroscopic and microscopic spaces.
Winterson, therefore, does not categorically abominate science. When science is
able to furnish fascinating metaphors to describe postmodern spaces, uncertain
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and unstable, she celebrates science as an integral part of a dynamic concept of
culture that calls to mind Porush’s Eudoxical discourse (cf. page 27) or Hayles’
cosmic web (cf. page 24). When physics underwrites Winterson’s postmodern
goals, when science supports an irrational, dynamic, fluid, and unstable concept
of space and place, Winterson’s usual enmity toward science makes place for
approval. It is then that science and literature become complementary,
collaborating in the undetermined, complex and fertile process of expressing our
experience of reality. Only then science and beauty go hand in hand, as in this
quote from “A Green Square”:
We were in a boat and the sea was deep and clear. I’ve seen a photograph
of the earth, copyright NASA, taken from the moon. The seas cup the
world in blue. The blue-held world rested on light. 
The sea is not dark and dense but banded with light, as if the light could
be mined. I’m an optical millionaire, floating on gold and platinum, gold
beads on the surface, pale bars beneath. 
I’m as rich as a fish. (TWOP 198-199)
The NASA photograph, product of technology and symbol of scientific
achievement, is the source of an aesthetic experience. As the story unfolds, this
experience turns out to be a significant moment in the psychological
development of the narrator. The beauty that astronomy produces becomes one
of the main ingredients of the narrator’s psychological space – his utopia. Here,
we are confronted with a specifically Romantic element of style: Schiller’s
‘aestheticisation’ (cf. page 55) or Novalis’ ‘Romantisierung der Welt’ (cf.
page 56): Winterson enriches the meaning of the scientific object by means of
this Romantic literary strategy. 
It is not only that objects from science are interpreted aesthetically;
scientific elements are often described as if they are endowed with life or even
human feelings. In the extract that follows, Winterson stages a sudden and
spontaneous fusion between physics and sex. An almost cinematic transition
links the characteristics of space with those of a female body. 
If light travelled in a curved line it would mean that space itself is curved.
(Pitch of her body under me.)
‘Alice?’ (GS 17)
Winterson infuses the abstraction of space with very direct, warm and tangible
feelings. This also happens the other way around: human behaviour is often
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compared to the behaviour of macrocosmic bodies or of microcosmic particles.
Objects are personified and persons are ‘objectified’. Winterson’s ideas of space
involve a blurring of the boundaries between subject and object. She imports
scientific concepts into literature and ‘fertilises’ them by applying literary
strategies and by attaching mythical and religious associations to them. In the
following passage from Gut Symmetries, the natural laws that apply to microscopic
structures and that are explained within the framework of the Grand Unified
Theory (GUT), are applied to the love affair between Jove and Alice. When
heated, microscopic structures react in ways that correspond to the manner in
which the relationship between Jove and Alice develops. Changing positions at
sub-atomic level parallel changing positions in their relationship.
Our affair, like every other, was conducted inside a vas hermeticum: a
sealed vessel, shut off from the world, to boil and cool according to its
own laws. 
What did we hope for, heating and re-heating ourselves to absurd
temperatures? (...) At about a billion degrees K (...) he and she might
begin to counterfeit the interior of a neutron star and could rapidly be
heated further into sub-atomic particles. You be a quark and I’ll be a
lepton. 
If we had the courage to cook ourselves to a quadrillion degrees, the
splitting, the dividing, the ripping, the hurting, will be over. At this
temperature, the weak force and the electromagnetic force are united. A
little hotter, (...) GUT symmetries appear. (GS 100)
Besides personification, Winterson also uses incongruence as a strategy to evoke
alternative realities. In the following excerpt, fantasy, volatile and spiritual,
lacking spatial form and having no physical presence, is juxtaposed to an idea of
space that does involve size, form and place. This juxtaposition produces a
mysterious question:
Infinitely tiny, perhaps, but even without a lover’s gaze, how many
fantasies can force themselves into an infinitesimal space? (AL 30) 
There is, however, more to the question than the strange effect caused by the
incongruity of the concepts used. The philosophically inclined reader will be
reminded of Thomas Aquinas’ old scholastic question “whether several angels
can be at the same time in the same place?” (Aquinas 2003, q. 52, art. 3). This
question is an intriguing example of the old amalgam of metaphysics and
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mathematics, of speculation and logic. It takes us back to a period when
disciplinary separations within western intellectual thinking did not yet exist.
Winterson’s question, therefore, does not only serve to free the imagination, but
also to recall and pay homage to a way of thinking that got lost. 
Explorations of the philosophical concepts of finiteness and infinity, as in
the lines above, figure prominently in Winterson’s writing. Her panorama of
endless fantastic epistemological possibilities celebrates infinity. Limitations,
borders, confinement, and stability are rejected. In Art Objects, she proclaims the
inability of the applied sciences (technology and medical science) to escape from
the dreariness of a finite world. The universe is infinite, and in their minds her
characters long to be part of that infinity. Winterson believes that art helps them
to emotionally experience infinity, an experience that is blocked off by the
restraints of everyday life. Art overcomes this constraint of common experience:
We know that the universe is infinite, expanding and strangely complete,
that it lacks nothing we need, but in spite of that knowledge, the tragic
paradigm of human life is lack, loss, finality, a primitive doomsaying that
has not been repealed by technology or medical science. The arts stand in
the way of this doomsaying. Art objects. The nouns become an active
force not a collector’s item. Art objects. (AO 19)
Winterson hints at the kinship between theoretical physics (the expanding
universe) and art, and complains that, unlike the arts, the applied sciences have
not been able to absorb concepts like infinity. Winterson’s work shows us that
she is very much aware of the fact that certain branches of science have explored
alternative ideas of space. She uses the correspondences between art and the new
sciences to her own advantage. Non-Euclidean geometry, for instance,
revolutionised the field of geometry, challenging the limited assumptions of
Euclidean geometry. Both in non-Euclidean geometry and in Winterson’s
writing, habits of visualisation that have their basis in the self-evident and in
common sense, are replaced by more complex, imaginatively richer concepts of
the framework in which bodies move. A new visualisation of this framework
suddenly forces itself upon the characters, and only then an hitherto invisible
reality reveals itself. Revelations of other layers beyond the surface, of new
dimensions in space, lead to unexpected turns in characters’ experiences. They
also account for the sudden narrative turns that occur in Winterson’s writing.
The unexpected swing from Russia to Venice in The Passion is an example of such
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a turn. The following passage from Sexing the Cherry shows how revealing such
an experience can be:
A man or woman sunk in dreams that cannot be spoken, about a life they
do not possess, comes suddenly to a door in the wall. They open it.
Beyond the door is that life and a man or a woman to whom it is already
natural. It may not be possessions they want, it may very well be the lack
of them, but the secret life is suddenly revealed. This is their true home
and this is their beloved. (STC 74)
All through her work, Winterson repeatedly states that life is not a continuous
stream – it is built from scattered parts, places and experiences. The ruptures and
jumps in her narrative structures reflect that insight. Winterson’s characters’
mental breakthroughs and the ways in which the environments in her novels
behave, often involve abrupt transitions as well. Winterson tries to elucidate how
her narrators experience radical changes in (their perceptions of) time and space.
More than once, she uses geometrical metaphors to do so. The possibilities that
are unlocked by non-Euclidean geometry (e.g. the theoretical existence of
wormholes) have had an enormous impact on our worldview. Winterson’s
narrators experience revelations similar to scientific revolutions like this
particular one. 
Winterson refers directly to non-Euclidean thinking in Gut Symmetries only.
In her earlier writings, she merely hints at the strange behaviour of surfaces and
lines. The following passage from Sexing the Cherry, for instance, suggests a non-
Euclidean concept of space: 
Start another drawing (...) and (...) identify, if you can, the places you have
not found yet on those other maps, the connections obvious only to you.
Round and flat, only very little has been discovered. (STC 81)
Whether Winterson here is only referring to the revolution from the flat earth
theory to the idea of the earth as a globe, or also to the revolution from
Euclidean to non-Euclidean space, is not certain. She does not mention Euclid
in her early writings, yet the revolutions in the perceptions of space she describes
are strikingly similar. 
The difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean thinking, without
going into too much technical detail, is that the former recognises forms and
shapes only in a flat space, whereas the latter takes curved space into account. So
where in the one case the shortest path between two opposite points on a circle
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is through the centre of that circle, in the latter case the shortest distance may be
to follow the circle. Non-Euclidean thinking questioned certainties that appeared
to be self-evident in Euclidean thinking: in this system parallel lines can meet,
triangles become deformed, and short distances may turn out to be detours. The
interesting thing is that these two concepts of space – Euclidean and non-
Euclidean – are in fact both valid, although they seem very much opposed. 
After the discoveries of non-Euclidean geometries the duality of physical
and possible space was recognized. (Reichenbach 1958:6) 
Non-Euclidean images of space, though, are not easy to demonstrate and not
self-evident. They are counterintuitive and hard to visualise. The non-Euclidean
concept of space is therefore much better suited to magical worldviews than the
scientific rigor of the Euclidean system, which is always transparent, lucid and
logical. 
In The Philosophy of Space and Time, Hans Reichenbach investigates the limits
to our visualization of (elements of) space. He says that one is not able to
visualise all possible forms of space: “there exist limits for visualization that
prevent the production of images from going beyond certain simple relations”.
“we can visualize a sphere, but not of the dimensions of the earth.” He says that
what we can more easily visualise are elements of Euclidean geometry because it
includes theorems of similarity. “In non-Euclidean geometry there are no such
theorems” (Reichenbach 1958:44-45). A number of axioms form the foundation
of the Euclidean system. Axioms were thought to be “so self-evident that their
truth was accepted without reservation” (Reichenbach 1958:1). These axioms
subsequently gave rise to theorems, which, in turn, were considered equally true.
“Geometry thus became the prototype of a demonstrable science, the first
instance of a scientific rigor which, since that time, has been the ideal of every
science” (Ibid.). The axioms and theorems in Euclidean geometry are thought to
be self-revealing data accounting for empirically perceived space as an empirical
fact. Cambridge philosopher Robert Audi states that 
From the point of view of logic and rigor, Euclid was thought to be an
apotheosis of certainty in human knowledge; indeed, ‘Euclidean’ was also
used to suggest certainty, without any particular concern with geometry.
(Audi 1996:251) 
Winterson’s views on Euclidean geometry affirm Audi’s statement:
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In the nineteenth century, most people knew their place, even if they did
not know the mathematics that predicated it. In a strictly three-
dimensional world, where the shortest distance between two points is a
straight line, the comings and goings of sexual intrigue could be measured
with reassuring accuracy. On a flat sea the boat hardly rocks. What
happens when the sea itself plunges away? 
1856. A poor obscure tubercular German called Reimann delivered a
lecture calculating that Euclid is valid only in terms of flat surfaces. If the
surface were to turn out not to be flat then two thousand years of
mathematical smugness might not be smiling. (GS 17)
Here, Alice, one of Winterson’s protagonists, almost triumphantly professes the
impact of non-Euclidean thinking. Winterson thus blends non-Euclidean
thinking into the situation in which her characters find themselves: in a love
triangle, on a boat. She uses the metaphor of line and figure to express that, as
we live in a non-Euclidean paradigm, the nature of human lives and relationships
is not self-evident. Lives intermingle that should have remained separate.
Relationships emerge that were inconceivable before. The mystery in
Winterson’s alternative to Euclidean mathematics comes about by means of
metaphoric relationships: lines substitute for lives and figures are
interchangeable with relationships. When the laws of non-Euclidean geometry
are at work, lost lovers will find one another, because “parallel lines always meet”
(GS 17). Finally, the shift to the non-Euclidean paradigm produces a world that
is not only imaginatively richer, but also more threatening: non-Euclidean life is
less secure in every possible way. 
Jeanette Winterson rejects the way in which Euclidean thinking, with its
aura of certainty, has become the dominant mode of thought in our society.
When, in the passage above, she suggests that branches of science such as
Euclidean geometry have produced sets of self-evident principles that were
accepted as common sense and gradually acquired the status of truth in the wider
cultural setting, she also proposes a revolution in that cultural setting, in everyday
reality, similar to the movement from Euclidean to non-Euclidean geometry.
From interviews, we know that Winterson considers herself a prophet of such a
revolution between systems of thought. That is also why certain critics have
described her as an “evangelist” (Vermij 1991), a “saviour” (Wytzes 1997), and
a “preacher” (Turner 1994), and called her style “hammering” (Peeters 1995) and
her appearance “that of an omniscient prophet” (Heijne 1994). The fact that
Winterson indeed preaches a revolution can be seen in Art Objects:
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If I say that now, writing now, are too many people who have no concept
of art as energy, of art as space, I think you will follow me. I think you will
realise that if fiction is to have any future in the technological dream/
nightmare of the twenty-first century, it needs, more than ever, to
remember itself as imaginative, innovative, Other. (AO 178) 
It is for a new generation that I write. (AO 192)
Both in her essays and in her fiction, Winterson’s diction betrays which ideas of
space she favours and which ones she rejects. Her choice of words often
functions as the external marker of philosophical statement. The alternations of
vocabulary and her use of figurative language in the following passage clearly
pinpoint what she dislikes about science: 
Here are the coordinates: Five hours, thirty minutes right ascension (the
coordinate on the celestial sphere analogous to longitude on earth) and
zero declination (at the celestial equator). Any astronomer can tell where
you are. 
It’s different isn’t it, from head back in the garden on a frosty night,
sensing other worlds though a pair of binoculars? I like those nights,
kitchen light out, wearing Wellingtons with shiny silver insoles. (TWOP
55)
In the first paragraph, Winterson’s words echo Thomas Sprat’s “close, naked”
style of speech and writing, bringing language as near as possible to what Sprat
called “Mathematical plainness” (cf. page 50). The vocabulary is dull and barren
and the phrase ‘any astronomer’ expresses her clear disdain; the mathematical
method brings out nothing noteworthy or unusual. In the second paragraph,
however, Winterson’s diction takes a different turn: the narrator is describing a
unique personal experience. A highly intimate world is revealed, cosy and
pleasant. This alternative way of looking at the universe is obviously considered
to be more valuable. Winterson’s diction is the vehicle of a philosophical
statement: the unique and subjective idea of space is more important than the
objectively and falsifiably reproducible one.
We have seen that Winterson’s alternative ideas of space result from a
‘fertilisation’ of scientific vocabulary and scientific ideas through aestheticisation,
personification, incongruity, metaphor, and an intimate poetic diction. She
forges a union between the two cultures through literarily fortified scientific
imagery, a union capable of repelling a rational worldview in which space is just
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as frozen and fixed as the two cultures are. She creates a hotchpotch of literature,
religion, myth and science, not merely to counter narrow ideas of space, but, in
fact, to fight constipated ideas of the world in general. As we shall see in the next
section, Winterson uses two particular metaphors of space and place, namely the
room and the city, to escape narrow-minded worldviews. 
Two Metaphors of Space and Place
Throughout Winterson’s novels and short stories, two images related to space
and place keep reappearing: the room and the city. How are these forms of
spatial organisation presented in different contexts? What philosophical views
do they support? And do these forms of spatial organisation signify ideas that fit
Winterson’s cultural politics? 
This is where the story starts, in this threadbare room. The walls are
exploding. The windows have turned into telescopes. Moon and stars are
magnified in this room. The sun hangs over the mantelpiece. I stretch out
my hand and reach the corners of the world. The world is bundled up in
this room. Beyond the door, where the river is, where the roads are, we
shall be. We can take the world with us when we go and sling the sun
under your arm. Hurry now, it’s getting late. I don’t know if this is a happy
ending but here we are let loose in open fields. (WOB 190)
This paragraph is the apotheosis of Written on the Body. It is not certain if Louise
is dead or alive, and after having lost track of Louise the narrator has desperately
tried to find her, to forget her, to come to terms with her, but all attempts are in
vain. Passion rules the narrator’s body and mind. Then, at the very end of the
book, he/she sees Louise again, or perhaps it is just a dream. She appears in the
kitchen door; the narrator puts out his/her hand and feels that Louise is warm.
What follows is the passage quoted above. The room is a place of high pressure
(“bundled up”, “exploding”). Objects in the room have an incredible size, and
the temperature is so high that the windows are melting. The confinement causes
an atmosphere of nausea (“the sun hangs”); the world is compressed. Then,
“beyond the door”, there is freedom. The two lovers escape from the place
“where the story starts” and are “let loose in open fields”. This liberation, away
from the room, makes it possible to experience free movement (“sling”,
“loose”). The contrast produces a set of binary concepts: inside/outside;
bundled/loose; closed/open; confinement/freedom; captivation/liberation.
The room, in this excerpt , signifies a worldview of disabled stasis followed by a
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moment of joy and potential. The room is to the field as the modern project of
fixity and closure is to free and dynamic postmodernity. 
In “Disappearance II”, a short story from The World and Other Places, the
narrator, Samuel Wisbech, fifty-three years old, explains his personal relationship
to the house that has been in his family since Medieval times. The house is alive:
“Room by room, the house is quieted for the winter, until only I am its beating
heart. Only I, the rise and fall of its lungs, the house and I breathing together in
night” (TWOP 119). The personification of the house produces a conception of
space as something alive. Additionally, rooms are taken to be metaphors for life
and death: “The line between life and death is a couple of inches at most. The
width of a door that connects two rooms. The dead are, as we say, on the other
side. Indeed they are, the other side of the door, and sometimes the door is open;
their hand on the knob or mine?” (TWOP 120). One day, Samuel and the house
get a visitor, a woman, and the longer she stays in the house, the more silent she
becomes. She says it has something to do with the house. All of a sudden he
understands that he must find his mother’s room.
The house grew bigger and bigger and the room she was in faded further
and further away. (...) The room is there, somewhere, it must be. I can see
the window from where I stand at the weir. I know the way through the
house. When I go indoors to find her the house mocks me. There is no
room. (TWOP 129-130)
The room here symbolises what escapes organisation, what escapes structuring,
mapping, rationalisation. It fits into Winterson’s postmodern idea of spatial
organisation, her worldview of instability and uncertainty. The room does not
obey laws of stability and predictability – any attempt of human mastery over his
environment is frustrated. The Enlightenment mind that wants to control
nature, to transform wilderness into a superbly managed system for human
benefit, is thwarted here. 
A successful attempt to control the human environment is described in a
passage about a house in Boating for Beginners. Mrs. Munde demolished the kitchen
on the ground floor.
(...) Gloria wondered how the bedrooms were staying up. ‘Will power,’
said Mrs Munde in an offhand manner. ‘If I want the bedrooms to stay
up, they stay up. I built them, they’re part of my life.’ (BFB 47)
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Here, space obeys spiritual mastery instead of natural law. Winterson affirms the
primacy of mind over matter: in spite of natural laws, the house retains its shape
due to the exertion of mental control. Again, however, this is not a common-
sense concept of space. The rooms stay in the place they are assigned to, but not
because they are made of immovable piles of brick. The only thing that keeps
them in their place is the spiritual influence of the woman that owns them. In a
previous passage, Winterson ironically glosses English scholar and literary critic
Northrop Frye’s idea of metaphoric language: 
Northrop Frye had written about the development of language through
three stages: the metaphoric, where persons and matter share a common
energy and are described as an inseparable unit (...) (BFB 44) 
With a great sense of nonsense, she applies Frye’s poetical assertion to one of the
characters’ demolition projects. Frye’s idea of metaphor is taken literally, so that
in the novel the human characteristics attached to brick and wood become quite
absurd: “she wanted to knock down her kitchen which had been oppressing her
for some time” (BFB 38). In Winterson’s writings, space ceases to behave
‘normally’.
Some of Winterson’s characters consciously construct alternative places to
live in. In the following passage from Sexing the Cherry, a family tries to avoid
normality, stability and regularity as far as the space of their home is concerned.
In fact, they turn their home into a denial of normal spatial behaviour:
It is well known that the ceiling of one room is the floor of another, but
the household ignores this ever-downward necessity and continues ever
upward, celebrating ceilings but denying floors, and so their house never
ends and they must travel by winch or rope from room to room, calling to
one another as they go. (STC 20-21) 
Here, Jordan, a character in this particular novel, suggests that when you think
upward rather than downward, space will appear to be infinite rather than finite.
If we confine our world to the space that extends from our ceiling to the floor,
our reality is unnecessarily limited. If we think upward, our world, our
possibilities, will stretch further and further. Similarly, in Gut Symmetries,
Winterson suggests that if you give your environment the chance to surprise you,
it will. In this book, a nostalgia for the past leads one of the characters to seek
for a room, her mother’s kitchen, in places where no one would expect it to be.
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Their apartment block had been demolished but the iron fire escape was
still there, crazy, twisted, leading to nothing. She climbed it and opened
the lost door to the invisible room (...) (GS 135)
Why do Winterson’s characters have this passionate wish to escape from the
boundaries of everyday reality? Why does Winterson feel the need to express
such visions of overcoming limitations? These miraculous transformations of
space are often used to indicate that reality provides more possibilities than most
people dare assume in everyday life. Winterson dresses places of heightened
reality as antidotes against the classical empiricists’ construction of reality and
against the banality of ordinary life that the latter produced. In Art Objects, we
encounter the following passage: 
(...) art works to enlarge emotional possibility. In a dead society that
inevitably puts it on the side of the rebels. (…) The rebellion of art is a
daily rebellion against the state of living death routinely called real life.
(AO 108)
The liberating role of art is a crucial motive in Jeanette Winterson’s writing and
is often literally associated with the creation of space for another life. Art in a way
creates room for a utopian life of love and unlimited possibilities. Space, room,
and place: these are the materials by means of which we can actualise a new life.
By envisioning other spaces that obey radically different laws (or rather: do not
obey any laws at all), other realities are created. So, at the basis of Winterson’s
creation of alternative space, lies a cultural criticism. Winterson formulates her
goal – to reach energetic space – as follows:
I do not think of art as Consolation. I think of it as Creation. I think of it
as an energetic space that begets energetic space. Works of art do not
reproduce themselves, they re-create themselves and have at the same
time sufficient permanent power to create rooms for us, the dispossessed.
In other words, art makes it possible to live in energetic space. (AO 114)
In another passage, we see how the old reality, a room, is ravaged by a wind.
Again we see that stability is replaced by dynamics and that confinement is
exchanged for the open air. The wind symbolises a sudden emotional experience,
that of madly falling in love, which destroys not only the room but the old status
quo between the two as well. As they enter their new life, the city they find is
twisted, leaving them disoriented. 
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There was a wind in the room that tore the drink out of the drinkers, that
scattered the bar bottles like bottle tops, that levitated the furniture and
smashed it into the tranced wall. Waiters and waited on blew in rags out
of the door. There was nothing left in the room but she and me, she and
me hypnotised by each other, unable to speak because of the wind.
She gathered her things and together we left the destroyed room. I had to
follow her as she twisted the pavements under her feet. I lost sense of
where we were. The grid had buckled. The city was a bent alley and she
was the better rat. (GS 110)
In Winterson’s writings, the city functions as a metaphor for dynamic life. There
are several important cities in Winterson’s novels. They function as spaces that
are beyond empirical understanding and beyond control. The city in Jeanette
Winterson’s fiction is a place of movement. London, Venice, and New York
represent a philosophy of life that celebrates change. Venice for instance, is
portrayed in The Passion as a city that behaves unpredictably, a “living city” in
which “things change” (TP 113), a city that cannot be mapped. 
This is the city of mazes. You may set off from the same place to the same
place every day and never go by the same route. If you do so, it will be by
mistake. Your bloodhound nose will not serve you here. Your course in
compass reading will fail you. Your confident instructions to passers-by
will send them to squares they have never heard of, over canals not listed
in the notes. (TP 49)
Venice is an irrational place, a place for passion and the imagination. Venice is
constructed as an antidote against the reality of Napoleon Bonaparte, the man
who imposed modernity on his empire. His reality is built on ideas devoid of
humanity, as the first chapter of the book demonstrates. Napoleon’s world is a
calculated world, a rational nation state – a world in which roads are straight and
well sign-posted (cf. TP 112). But here, Winterson’s protagonist Villanelle, an
extremely erotic and androgynous creature, asserts that it is a hopeless endeavour
to try and follow the map in Venice. Venice defies intellectual understanding –
it is subject to games of chance, it is unreliable, it is a city of madmen. In Sexing
the Cherry, Winterson vents her scepticism of map-making: 
A map can tell me how to find a place I have not seen but have often
imagined. When I get there, following the map faithfully, the place is not
the place of my imagination. Maps, growing ever more real, are much less
true. (STC 81) 
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The imagination thus provides us with a comprehension of space that is more
valuable than the understanding of space through reason. Villanelle’s assertion
that “The cities of the interior do not lie on any map” (TP 114) upholds the idea
that subjective experience should not be measured or quantified. The city of
Venice functions as a metaphor for a different kind of knowledge – for
immeasurable gut feeling. 
A similar link between the city and emotional comprehension transpires
from Art & Lies. In the passage to follow we see that, like Venice, London too
resists map-making. Winterson’s London consists of three different layers. It is
divided into three separate ontological realms, that cannot be known
simultaneously. Instead of being a public space accessible to all, London is
divided into three ‘dimensions’ of which two always seem to escape us.
Winterson echoes Foucault when she distinguishes a ceremonial, a political and
an invisible level. Foucault’s interest in the strategies of concealment used by
powerful discourses (cf. page 20) is comparable to Winterson’s layering of urban
organisation. The layering produces masking mechanisms. At the same time,
sudden movements of people and objects from one level to another account for
the shifty character of urban space in particular, and of modern society in
general. As we will see in the next section, this kind of unreliability is related to
the idea of the ‘quantum jump’ (cf. page 102). Here, Winterson undermines the
belief in human control – space is living a life of its own, frustrating the
Enlightenment spirit of control over the human environment. 
Shall I tell you something about my City? (...) The First City is ceremonial.
Ceremonies of religion, monarchy, law. (...) This is the old city and it has
been the most destroyed. (AL 11) 
The Second City is political. Politics of slums, apartments, mansions. 
(AL 19) 
People vanish everyday... The Third City is invisible, the city of the
vanished, home to those who no longer exist. (AL 22) 
In Gut Symmetries, Winterson introduces New York using geographers’
vocabulary: “NEW YORK: Manhattan Island. Latitude 40:46N Longitude
73:59W” (GS 6). This introduction, however, contrasts sharply with the city of
miraculous events that New York turns into later in the book, a place where
people get lost and lose their sense of coordination. When the relationships
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between Jove, Stella and Alice turn out really confusing, New York turns into an
extremely surreal place:
She knew that New York could not exist; that it was an invented city
poised in the minds of its inhabitants, a hoisted dream. (GS 135)
This duality of objectivity and subjectivity pervades Winterson’s narrations of
space. We have already seen how certain scientific vocabulary figures
prominently in Winterson’s fictions, and that in various ways this vocabulary is
amalgamated into miraculous tales. In this way, Winterson juxtaposes the human
urge to measure and the human passion for the mystical. Although many of her
characters are ‘average’ people, seeking certainty and control, Winterson’s stories
really begin to excite us when these same characters discover that spaces – and
their own minds – resist such control. The mind and the city, subject and object,
fuse, and the only thing left to know and to remain amazed about is the fleeting
nature of knowledge and of feeling. Indeed, the city of New York in this novel
also aligns itself with the feeling of ‘unbound identity’ related to Alice’s
bisexuality. The love-triangle in the novel involves two heterosexual
relationships – one between Jove and his wife Stella, one between Jove and his
mistress Alice, and a lesbian relationship between Alice and Stella. The
unexpected emergence of lesbian feelings mirrors the appearance of London’s
veiled sides in Art & Lies or the hidden rooms in The World and Other Places. 
Whether it be Venice, London or New York, Winterson describes the city
as a space that cannot be described – the city always escapes ordering. It is
continually reshaping and renewing itself. Moreover, the shape of the city is
always determined by the character’s state of mind at a particular moment.
Political as well as emotive frames of reference determine the city’s appearance.
The city defies objective understanding and rational structuring. As we already
saw in chapter 2, Winterson holds that the idea of gravity is an example of these
efforts at structuring the world. In Sexing the Cherry, Winterson presents us with
a city that, by the willpower of its inhabitants, escapes from the law of gravity,
i.e. from the shackles of reason. 
The city, being freed from the laws of gravity, began to drift upwards for
some 200 miles, until it was out of the earth’s atmosphere. (STC 97)
Not only places and spaces have this ability to escape the constrictions of
physical organisation, and to assume shapes created by the human mind.
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People’s movements through space (travels, journeys, walks) are constructed by
the imagination as well. In the passage that follows, we read Alice’s invitation to
Jove to follow her on a long and dazzling walk, through the seasons and the
limits of what can be seen, as an invitation to follow her not only on her physical
travels, but also on her journeys of the mind. She asks Jove to join her in her
utopian spaces:
Walk with me. Walk the 6,000,000,000,000 miles of travelled light, single
year’s journey of illumination, ship miles under the glowing keel. In the
long frost the sky brightens and the rim of the earth is pierced by sharp
stars. After the leaf-fall the star-fall, the winter shedding of too much
light. Walk the seen and the unseen. What can be rendered visible and
what cannot. (GS 101-102)
Alice says that we should not only focus on what is directly accessible through
the senses, the world as accounted for by classical empiricists (the seen), but also
experience other, invisible, (perhaps imagined) realities (the unseen). Alice
continues by sharing her own travelling experiences. Looking around her, she
sees birds and leaves. Then,
(...) I could not say where the leaves stopped and the birds began. I try to
distinguish but at crucial moments the space between carefully separated
objects collapses and I too am whirled up against my will into the dervish
of matter. The difficulty is that every firm step I win out of chaos is a firm
step towards... more chaos. (GS 102) 
For Winterson, attempting to know necessarily results in incomprehension.
Space collapses; chaos forces itself upon us. The behaviour of our environment
can never be fully understood; it always escapes human prediction. Any
authoritative physical determination of place is rejected, to be replaced by a
fantastic account of place.
In The Idea of the Postmodern, Hans Bertens comments on postmodern
conceptions of space as opposed to modern ones. He says that modernity is
oriented towards technologically rational plan-making, and urban control. This
modern functionalism is then replaced by the postmodern idea of the urban
fabric as ‘fragmented’, and by a ‘collage’ of uses. In the postmodern conception,
space is seen as relating to different situations, functions and taste cultures.
Postmodernism thus reacts against a crisis within modernism and emphasises
the fragmentary and the chaotic, as well as play and aesthetics. Postmodern ideas
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of space should therefore be seen as rejecting old traditions of hierarchisation
(cf. Bertens 1995:221-223). Winterson’s abolition of map-making and her
celebration of an unstable, fantastic and indeterminate idea of place, is
symptomatic of the postmodern worldview. 
Brian McHale also comments on the postmodern reconfiguration of
space. He says that magic realist postmodern literary writings reshape “the
ontological structure of the projected world”, to order them into a “dual
ontology, on one side our world of the normal and everyday, on the other side
the next-door world of the paranormal and the supernatural, and running
between them the contested boundary separating the two worlds (...)” (McHale
1987:73). 
Because of their resistance against mapping, postmodern ‘other’ spaces
and rejections of realism can also be related to what Linda Hutcheon calls “de-
doxification” (or de-normalisation) (Hutcheon 1995:7). Viewed in this light,
Winterson’s postmodern strategies are set against the power of the discourses
that strive to normalise space. As I suggested before, one of these discourses is
classical empiricism. Winterson’s construction of ‘other’ representations thus
has its political dimensions. Consequently, her alternative places and spaces
should be interpreted as attempts to escape the totalising power of the order and
hierarchy of modernity. 
As Winterson’s oeuvre grows, we note that her depiction of the collapse
of modernity comes to rely more and more on metaphors derived from quantum
physics. In what follows, I will highlight some of Winterson’s ‘quantum ideas’,
to show that she cuts and pastes elements from the discourse of science into her
own literary sphere. If along these lines a fusion of science and literature
eventually does come about in Winterson’s novels, this is still a union forged
strictly on her own conditions – her final goal remains a literary one.
Unstable Environments
Cornell physicist N. David Mermin explains the anti-realist implications of
quantum physics as follows: “We now know that the moon is demonstrably not
there when nobody looks” (Mermin in Herbert 1987:17). A similar macroscopic
experience of quantum behaviour features in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit. The
narrator, Jeanette, speaks of the influence of a spectator on the existence of a
cow: here, Winterson clearly displays an anti-realism that is strikingly similar to
the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. This interpretation is a way
to explain what is called the ‘measurement problem’: 
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She was an absolutist, and had no time for people who thought that cows
didn’t exist unless you looked at them. Once a thing was created, it was
valid for all time. Its value went up nor down. (OAF 44-45)
The measurement problem is one of the central issues of quantum mechanics.
Suppose a closed box, in which there is a quantum particle. When we do not
happen to look into the box, the quantum particle can be at all possible places in
the box. This is very hard to imagine. We would expect the quantum particle to
be in a certain place, whether we look at it or not, but this appears not to be the
case in fact. The total system is, as we call it, in a superposition of different
‘eigenstates’. An eigenstate is a characteristic, for instance a thing’s place, that can
be determined in reality and macroscopically; so without the aid of a microscope.
A particle is in fact both nowhere and at all places at the same time. When
someone opens the box in order to determine the place of the quantum particle,
or, in other words, when one is going to measure things, the quantum particle
will always be found in one particular place. So, by the act of measuring, the
system is changed fundamentally. Physicists describe the transition from the
state of multiple places to the state of one place as a ‘discontinuous
undetermined transition to a certain eigenstate’. The transition is called
discontinuous because there is no logical continuity in the quantum particle’s
state; it is undetermined because there are no laws of causality that describe its
transition. For the sake of clarity, I will quote Fred Alan Wolf:
(...) the wave of all possibilities undergoes a sudden change the instant
anything physical is observed. This is called the collapse of the wave
function. It can be imagined to occur just like a pricked balloon suddenly
collapsing. The observer is responsible for the collapse of the wave
function. She looks at the system, and the system suddenly quantum leaps
into one of the possible states. (Wolf 1990:53)
The Copenhagen Interpretation argues for the spectacular idea that the cause of
the transition to another state is localised in our consciousness. Not only literary
and philosophical thinkers have argued for the idea that man creates his own
reality through his consciousness (like Kant and Berkeley for instance) but –
since the Copenhagen Interpretation – scientists have too. Wolf elucidates that
in certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, the influence of human
consciousness upon reality is acknowledged. This wild and seemingly bizarre
interpretation has been contended among scientists since its genesis in 1927. It
is not surprising that it was (and is) unacceptable to many physicists.
Place, Space and Uncertainty
99
Both in Winterson’s narrative and in the Copenhagen Interpretation,
consciousness exerts an active influence on the part of nature under research. In
the passage from Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit discussed above, she suggests that
our environment only exists when we want it to. Using the terminology of
quantum mechanics, she transposes the microscopic working of the
measurement problem to a macroscopic level. She applies the quantum
mechanical phenomenon directly to the macroscopic world. This transposition
can well be considered as another example of ‘aestheticisation’ or Romantisierung,
as physicists maintain that the chance for a macroscopic object to behave like a
particle is about zero. Unlike the scientists, Winterson violates the borderline
between the small-scale world and the everyday world as we experience it
through our senses. She in fact ‘pollutes’ the two separate zones by confusing the
two. 
Apart from the urge to aestheticise and enchant the world, Winterson has
yet another motive to incorporate quantum physics into her work. Not unlike
New Age thinkers, Winterson asks herself whether the unification of science and
metaphysics will destroy our passions, hopes and beliefs, or whether it may
actually furnish us with answers to a number of existential questions. 
In Written on the Body, the debate between belief and science is personified
by Elgin, a doctor, and the narrator, who will not accept Elgin’s diagnosis that
Louise, the narrator’s lover and Elgin’s wife, is fatally ill. The novel opposes two
worlds of discourse – the rational, medical world of Elgin, and the narrator’s
world of physical passion. The novel also shows the conflict between the types
of language these discourses rely upon. The narrator distrusts Elgin’s diagnosis
and comes to believe that Elgin’s statements about Louise’s condition are
unreliable. Elgin represents scientific determinism and the belief in certainty.
The narrator stands for emotion and open-endedness. Furthermore, the narrator
represents constructivism: the idea that the mind determines reality and that
reality is created by means of language. The viewpoint of the narrator does
provide comfort, as the narrator enters a utopian state of being when at the end
he/she leaves the nauseating room together with Louise. As we also saw above,
the constructivist worldview is not per se opposed to science in general. In fact,
it is related to the quantum mechanical idea that consciousness determines the
state of the world. Science, then, is confronted with its own mystical nature, at
the expense of its earlier tendency towards determination and certainty. It seems
as if Jeanette Winterson wants to confront science with its former pretensions,
to prove its arrogance unfounded. 
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In Gut Symmetries, the debate between science and mysticism continues.
Again, Winterson investigates whether quantum physics can provide some moral
support for the desperate. Her conclusion seems to be that, in matters of life and
death, quantum physics certainly can. The narrators mention Heisenberg (GS
168) and Hawking (GS 162). The ideas of these scientists form the background
against which the emotional lives of the physicists Jove and Stella are enacted.
Jove frequently seeks refuge in quantum theory when common-sense
explanations fail. One of the questions he struggles with is what happens after
death. 
My father, at the moment of physical death, may simply have shifted to an
alternative point of his wave function. What my grandmother believes in
and I speculate upon, seems only to be a difference in terminology. She
hopes he is in heaven. I hope he has found the energy to continue along
his own possibility. (GS 161-162) 
As Jove already indicates, the difference between a religious worldview and a
scientific one is not as big as it seems. The terminology differs, but the hope, the
imagination, seem identical. The vocabulary Winterson borrows from quantum
theory surfaces where characters are going through experiences of emotional
breakdown and of renewed quests for meaning. Life as a continuum (cf. GS 163),
the universe as a wave function (cf. GS 162), other universes as parallel realities
(cf. GS 191), objects as wave functions (cf. GS 168), matter as energy (cf. GS
191): these metaphors (or realities) give rise to tremendous amounts of
possibilities, and give us a great deal of emotional support when loss and pain are
involved. Winterson borrows the vocabulary for these metaphoric relationships
directly from the scientific realm and applies them to situations of existential
crisis. 
Winterson holds that the new sciences can provide us with new meaning
in a world that is disintegrating. In the middle of collapsing certainties, we see the
appearance of ideas that we can hold on to: some scientific ideas now newly
emerging are strikingly similar to religious ideas that we thought we had seen the
last of. Science, seen in this light, restores religion. This is Jove’s quest as well: to
seek for ways in which science is able to affirm religious ideas like immortality.
Winterson is not the only contemporary writer or thinker to link quantum
physics to the idea that a life cannot just cease to be. In The Quantum Self, a book
on the implications of quantum theory for the concept of the self, modern
physics is integrated with psychology. It brings forward a notion of the self that,
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like the quantum itself, is free, responsive and creative. Danah Zohar, author of
The Quantum Self, says the following about loss:
As the outlines of the quantum self, its identity and its relationships,
began to emerge (...) a wholly new way of thinking about the survival of
that self began to emerge. At the subatomic level of elementary particles,
there is no death in the sense of permanent loss. The quantum vacuum,
which is the underlying reality of all that is, exists eternally. Speaking
poetically, we might describe the vacuum as ‘the well of being’. Within
this well all basic properties are conserved – mass/energy, charge, spin,
etc. – nothing is ever lost. (Zohar 1991:124)
In Gut Symmetries, whenever the new sciences are used to sustain a threatening
concept of reality, Jove gets angry. He and Stella are on a boat trip when a storm
comes up. They suffer shipwreck and lose all sense of orientation. Finally, Stella
has only one thing left: her hope to be saved. At that moment she remembers a
quantum mechanical theorem that feeds her anxiety:
‘Maybe we’ve sailed through one of your wormholes and come up in a
parallel universe. In this universe, identical to our own, there are no
people.’ 
He turned to me in a fury. ‘Stupid, stupid, stupid. The probability is
beyond calculation. A large quantum transition such as that is virtually
impossible.’ 
‘Virtually?’ (GS 180)
When Stella begins to doubt whether quantum physics will save her, Jove turns
into a rationalist. Like Stella, Jove is seeking for hope and certainty, but when
quantum physics cannot provide it, he reverts to scepticism. Likewise, in Jeanette
Winterson’s novels, science is embraced only when it generates a sense of beauty
and happiness. When science involves constraints and impossibility, it is
rejected. 
Influence and Intertextuality
Although little known and even less publicised, Winterson’s work shows the
influence of quantum physics even prior to 1996, the year of writing of Gut
Symmetries. As we have seen, Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit already plays with the
Copenhagen Interpretation. Sexing the Cherry, published four years after Oranges
Are Not the Only Fruit, also contains phrases and ideas that hint at quantum
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physics. One of the phrases to reveal this presence is “empty space and points
of light”.
Matter, that thing the most solid and the well known, which you are
holding in your hands and which makes up your body, is now known to
be mostly empty space. Empty space and points of light. What does this
say about the reality of the world? (STC 8)
And even the most solid of things and the most real, the best-loved and
the well-known, are only hand-shadows on the wall. Empty space and
points of light. (STC 144)
A few years ago, Richard Caink, a British sculptor, baptised two of the statues in
his series “Full Circle” Points of Light I and Points of Light II. As Caink indicates on
his website www.richardcaink.co.uk, these sculptures were directly inspired by
Winterson’s phrase. 
It is interesting to see that Caink uses curved shapes where Winterson uses
circular structures in their respective representations of space. Like modern
scientists, both artists leave flat models of space for what they are. Both Caink
and Winterson celebrate the loss of solidity, the dynamic characteristics of space
and with that, the capricious behaviour of the world around us. 
Around 1913, Niels Bohr discovered the ‘quantum jump’. This term in
physics refers to how electrons shift between orbits around the nucleus. Bohr
found that at specific distances from the nucleus, there were several orbits. The
orbit closest to the nucleus was at the same time the shortest possible distance
between an electron and a nucleus. He also observed that electrons could jump
from one orbit to another. This is remarkable, as the orbits are relatively far
apart. Scientists showed that deep within the seemingly solid human
environment, at quantum level, reality was unstable and not continuous. As
Brian Green says, 
Imagine a universe in which the laws of physics are as ephemeral as the
tastes of fashion – changing from year to year, from week to week, or
even from moment to moment. In such a world, assuming that the
changes do not disrupt basic life processes, you would never experience a
dull moment, to say the least. The simplest acts would be an adventure,
since random variations would prevent you or anyone else from using
past experience to predict anything about future outcomes. Such a
universe is a physicist’s nightmare. Physicists – and most everyone else as
well – rely upon the stability of the universe. (Green 1999:168)
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Despite the fact that people keep relying on (re-lying) a stable worldview, a new
awareness has started to haunt our postmodern era: the awareness that the
observed stability is a mere illusion. 
At the time Bohr made his discovery, the Modernist poets were trying “to
isolate the poememe” (Albright 1997:1) – elementary particles of which poems
were constructed – that unpredictable, capricious behaviour of space became a
common metaphor. At that time, poetic ideas about verbal structures were
similar to physical theories about material structures: one can say that quantum
poetics and quantum physics went hand in hand. And in the two cultures, this
idea and its metaphors have become stronger ever since. By (re-)using quantum
metaphors, Winterson posits herself in this tradition. 
If we follow Hayles’ perspective (cf. page 24), the idea of the quantum
jump must have energised a field where people discuss related or comparable
matters freely, in media other than the scientific journals, in other terminologies
than the terminology of mathematics, and through metaphors that travel from
one subculture to another and back again. At all times, whirlwinds of ideas
emerge from a constant collision of subcultures. In this way, fields arise, fields
that both energise and are energised by the humanities and the sciences at the
same time. Caink, Winterson, Hawking, Heisenberg and many others meet in
that field, in this cosmic web. What unites them is a fascination with the mystical
phenomenon of quantum jumps. Is it a quantum jump, for instance, that makes
Fortunata disappear in Sexing the Cherry? 
I thought I saw someone standing beside him, a woman, slight and
strong. I tried to call out but I had no voice. Then she vanished and there
was nothing next to Jordan but empty space. (STC 144)
The idea of empty space not only applies to our environment. Quantum theory
gets under our skin, generating a fragmented and dynamic concept of the self.
This, in turn, can have an effect on our psychological well-being. In the passage
below, for instance, we see how an unstable and unreliable image of matter goes
hand in hand with a feeling of insecurity. 
Should I acknowledge the fiction that I am? A man made of nothing but
space and light, a pinpoint on a pinpointed planet stitched among the
stars? (AL 30)
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The phrase ‘empty space and points of light’ contains a double reference. It is an
obvious reference to classical Atomist ideas about the construction of matter.
Macroscopically, matter seems to be solid, but in microscopic reality, it consists
for ninety-nine percent of emptiness. For the remaining one percent, matter
consists of protons and neutrons, which make up an atom’s very dense nucleus,
and electrons, which orbit around the nucleus. 
However, the phrase ‘empty space and points of light’ also refers to the
quantum mechanical idea of the vacuum, where particles are generated
spontaneously out of nothing, only to decompose just as spontaneously. The
phrase returns in the passage below, where it functions in the context of a
fantastic spontaneous generation of particles. Here, Winterson moves beyond
quantum mechanics into science fiction: the moving particles develop into
human beings. 
What I saw astonished me. 
There appeared to be ten points of light spiralling in a line along
the floor, and from these beings came the sound I had heard. It was
harmonic but it had no tune. I could hardly bear to look at the light, and
the tone, though far from unpleasant, hurt my ears. It was too rich, too
strong, to be music. 
Then I saw a young woman, darting in a figure of eight in between
the lights and turning her hands through it as a potter turns clay on the
wheel. At last she stood back, and one by one I watched the light form
into a head and arms and legs. Slower and slower, the sound dying with
the light, until on the floor were ten women, their shoes in holes, their
bodies wet with sweat. (STC 93)
Bodies can disappear in a similar way:
At a dancing school in a remote place, Fortunata teaches her pupils to
become points of light. (...) 
She believes that we are fallen creatures who once knew how to fly.
She says that light burns in our bodies and threatens to dissolve us at any
moment. How else can we account for so many of us who disappear?
(STC 72)
In quantum mechanics, a vacuum is no longer seen as a perfectly empty bit of
space, but rather as a place where occasionally particles may unpredictably
emerge from the void, borrowing energy from their surroundings, fuse, and fall
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apart again. The passages above echo this behaviour, subtly blending in quantum
mechanics with literature. 
How closely related Winterson’s fictions are to these theories, becomes
clear when we read the following passage, where Stephen Hawking describes the
quantum mechanical revision of the classical idea of the vacuum:
What we think of as ‘empty’ space cannot be completely empty because
that would mean that all the fields, such as the gravitational and the
electromagnetic fields, would have to be exactly zero. However, the value
of a field and its rate of change with time are like the position and the
velocity of a particle: the uncertainty principle implies that the more
accurately one knows one of these quantities, the less accurately one can
know the other. So in empty space the field cannot be fixed at exactly
zero, because then it would have both a precise value (zero) and a precise
rate of change (also zero). There must be a certain minimum amount of
uncertainty, or quantum fluctuation, in the value of the field. One can
think of these fluctuations as pairs of particles of light or gravity that
appear together at some time, move apart, and then come together again
and annihilate each other. (Hawking 1996:112)
The obvious parallels between Sexing the Cherry and Hawking’s A Brief History of
Time illustrate how literary postmodernism shares certain ideas with quantum
mechanics. Hawking, too, speaks of empty space and pairs or particles of light.
If this is not a direct influence (A Brief History of Time was published in 1988 and
Sexing the Cherry in 1989), then at least this terminology must have been ‘in the
air’ at the time. Without denying that Winterson may be directly influenced by
Hawking, I like to suggest that there might also have existed a web of affinities,
where both emplotment and vocabulary were signs of the times. 
Creative Interpretations of Science
Winterson’s enchantment of space can be seen as an antidote to the despair that
modernity has left behind. These antidotes are presented as alternative realities,
fairy tales perhaps, or utopias. Winterson disposes of measurement,
quantification, and the rigid tracing of natural laws by treating these scientific
methods and aims as unworthy pursuits. Positivist scientists’ authoritative means
of control are ridiculed while Winterson at the same time vents the need to
escape from a deterministic and mechanistic world-picture. Paradoxically, this
escape is realised through an appropriation of scientific vocabulary and imagery.
Winterson deploys this vocabulary and imagery to present a worldview in which
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magic, religion and the fantastic rule. By positing a worldview that in many ways
can be considered miraculous, Winterson also profiles herself as a political writer
concerned with the development of western culture. The desire to change
everyday reality, including the way in which we eat, commute, use central heating,
and so forth, is a desire one can only interpret as politically inspired. Winterson
directly borrows images from popular interpretations of quantum mechanics,
but her ideas can also be seen as issuing from a web of affinities. An existential
philosophy of indeterminism, of a passionate involvement of the subject in the
miraculous and the metaphysical, is presented with the aid of metaphors
originating from scientific ideas on subatomic space. These scientific images of
space function as vehicles for an artistic and fantastic worldview. Winterson’s
texts uphold Hayles’ idea of the cosmic web, or Porush’s idea of Eudoxical
discourse. The literary is inseparably and imaginatively intertwined with the
scientific. Winterson’s texts therefore are environments where different
subcultures intersect. Her creative interpretations of science are, in the end, not
directed against science per se, but rather against a specific kind of science –
against classical empiricism. Still, although she seems to bring about a fertile
mixture between the two cultures, her ‘quantum politics’ is only geared towards
the fortification of values that have always been literary to begin with: physics is
only accepted in Winterson’s spaces when it underwrites ideas that long since
have been put forward by literature. Winterson fuses science and literature only
when they can both be used to express the miraculous.
I
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TIME AND HISTORY 
As the incorporation of ideas from the new sciences into her fiction
became more and more prominent, this aspect of Jeanette Winterson’s
fiction met with increasing criticism. Many critics think of it as “cod-
scientific post-Stephen Hawking-pretension” (Barnacle 1997), or
something similarly unflattering. In the previous chapter I have argued
that quantum mechanics provides Winterson with a number of useful
metaphors to express a miraculous sense of space and place. I will argue
below that relativity theory also opens up possibilities for Winterson to
weave time and history into her fabric of enchantment. The question is,
can Winterson’s notions of time and history be called postmodern? In
this chapter I will show how Winterson plays with contemporary
scientific theories about time to substantiate such fantastic ideas as time
travel, the denial of causality, and the simultaneity of past, present and
future. In this way, Winterson expresses a postmodern worldview,
involving a denial of linearity and causality, and an acceptance of
contingency. Also, Winterson shows that consciousness plays a crucial
role in our understanding, or rather, construction of reality. Ideas in
contemporary science correspond with the beliefs put forward by
Winterson’s protagonists, and with the narrative structures of her fiction.
Winterson’s idea of history is equally postmodern: it questions not only
the validity of historical explanation but in fact the very concept of
chronology. Historical explanation, according to Winterson, should not
be taken any more seriously than cat’s play.
The Notion of Time in Science and Literature
In his preface to Time in Literature, Hans Meyerhoff explains how he realised
how remote the scientific, logical construction of the concept of time was
from certain aspects of time in human experience which literature has
often singled out for analysis. What seemed most significant in terms of
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the experience of time was quite irrelevant to the logical concept of time
as formulated by science; per contra, the scientific concept seemed to
have little to say about the most significant aspects of time in the lives of
human beings. Startled by this striking contrast, I wondered why this was
so, what the function of literary analysis was as compared with the
scientific analysis of time, why literature was so much concerned with this
problem, particularly in our own age, and what, if anything, these
questions had to do with philosophy. (Meyerhoff 1955:viii) 
The starting point for Meyerhoff’s book is that literary writers describe time as
it is experienced by the human mind, whereas science describes “time which is
not private, subjective, or defined in terms of experience, but which is public,
[and] objective” (Meyerhoff 1955:5). The scientific idea of time is “expressed by
the symbol ‘t’ in mathematical equations. It is also our ‘public’ time, which we
use, with the aid of watches, calendars, etc., in order to synchronize our private
experiences of time for the purpose of social action and communication”
(Meyerhoff 1955:5). Meyerhoff assumes there is a difference between scientific
goals and presuppositions on the one hand and a human, psychological interest
on the other. However, are scientific ideas of time really all that different? Don’t
scientific and literary notions of time proceed along parallel paths? (cf. page 32).
Aren’t scientific notions of time “closely related to developments in the culture
at large?” (cf. page 26). To answer these questions, I will look at the main
developments in the scientific conceptualisation of time, and show that literary
notions went hand in hand with these developments.
It was Aristotle who formulated the classical theory of time that is still
commonly accepted today. In his Physics, Aristotle imagined time as a straight line
extending indefinitely in either direction. The present moment is a point on the
line, separating the past from the future: “So the ‘now’ also is in one way a
potential dividing of time, in another the termination of both parts, and their
unity” (Aristotle, b.4. ch.13). He sees the present as a moving instant: “For time
is just this-number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’ ”(Ibid. b.4. ch.11).
From his text, it becomes clear that Aristotle feels the need to measure and
quantify time. “Time then is a kind of number. (...) Time obviously is what is
counted (...)” (Ibid. b.4. ch.11). 
Historians of science often argue that only with Isaac Barrow and Isaac
Newton, the idea took hold that time is a mathematical co-ordinate, and that
Barrow and Newton were the first to see time as a framework within which
processes and events occur. However, Aristotle already visualised time as a solid
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framework against which change or motion can be measured. In the passage
below, Aristotle explains that time has an independent and constant existence: 
(...) change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for ‘fast’ and
‘slow’ are defined by time – ‘fast’ is what moves much in a short time,
‘slow’ what moves little in a long time; but time is not defined by time, by
being either a certain amount or a certain kind of it. (Ibid. b.4. ch.10)
But Barrow and Newton did add some vital new elements to the Aristotelean
concept of time. They were able, among other things, to surpass Aristotle’s
vague descriptions with clean formulas such as velocity = distance/time. They
also systematically worked from Descartes’ notion that physical phenomena can
be described as mechanical systems. Aristotle’s model of time was gradually
expanded and strengthened by Newton and his followers, who developed the
modern clock and sought to standardise time. This culminated in the
institutionalisation of a time system centred around “Greenwich Mean Time”,
involving a detailed and sophisticated knowledge of geography, mathematics,
mechanics, and astronomy. 
Meanwhile, literary narrative followed an analogous path, laid down by
classical poetics, where characters developed in a linear way, and plot structures
had a stable, inner rhythm, continuously moving forward. Aristotle found that a
play had to have a beginning, a middle and an end, and unity of action, integrity
and logic (Barton and Hudson 1997:34). 
Life itself was conceptualised along similar lines. Everyday expressions like
“let bygones be bygones”, “time is a devouring tyrant” and “that’s for the future
to show”, reveal that life has been conceptualised in an Aristotelean way.
Classical philosophy and poetics have thus informed not only literary traditions
until today, but also our narrativisations of life. The Aristotelean model of time
has established itself as the common-sense notion of time that still governs our
rational actions and decisions. It is the Aristotelean notion of time that lead most
scientists to believe, at least until very recently, that time travel could never
become a reality. But now, some interpretations of quantum physics suggest that
time travel is possible – at least in theory.
The Aristotelean and Newtonian notions of time had to be abandoned –
in the world of science at least – at the beginning of the twentieth century, when
Albert Einstein showed that time is relative to the observer. The Minkowski
diagram below illustrates how the results of Einstein’s and Minkowski’s work
undermine the notion of absolute simultaneity. 
Jeanette Winterson’s Enchanted Science
110
Hermann Minkowski was a contemporary of Albert Einstein. He realised that
Einstein’s ideas could be best understood in a non-Euclidean – curved –
conception of space. He then developed the idea of a four-dimensional
spacetime continuum. In the Minkowski diagram above, time is represented by
the vertical axis, and space (now one-dimensional) by the horizontal axis. When
someone moves with a constant velocity, that person moves for instance from
co-ordinate (0,0) to (1,2) to (2,4) and so forth. At time 0, Mr. A and Mrs. B are
standing on (0,0), each in their own space ship. Mrs. B has a velocity with respect
to Mr. A. This means in the diagram that Mr. A does not make a move to either
the left or the right of the axis that represents space, but stays put in the same
spatial point (0), while time proceeds. Thus, he ascends along the vertical axis,
not moving away from it. Mrs. B is moving away from Mr. A in space, so she
moves away from the vertical axis, for instance to the right. At the same time,
like Mr. A, she moves upwards, that is, in time. They both think that they are not
moving because there is no way to show the difference between moving with a
constant velocity and not-moving. Now we are going to make two flashlights
flash once. Flashlight number 2 is standing on (3,0) and flashlight number 1 is
standing on (-3,0). Mr. A. and Mrs. B. want to know whether the flashlights have
flashed at exactly the same time. Mr. A will experience that on co-ordinate (0,3),
the two flashes arrive at the same time. At that moment, Mrs. B has already
Space
Time
Mr. A
Mrs. B
Flash 1    Flash 2
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received the flash sent by flashlight number 2, namely on co-ordinate (1,2); but
the moment at which she will receive the flash from flashlight number 1 is still
in the future for her. So, when Mr. A experiences the arrival of flash number 1
as his present, the arrival of that flash will only occur in Mrs. B’s future. She will
see the flash later than Mr. A does. Also, when the arrival of flash number 2
constitutes Mr. A’s present, the same event is part of Mrs. B’s past. The other
way around, the arrival of flash 1 is Mrs. B’s present, when Mr. A experiences it
as his past. And at the moment when the arrival of flash 2 is Mrs B’s present it
is Mr. A’s future.
This complicates the notion of simultaneity – it destabilises the belief in a
shared universal present. It multiplies the single presence of one ‘now’ into a vast
number of ‘nows’. There can be as many ‘nows’ as there are spectators!
Einstein’s theory of relativity and Minkowski’s research brought space and time
together in a single, four-dimensional arrangement called spacetime. In this
arrangement it is not only possible to travel forwards, backwards and sideways
in space, but also forwards and backwards in time. Spacetime can thus be
considered a so-called ‘block universe’. The Oxford quantum physicist David
Deutsch explains in The Fabric of Reality:
Spacetime is sometimes referred to as the ‘block universe’, because within
it the whole of physical reality – past, present and future – is laid out once
and for all, frozen in a single four-dimensional block. (Deutsch 1998:268)
And, because of gravitational effects caused by large, heavy objects in space,
space is not flat, but curved. 
Deutsch makes clear that, if the world exists in the form of a single four-
dimensional arrangement, time does not flow, as Newton thought it would.
Basically, Deutsch suggests not only that past, present and future all coexist at
the same time, but he also suggests a Multiple Worlds approach. The Multiple
Worlds approach implies that there is not one single future, but that there is an
infinite number of futures, realised in an infinite number of universes. This
number is so large because there are vastly more ‘nows’ associated with probable
events than with less probable events. Deutsch believes that reality is a collection
not only of the probable or the actual ‘nows’ but also of the infinite number of
possible ‘nows’. In fact, Deutsch goes so far as to argue that possible ‘nows’ or
‘snapshots’, as he calls them, are just as real as past, present or future snapshots.
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This would mean, for instance, that everyone has countless lives, all separately
existent in one big ‘multiverse’ (cf. page 130). 
Finally, if one combines Einstein’s spacetime (which deals with large-scale
phenomena), with quantum physics (concerned with tiny particles), it follows
that the block universe is not smooth. In the quantum world, it is likely that
minute holes will open up, entrances to little tunnels between moments in time,
or between different places. These holes are called ‘wormholes’. I will return to
this later (cf. page 117 and page 119). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, when scientists were developing
these theories, discarding a concept of time that had ruled for thousands of years,
writers and philosophers were experimenting with alternative notions of time as
well. Philosophers asked themselves for instance whether the divisions between
past, present and future are as absolute as traditionally assumed, and if time is
not in fact relative to our perceptual modes – i.e. to the imagination or to
emotional states of mind. At that time, writers began to shape time in more
intricate ways than that of the clock, moving beyond received ideas of plot and
linear progressive development. James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake (1939), for
instance, does not have a traditional ‘opening’, as the first sentence completes the
final one. This cyclical structure was a striking alternative to the traditional
“sequential narrative structure which orders and forces chaotic reality into a neat
chronology” (Williams 1992:3). Concurrently, Virginia Woolf frequently
addressed the subject of the human perception of time and the way in which
consciousness distorts the measurement of time. In Orlando (1928), Woolf’s
characters dwell upon ideas similar to the insights of relativity theory (cf.
page 171). In 1936, T.S. Eliot expressed non-linear notions of time in his “Four
Quartets” (cf. page 125). More and more, in the course of the Modernist period,
human experience came to be regarded as a non-linear phenomenon,
culminating in the postmodern age when Jorge Luis Borges’ explored the theme
of parallel universes in “The Garden of Forking Paths” (1964) and Julio Cortazar
published Rayuela (1963), a novel that encourages its readers to leave traditional
notions of chronology behind, as its temporal organisation is at will either
forward, from beginning to end, or ‘chaotically’ shifting from 73 to 1, to 2, to
116, to 3, to 84, to 71 and so on, undermining classical poetics.
These examples show that literary and scientific notions of time proceed
along parallel paths, moving in and out of the same paradigms. The struggle
between different conceptualisations of time did not arise from the two cultures,
but from the transition from the classical and Newtonian world to the world of
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the new sciences, Modernist and postmodern literature. Contrary to Meyerhoff’s
conviction that the interests of literature are ultimately different from those of
science, I argue that literary and scientific ideas of a particular period go hand in
hand. 
Simultaneity and Relativity
If we consider the analogous development of literature and science in the
twentieth century, it is not surprising to see how echoes of the new sciences
reverberate in Winterson’s work. Winterson upsets the notion of simultaneity, as
can be discovered in the passage from Art & Lies quoted below. This passage
echoes one of Einstein’s main insights about time. Einstein asked himself what
we do if we try to determine a duration, i.e. when we measure a time interval. He
observed that a statement about time actually deals with simultaneity. When we
say ‘the train arrives at seven o’clock’, this actually means that the indication of
the figure seven by the small hand of the clock and the arrival of the train, are
simultaneous happenings. However, in the passage that follows, Winterson is
playing with this notion of simultaneity. 
‘What time shall I expect the arrival of the 9:15?’ 
He looked at her with undisguised contempt. (...) ‘The board tells me that
the 9:15 will arrive at 9:20. It’s now 9:30.’ (AL 37)
The train indicated by ‘the 9:15’ receives its identity from its due time of arrival.
The train is not identified by the place it came from, nor by its colour, type or
any other characteristic, but by the prediction of the simultaneous events of a
train coming in and the clock pointing at 9:15. Strictly speaking, for all observers
on the station, any train that arrives at the station at 9:15 is a 9:15; but if you are
able to assume a bird’s eye view, there is only one actual 9:15, namely the one
that was supposed to come in at 9:15. So, even if it is late, that train is still the 9:15.
Consequently, whether the train that is actually coming in at 9:20 is in fact the
9:20 or the 9:15 can only be known by those observers that have an overview of
the complete situation. Having an overview of the train tracks and the timetables
provides a different perspective from someone who is waiting on a platform for
a train to come in. So, understanding is not universal; the meaning of events
depends on the place and the time occupied by the person who is trying to
understand. 
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But there is more to this short passage, where two competing worldviews
are at odds. The man is looking for absolute values: what is supposed to happen
at 9:15, must happen at 9:15. In the woman’s voice we can recognise Einstein’s
thinking – the idea that what is expected as simultaneous, need not happen as
simultaneous. The man seems to support the idea that when there is no event
coinciding with the moment, the concept ‘the 9:15’ loses all meaning. The
woman is able to attach a new meaning to a fleeting reality. Also, Winterson
presents us with a male worldview that expresses a sense of superiority: the man
displays “undisguised contempt” for the question coming from the feminine
worldview. Winterson thus makes a value judgement about absolutism and
relativism, saying that the absolute is the product of a male dominated order,
rigid and self-absorbed, and that the relative expresses a more subtle and
sympathetic – ergo feminine – way of thinking. This aligns perfectly with what
Winterson says later on in Art & Lies: “That Time, the Destroyer, was a man,
she had no doubt” (AL 60). Of course, such texts are begging for analysis from
a gender perspective, but this will have to wait until chapter 6. 
Art & Lies also contains more explicit references to Einstein’s Special
Theory of Relativity. For Sappho, Picasso and Handel, the train represents the
possibility of escape from a daily reality filled with problems and injustice. At a
certain point in their lives, they leave their normal surroundings, and board this
train, hoping to start a new life.
From a distance only the light is visible, a speeding gleaming horizontal
angel, trumpet out on a hard bend. The note bells. The note bells the
beauty of the stretching train that pulls the light in a long gold thread. It
catches in the wheels, it flashes on the doors, that open and close, that
open and close, in commuter rhythm. (AL 3)
Long trains leaving. The square light in the windows. The yellow light on
the black train. The reptile train with yellow scales. Yellow and BLACK
yellow and BLACK yellow and BLACK chants the train. 
The light was fretted around the border of the train; decorative light that
made a cornice for the unrelieved metal, pale patterns worked against an
austerity of line. 
Had the light been fixed in Victorian embellishment it would have tired
the eye and not refreshed it. Its charm was in its movement, the play of
light, beautiful and surprising, new. New light escaped from an ancient
sun. 
Sun-yeared light. 
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In its effect the light was choral. Harmonies of power simultaneously
achieved, a depth of light, not one note but many, notes of light sung
together. In its high register, far beyond the ears of man, the music of the
spheres, vibrating light noted in its own frequency. Light seen and heard.
Light that writes on tablets of stone. Light that glories what it touches.
Solemn self-delighting light. 
The train crawled on beneath the speeding light that had already belted
the earth. The scientific train and the artful light. (AL 25-26)
In Art & Lies, descriptions of the train are always accompanied by allusions to a
strange, mystical behaviour of light. Here, light not only produces visual
experiences, but also fuses with auditory experiences. The visual and the audible
become one. Winterson uses a specific kind of scientific imagery to describe the
peculiar behaviour of the light. The phrases “speeding gleeming horizontal
angel” and the “train that pulls the light” are references to Einstein’s experiments
with light on trains, which I will briefly go into below.
Einstein asked himself how we can determine the simultaneity of two
events that occur at a great distance from each other. He worked it out as
follows. Two clocks are far apart. We put observer A near the first clock, and
observer B near the other clock. A third person, C, is put right in the middle. A
and B send a light signal to C at exactly seven o’clock. When C observes both
signals at the same time, both clocks are synchronous. Now A and B get on a
long train: observer A goes into the carriage at the end of the train; observer B
goes into the front carriage. The train starts to ride at a very high speed, and
another observer D watches the railway. A sends a light signal to B and B reflects
it back to A. A will answer, when asked, that this light beam takes just as long to
go from A to B as from B to A. Light inside a riding train travels at the same
speed as outside the train. D, however, observes something different. This is
because A and B move with respect to D. As B moves in the same direction as
the light sent by A, the light beam has to overtake B. The light sent back by B
goes to meet A. According to D, the light beam will take more time to go from
A to B than to return from B to A. The observers A and D differ in their opinion
about the length of the time interval. So, it depends on the point of view of the
observer how much time passes between two events. Time, in other words, is
relative (cf. Einstein 1988:18-19).
The first of the two passages quoted above describes a long train “that
pulls the light in a long gold thread” and says that “from a distance, only the light
is visible”, the light that moves over a “hard bend”. These images relate to
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Einstein’s railway experiment not only in that a train and light beams jointly
configure; but also because of the fact that light is observed from a distance.
Both passages quoted above in fact describe the scene from the perspective of
D. The fact that the train stretches itself confirms the idea that Winterson in fact
describes Einstein’s train experiment here. When the train is seen from D’s point
of view, according to Winterson, the train stretches itself. It seems to become
longer, suggesting that for the observer, the light takes longer to get from A to
B than from B to A. The image of the stretching train might therefore refer to
the extra effort the light has to make to reach B: it has to overtake B. 
The image of the stretching train refers to another scientific discussion at
the same time. The idea of contracting moving objects was originally conceived
by Lorentz and Fitzgerald. They witnessed how material bodies contract in the
direction of their motion. Einstein later understood that the bodies did not really
contract, but only seemed to contract because of a change in the way space and
time are measured. 
Moreover, Winterson expresses in these passages a typically twentieth-
century topic in a form of rhetoric we would usually associate with religious
discourse. Here, she links technology and physics to visions of the sublime, while
referring to the Pythagorean concept of ‘the music of the spheres’. In the fifth
century B.C., Pythagoras regarded the stars and the planets as spheres, separated
by intervals which were associated with tones. Together, these tones would
create celestial music. As we can see in the second passage, the narrator’s
experience is an intense artistic and metaphysical experience. The harmonious
transcendent vibration – the harmony of the spheres – is directly associated with
the physical laws that describe the behaviour of light (“frequency”, “speeding
light”), technological development (“unrelieved metal”) and rational, efficient
structures (“austerity of line”). By doing so, she endows a seemingly materialist
culture with new, sacred meaning. In her efforts to Romanticise reality,
Winterson appropriates the new science, interpreting it in a way that makes
science match her own aesthetic and magic realist goals. That Winterson (ab)uses
Einstein’s findings to make them fit her own goals becomes extremely clear
when she introduces Einstein into Gut Symmetries as a character. There Einstein
becomes a mystic, an alchemist, mysteriously creating formulas out of ancient
words and numbers endowed with souls, beginning in the “waters of his spirit”
(GS 23). Winterson thus amalgamates the most famous modern scientist of all
with the secrets of hermetic philosophy. 
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So far, I have discussed how Winterson refers to Einstein’s Special Theory
of Relativity. But she is also inspired by the notions of time that have been
developed since, made possible by Einstein’s thinking. In one of her essays about
Virginia Woolf, Winterson suggests that Woolf’s world is permeated with
alternative notions of time and space – ideas that science in fact only began to
develop after 1920. In the passage below, Winterson argues that Woolf presents
temporal and spatial dimensions as a single interconnected whole, at the same
time indiscriminately intertwined with the human consciousness, which in its
turn is an amalgam of both imagination and experience. 
Woolf ’s connections across time and space, through the inner and outer
worlds of imagination and experience, are made brilliantly, vertiginously,
with not a glance over the edge. Cities and peoples pass beneath us, in a
moment we are in England, in another moment in Persia, then the carpet
flies on, ignoring the claims of the clock. (AO 73)
As we will see in chapter 5, Winterson is clearly inspired by Woolf’s connections
between points in spacetime, and the way in which Woolf creates an escape from
a world of rigid laws. For both Woolf and Winterson, spacetime is riddled with
wormholes (cf. next section). But these wormholes do not merely connect co-
ordinates in space and time. The realm of consciousness and the imagination has
is own wormholes – wormholes of the mind – connecting one phantasmagoria
to another. In that way, all possible realities are interconnected, which adds a new
dimension to knowledge. The dizzy confusion within the postmodern epistemic
system is able to fuse what the moderns used to separate: imagination and
experience. 
Winterson thus makes good use of the creative potential that was –
intentionally or unintentionally – freed by Einstein and his followers. Winterson
registers the imaginative possibilities of several scientific theories, and extends
their artistic and emotional implications, turning them into instruments of her
politics of aestheticisation.
Time Travel
Time has no meaning, space and place have no meaning, on this journey.
All times can be inhabited, all places visited. (STC 80)
The phenomenon of time travel is essential to the worldview put forward in
Winterson’s fiction. All of her works to date in one way or another involve
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crossing temporal boundaries. It is not only in Gut Symmetries that we find
scientifically inspired explanations for jumps through spacetime. Jordan’s
journey through time in Sexing the Cherry reveals that Winterson imaginatively
manipulates ideas from the field of physics in her early work. 
The last two chapters of this novel are called “1649” and “Some Years
Later”. This latter title hardly prepares us for the sudden transition Winterson
has in store for her readers. Although at first we are led to believe that the story
is still set in the seventeenth century – we are presented with explorers offering
pineapples to a king – it soon becomes clear that Jordan has been transferred to
the late twentieth century, complete with newspapers and television, Playboy and
computer hackers. But Jordan is still more or less the same person. He still feels
pineapples are strange objects and he has retained his passion for ships. The
explorers we meet at the beginning of the chapter turn out to be figures in a
painting in a museum. This painting in fact functions like a trapdoor, an interface
between two points in spacetime. Inspired by this painting, Jordan joins the navy.
But it is the same painting that takes him back to the seventeenth century:
I rested my arms on the railing and my head on my arms. I felt I was
falling falling into a black hole with no stars and no life and no helmet. I
heard a foot scrape on the deck beside me. Then a man’s voice said, ‘They
are burying the King at Windsor today.’ I snapped upright and looked full
in the face of the man who was staring out over the water. I knew him but
from where? And his clothes... nobody wears clothes like that any more. 
I looked beyond him, upwards. The sails creaked in the breeze, the main
spar was heavy with rope. Further beyond I saw the Plough and Orion
and the bright sickle of the moon. 
I heard a bird cry, sharp and fierce. Tradescant sighed. My name is Jordan.
(STC 121)
It is no coincidence that Winterson uses the phrase ‘black hole’ when Jordan
travels from one time system to another. The combination of a ‘black hole’ and
time travel makes it clear that Winterson was inspired by the new physics. Black
holes, even though sometimes located very far apart in space and time, are
connected to one another by wormholes. Although physicists believe that
nobody could survive inside a black hole, a literary interpretation of this
phenomenon would allow travel through black holes and wormholes to distant
spacetime regions. In The Physics of Star Trek, Lawrence Krauss describes the
differences and likenesses between science and science fiction. He explains how
scientists believe wormholes to function: 
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If spacetime is curved, then perhaps there are different ways of
connecting two points so that the distance between them is much shorter
than that which would be measured by traveling in a ‘straight line’
through curved space. (Krauss 1995:38)
Such wormholes are created as two microscopic ‘singularities’ – regions
of spacetime where the curvature becomes infinitely sharp – find each
other and momentarily join. (Krauss 1995:40)
Winterson obviously mixes literary techniques like flashbacks and flash-forwards
with scientific ideas. But why does Winterson make use of these theories? The
developments in the new sciences are akin to current literary shapings of time
and space. The absolutist worldview has been replaced by a relational, situated
idea of timespace, drawing upon Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity.
Contemporary physicists such as Hawking discuss recently discovered
phenomena such as black holes and wormholes. These phenomena cause time
to behave in a much less orderly fashion than we had always assumed. Winterson
is telling us, too, that the way in which the human mind handles reality is
represented more closely by these new theories than by the traditional concepts
of time and space. Subsequently, she liberally draws on the new sciences to
propagate her fantastic imaginings. She feels that the human mind does not order
the world according to chronological – linear – principles only. In fact, our
memory actually deals with fragments of the past in a less uniform and structured
way than prescribed by the rules of chronology: it puts together a story from
remembered bits and pieces, making jumps, experiencing simultaneities, moving
backwards and sideways, and with varying speed: 
In a night 200,000 years can pass, time moving only in our minds. (STC
132)
A similar insight is found in Woolf’s Orlando:
The mind of man, moreover, works with equal strangeness upon the body
of time. An hour, once it lodges in the queer element of the human spirit,
may be stretched to fifty or a hundred times its clock length; on the other
hand, an hour may be accurately represented on the timepiece of the
mind by one second. (Woolf 1928:91)
Whereas Woolf refers to the subjective experience of duration through the
meandering workings of the human mind, Winterson, more radically, holds that
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this subjective experience can actually produce radical jumps between different
points in spacetime. This idea is not only communicated through the voices of
Winterson’s protagonists; it is also inherent in the way she structures her novels,
and particularly in the way she uses various disruptions of linear time. I will
expand on these structures in chapter 5. Time shifts in Winterson’s fiction are
not merely meant to amuse or to marvel, they signal instead a specific mentality,
a particular way of looking at the world, and, conversely, the erratic way the
world presents itself to her. 
In Winterson’s view, the common-sense notion of time does not match
the workings of our mind at all. The human mind, she feels, does not experience
time in any rigid form. She rather thinks of it as an incessant time traveller, an
illusionist, and a fantasist. This, at least, is what Winterson suggests in the passage
below. 
Did my childhood happen? (...) Everyone remembers things which never
happened. And it is common knowledge that people often forget things
which did. Either we are all fantasists and liars or the past has nothing
definite in it. I have heard people say we are shaped by our childhood. But
which one? (STC 92)
Although Winterson does not directly refer to the psychology of memory, there
are obvious parallels between the ideas she expresses here and contemporary
research in this field. Quite recently, the phenomenon of ‘recovered’ or ‘false
memories’ has led to the questioning of the reliability of psychoanalysis. The
Houston trials of 1998 showed that psychoanalytic treatment had ‘created’ rather
than ‘recovered’ memories of incest experiences during childhood. The
preconception of the treatment determined the outcome – the past was ‘made’
by attempts to remember; attempts that proved to construct rather than to
reflect. As a consequence, False Memory Syndrome has become a widely
discussed phenomenon. To many, these insights imply that in our memory, and
therefore in our dealing with the past, true correspondence or mimesis is a
fiction. Following in the physicists’ footsteps, psychologists were also
confronted with the measurement problem; they became aware that their
preconceptions determined the outcome of their observations.
By questioning the validity of memory, and the ‘pastness’ of the past,
Winterson subverts the common-sense notion of time (and of history). The
distinction between past and present dissolves:
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Past? Present? Future? The language of the dead. Totality of time. (GS 49)
Winterson suggests that the common-sense concept of time is no longer true. If
this is so, how could it have remained so powerful? Like Michel Foucault,
Winterson believes that not its closeness to whatever truth, but science’s aura of
power plays an important role here. Following this line of argument, it was the
aura of power and certainty that surrounds traditional science, which produced
the common-sense image of time. 
The unity of discourses on madness [or linear time, A.E.] would not be
based upon the existence of the object ‘madness’ [‘linear time’ A.E.] or
the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the
interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during
a given period of time: objects that are shaped by measures of
discrimination and repression (...) (Foucault 1997:32-33)
If we apply Foucault’s argument to the social construction of the concept of
‘time’, the mechanical worldview, with its idea of continuity, has proven more
powerful than notions that posited discontinuous and whimsical ideas of time.
Winterson refuses to acquiesce in this status quo. All through her work, it is
obvious that she wants to endorse other, repressed, experiences of and
discourses on time. And that is why she combats science with science: she
explores the artistic possibilities of the new physics. Winterson believes that the
undisciplined, fantastic ideas that (to her) spring from the conclusions of
quantum mechanics, point the way out of discursive oppression, and out of the
dreariness of modernity. She wants to achieve greater acceptance for miraculous
and fantastic modes of thought, not only as valid ways of thinking, but also with
a truth value comparable to the aura of truth that still surrounds our common-
sense worldview. 
Winterson imports such abstract phenomena (or theoretical constructs)
like black holes and wormholes into Sexing the Cherry and Gut Symmetries, to
express the idea that strict divisions between past, present and future are not
tenable, and to open up the possibility of time shifts. She juxtaposes fairy tales
and the new physics to produce a new sensation of time: she crosses not only the
boundaries between genres or epistemological classes, but also between various
historical periods.
When I look out of this window I am looking back into the past. It’s one
of those wormholes you people talk about, a membrane between now
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and then. A tunnel of energy. I work here, at this window, pulling the past
like Rapunzel’s hair. (GS 122) 
“Rapunzel” is a seventeenth-century Italian fairy tale, that reached a wide
audience when the Grimm brothers published it in their collection Kinder- und
Hausmärchen in 1812. Winterson fuses theoretical constructs (wormholes) and a
fairy tale (“Rapunzel”) to enrich and embellish a worldview otherwise, at least in
her opinion, devoid of depth. In the passage above, Alice is not talking of the
past as something that has vanished. To her, the past is accessible from the
present. In the passage below, we see that Alice considers the division between
past, present, and future as the product of a purely rational state of mind,
necessarily unsatisfactory and incomplete: 
Walk with me. The past lies in wait. It is not behind. It seems to be in
front. How else could it trip me as I start to run?
Past. Present. Future. The rational divisions of the rational life. And
always underneath, in dreams, in recollections, in the moment of
hesitation on a busy street, the hunch that life is not rational, not divided.
That the mirrored compartments could break. (GS 20) 
Man is not in control of the world he is living in, Alice is saying here. Reality can
trip you up, it can break. According to Winterson, time shifts do not merely
occur before the mind’s eye, they are real experiences that nature confronts us
with. Time shifts continually occur in our consciousness, presenting us with a
succession of discontinuous images, experiences, ideas, expectations,
perceptions and associations. Therefore, Winterson’s idea of time defies the
Aristotelian idea that time should be visualised as a line. She undermines the
concept of historical development, denying logical sequentiality and causality.
Winterson replaces the ‘line’ by the ‘jump’, both through time and through space
(cf. page 103). 
Strange Simultaneities
Boating for Beginners owes much of its wit to the anachronisms Winterson creates,
conjoining persons, concepts, theories, vocabulary, institutions and objects from
different times in one fictional world. Winterson creates anachronisms by having
these things from different epochs meet in one world. In our common-sense
understanding of time, everything has been assigned to specific loci on a
historical timeline, and when this line gets tangled up like “a ball of string full of
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knots” (OAF 91), unexpected ‘crossroads’ in time emerge where elements from
the twentieth century collide with archaic objects and concepts. Commerce,
photography, tourism, pop music and poststructuralism, for instance, by
common consent do not belong in the era of the Old Testament. Consider this
passage, however, wherein Noah and God decide to dramatise their books
Genesis or How I Did It and Exodus or Your Way Lies There: 
Ham and Shem were to play different aspects of YAHWEH because
everyone agreed that God is a multifaceted and complex character who
shouldn’t be restricted by a single actor. (BFB 21) 
Here, biblical figures ventriloquize poststructural jargon on the fragmentation of
the subject. In another passage, the twentieth-century tourist’s blasé attitude is
juxtaposed to the sacred atmosphere of Mesopotamia:
Noah was an ordinary man, bored and fat, running a thriving little
pleasure boat company called Boating for Beginners. Gaudily painted
cabin cruisers took droves of babbling tourists up and down the Tigris
and Euphrates, sightseeing. (BFB 12) 
Noah is depicted as a small entrepreneur in a consumer society that is somehow
situated in a time when Genesis still had to be written. The effect of this narrative
strategy is that the familiar notion of sequentiality, linear development and
causality have become useless. All moments in time exist at the same time; they
simply are, they do not fade away. Apart from its humorous potential, this
strategy also has philosophical implications. Winterson’s technique brings to
mind Deutsch’s idea of the ‘multiverse’ (cf. page 130). Although we do not find
explicit references to the new sciences in Boating for Beginners, the simultaneous
ontology that constitutes its fictional world certainly echoes the idea of the
multiverse. In postmodern historical fiction, the author often mixes ‘imagined’
or ‘possible’ situations with those that are generally considered realistic, often
with the intention to ridicule distinctions between time frames or between the
‘real’ and the ‘imagined’. Elisabeth Wesseling for instance mentions that Angela
Carter in The Infernal Desire Machines of Doctor Hoffman (1972) has “Van Gogh
writing Wuthering Heights, Milton painting the frescoes on the walls of the Sistine
Chapel, and other such incongruous concoctions” (Wesseling 1991:155). But
Winterson is not satisfied by merely bringing forward other possibilities in
history and making them ‘real’. In her historical novels, she also purposely
creates a “complex ontology involving different domains”, that are “populated
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by different kinds of beings” (McHale 1987:36). So we see two different
strategies to equate the possible (but unreal) with the actual, and that is, firstly,
by comparing alternative paths in history – ‘the path not taken, the forgotten
angle’ – with the well-trodden paths of what has hitherto been considered ‘real’
or ‘actual’ history, and, secondly, by simultaneously featuring inhabitants of
different ontological orders in one new, amalgamous, eclectic order. 
Looking at Winterson’s work to date, it is in Gut Symmetries that borrowing
from the new sciences is most frequent and most explicit. The important role
that the past plays in our present is a theme that pervades Winterson’s oeuvre,
but it takes different forms in different novels. In Sexing the Cherry, Winterson
uses images that recall T.S. Eliot’s poetry, especially “Four Quartets”, in which
time is an important theme. In both works, we are presented with a strange,
uncommon conception of time. Eliot also speaks about this in his essay Tradition
and the Individual Talent. The past is not yet finished, Eliot argues. All times exist
at once,
(...) and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness
of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to
write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling
that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the
whole of literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and
composes a simultaneous order. (Eliot in Abrams 1993:2171)
Winterson voices a very similar thought in the following passages:
Time: Change experienced and observed. Time measured by the angle of
the turning earth as it rotates through its axis. The earth turning slowly on
its spit under the fire of the sun. (AL 67) 
Time turns me under the sun but I can turn the sun through time. Here,
there, nowhere, carrying white roses never red. Mitylene 600 BC, the city
2000 After Death. All art belongs to the same period. The Grecian
drinking horn sits beside Picasso’s bulls, Giotto is a friend of Cézanne.
Who calls whom? Sappho to Mrs Woolf - Mrs Woolf to Sappho. The
Over-and-Out across time, the two-way radio on a secret frequency. Art
defeats Time. (AL 67)
Both to Eliot and to Winterson, all art has a simultaneous existence. Their
writing reveals a perspective on time that resembles that of late twentieth-
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century physicists – those physicists who believe in reality as a ‘block-universe’:
a universe in which
(...) the whole of physical reality – past, present and future – is laid out
once and for all, frozen in a single four-dimensional block. (Deutsch
1998:268)
Eliot and Winterson
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.
Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden. (Eliot 1969:71)
These are the first fourteen lines of Eliot’s “Four Quartets”. What Eliot is saying
here is quite unconventional, if not revolutionary – certainly if one considers the
time in which these lines were written. Although the phrase “time future
contained in time past” may be an expression of teleological or deterministic
thinking – both old philosophical ideas – Eliot’s words can also be taken to mean
that our future selves take us by the hand, just like our past selves. The phrase
“time present and time past are both perhaps present in time future” then, would
mean that past and present versions of our selves are not mere memories but
continuous realities – those other selves would be characters with whom we can
communicate. This could mean that the present and the past live on, a statement
that Winterson makes in Sexing the Cherry:
Lies 1 : There is only the present and nothing to remember.
Lies 2 : Time is a straight line.
Lies 3 : The difference between the past and the future is that one has
happened while the other has not. (STC 83)
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Sexing the Cherry bears references to “Four Quartets”. We can see in the
aphorisms above that Winterson shows her disapproval of the common-sense
notion of time. Eliot condemns this notion of time as follows: 
You shall not think ‘the past is finished’
Or ‘the future is before us’ (Eliot 1969:188)
Both writers reject the common-sense notion of time, and do so by using
authoritative language: aphorism, enumeration, and imperative. Also, in the
following passages both writers connect the notion of ‘invisible lives’ to the
image of people sitting in trees:
For the most part I can see only the most obvious detail, the present, my
present. But sometimes, by a trick of the light, I can see more than that. I
can see countless lives existing together and receding slowly into the trees.
(STC 92)
(...) for the leaves were full of children (Eliot 1969:172)
Ascend to summer in the tree
We move above the moving tree 
In light upon the figured leaf (Ibid. 172)
The moment in the arbour (...),
The moment (...),
(...) involved with past and future. (Ibid. 173)
There rises the hidden laughter 
Of children in the foliage 
Quick now, here, now, always – 
Ridiculous the waste sad time
Stretching before and after. (Ibid. 176)
While Winterson sees “countless lives receding slowly into the trees”, Eliot hears
“children in the foliage”. He rejects the “waste sad” notion of linear time and
favours simultaneity: “now, here, now, always”. In Winterson’s text, too, the
narrator is able to experience time as simultaneous, an experience triggered by “a
trick of the light” reminiscent of Eliot’s phrase “light upon the figured leaf”.
Eliot’s image of laughing children sitting in a summer tree produces an intimate
experience of nostalgia in the reader – bringing the past into the present. In
Winterson’s text, people’s lives somehow ascend to treetop level, which is a
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magical and beautiful event – producing an experience as intimate as Eliot’s
nostalgia. So, in Sexing the Cherry, Winterson is clearly recycling images from
“Burnt Norton”. In a recent interview, Winterson explains why: 
MR: You have said that Sexing the Cherry is a meditation on T.S. Eliot’s
“Four Quartets”. How? 
JW: It’s about time. It’s about the nature of time, and time is one of the
things that I’m obsessed with... What it is, how it affects us, how it moves
through us, how we move through it. And so I took that poem as a
starting point to explore. And of course the river runs through Four
Quartets and there’s always water in my work, but the river runs through
Sexing the Cherry, the river Thames is very important there. Just as it is in
Virginia Woolf ’s Orlando. We use these things because they come, already
full of meaning. It was Peter Ackroyd who said in his Dickens biography
that simply to introduce the Thames into a book is to bring with it all of
that weight of history which has gone before, and I was trying to do that.
I was using it literally and metaphorically as a place where time could flow.
(Winterson 2002c)
Before I go on to show why these correspondences between the work of Eliot
and Winterson are interesting, the end of this passage requires some explanation.
Although I said earlier that Winterson does not believe that time passes linearly,
in this passage Winterson indicates that time flows. ‘Flowing time’ is a concept
usually associated with the Newtonian idea of time. But to Newton, ‘flow’ means
‘to flow equably’, whereas Winterson associates ‘flow’ with a movement far more
turbulent, as we can see in this passage from Gut Symmetries: 
A river (...) can flow in circles; its eddies and whirlpools regularly break up
its strong press forward. The riverrun is maverick, there is a high chance
of cross-current, a snag of time that returns us without warning to a place
we thought we had sailed through long since. (GS 104-105)
Winterson’s ‘flow’ is not the same ‘flow’ as in the Enlightenment notion of time.
To her, time does not pass by, and movement through time is not predictable. 
Winterson’s attitude towards the past and historical development can be
seen as a Romantic as well as a postmodern reaction against the linear
conception of time implicit in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The
Romantic and postmodern perspectives on time and history can be seen as
reactions against the a-historical attitude of the Enlightenment. Postmodernists
set their sense of nostalgia and historical eclecticism against the heritage of the
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Enlightenment, because they consider the metanarrative of progress as
oppressive. The Romantics turned to the past to escape from society. Stephen
Bann, in Romanticism and the Rise of History, explains that the interest in the past
that emerges in Romanticism is not the same as the historical consciousness that
went before. In fact, a fundamental shift took place; history was no longer
regarded as an isolated practice, unconnected to society, but was instead believed
to influence the whole of society and slowly caused boundaries between
disciplines to fade. “History”, says Bann, “is the relentless appropriation, by text,
figure, and scenographic representation, of what is already irretrievably lost”
(Bann 1995:10). Winterson uses this strategy of “relentless appropriation” and
of escape, however, without feeling that the past is “irretrievably lost”. 
Her historical and escapist attitude is not always directly inspired by the
Romantics. In the part of Sexing the Cherry I just discussed, Winterson is in fact
advocating a Romantic historical attitude by recycling imagery of a Modernist
poet. She uses Eliot’s themes and language as a vehicle to express a complaint
about the modern western world. Both Eliot, in his early poetry like “The Waste
Land”, and Winterson, in Sexing the Cherry and Art & Lies, react against the decay
of culture. Both Eliot and Winterson feel that literature has an important role to
play in an increasingly superficial society. Even though they wrote in different
periods, they are equally aware of the growing complexity of civilisation and
language. They both believe that a writer should create works of art that reflect
that complexity, and create a poetic language able to function as an antidote
against superficiality, a language that questions received strategies of
representation. It makes sense for Winterson to refer to Eliot rather than the
Romantics when discussing attitudes to the past, because the Romantics did not
question conventional ways of representing reality as Eliot and other Modernists
do. Both Eliot’s and Winterson’s treatment of time in their works contributes to
their search for a higher reality. It exemplifies their struggle against the
conventions of realism in art. They aim at an alternative way of describing reality,
foregrounding the power of language to create worlds that counteract the
landscapes of the ‘waste land’ of modernity. Keeping the past alive is an
important strategy in this creative process. 
Both Eliot and Winterson position themselves as anti-moderns. Their
texts disavow the modern belief in a “Motor von Steigerungs- und
Erweiterungsprozessen der Rationalität” (Welsch 1991:75), simply because they
undermine the linear model that is prerequisite for “Steigerung” and
“Erweiterung”. When the past is not finished and the future is not before us, the
Time and History
129
programmatic outline of modernity loses its value. The modern project and its
prospects for progress depends on a view of time as linear and steady. Modern
philosophies like Hegel’s and Habermas’ rest on the notion of time as passing
by. Both Eliot and Winterson contradict such notions.
In “Four Quartets”, Eliot says that “all time is eternally present”. When
David Deutsch discusses time as a quantum concept, he uses a description that
is remarkably similar:
So a particular moment cannot become the present, or cease to be the
present, for these would be changes. Therefore, the present cannot,
objectively, be a single moment. (Deutsch 1997:265) [Italics A.E.]
This shows the extent to which Eliot was in tune with the evolving ideas of his
time. For Winterson, however, this idea is only a starting point. In “Four
Quartets”, Eliot says that “what might have been is an abstraction”. So what
could occur, but does not, remains “a perpetual possibility / Only in a world of
speculation” (Eliot 1969:171). In other words: he regards possible worlds as
unreal worlds: they have a fictional existence rather than a physical one. So,
where Winterson (in line with current science) attaches reality status to the
possible, Eliot directs the possible to the realm of fiction. 
David Deutsch and Winterson both confirm the ontological status of the
possible, whereas Eliot sticks to an ontology characterised by a bifurcation
between ‘real’ and ‘imagined’. Contemporary physics maintains that we,
linguistically and mentally, discern between factual statements and counter-
factual statements. Deutsch states that we evolved particular language constructs
for talking about different kinds of snapshots: tenses for time, and ‘if...then-
constructions’, and conditional and subjunctive forms of verbs for possibilities. 
We have traditionally placed these two types of snapshot – other times,
and other universes – in entirely different conceptual categories. Now we
see that this distinction is unnecessary”. (Deutsch 1998:278-279)
An example of what we agree to be a factual statement is ‘Jeanette Winterson is
a writer’; a counter-factual one would be ‘Jeanette Winterson is a clergywoman’.
Now, if we look at history in a traditional way, we could say that if we make a
polaroid picture of all facts and events, everywhere, and at every given moment,
we have a pile of pictures that together make up the whole factual history of the
universe. All polaroids ordered chronologically would thus be universal history.
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Consider the following situation: I am standing opposite a man and I am making
a choice: ‘shall I kiss him, or shall I not kiss him?’. In the traditional view of
history, if I choose not to kiss him, the moment-of-not-kissing is pictured and
added to the archive of polaroids. Any other choice, and the subsequent
outcome, would not exist in the universe. 
However, according to physicists that believe in the Multiple Worlds
Interpretation of quantum mechanics – and therefore in the existence of parallel
universes, these alternate histories do exist. From this perspective, the world
splits into many worlds, one world for each different possibility. In this way, the
set of worlds branches endlessly. What we perceive as the present, lies in the
pasts of an innumerable amount of different futures. Everything that can happen,
does happen, in other universes. In these places, the world in which ‘I kissed
him’, and the world in which Jeanette Winterson became a clergywoman actually
exist. Another example: according to most historians of science, the scientist
Michael Faraday died in 1867. But as Deutsch puts it: “..in the multiverse there
are almost certainly some universes in which Faraday died in 1830” and “There
is nothing arbitrary about which variants of our universe the counter-factual ‘if
Faraday had died in 1830...’ refers to: it refers to the variants which really occur
somewhere in the multiverse” (Deutsch 1998:276). In Deutsch’s view, the
multiverse contains not only the version of ourselves that we know, but also
innumerable other lives. There are worlds in which Winterson became a
clergywoman and there are versions of me that did kiss the man. Perceived in
this way, there is no great ontological difference between past, future and
possibility. David Deutsch argues that 
The snapshots which we call ‘other times in our universe’ are
distinguished from ‘other universes’ only from our perspective, and only
in that they are especially closely related to ours by the laws of physics.
They are therefore the ones of whose existence our own snapshot holds
the most evidence. (Deutsch 1998:278)
As we have seen, T.S. Eliot postulates a great ontological difference
between time and possibility. Winterson and Deutsch, however, do not. In the
next section, we will see how Winterson weaves possibility, past, present and
future into a single model of reality. 
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The Grid: Physics and History
The scene I have just described to you may lie in the future or the past.
Either I have found Fortunata or I will find her. I cannot be sure. Either I
am remembering her or I am still imagining her. But she is somewhere in
the grid of time, a co-ordinate, as I am. (STC 93)
Here, Jordan mentions the grid, which is perhaps the most abstract concept to
be found in Jeanette Winterson’s work. It describes how time, space and
possibility are joined. The grid can be seen as the underlying organising principle
of spacetime. It is like an infinite net or web, a coherent whole of co-ordinates,
where places and events interlace. In the grid, reality is a series of parallel events,
parallel places, parallel times, and parallel possibilities. The points where the
threads are knotted (co-ordinates) can be seen as states of affairs; as snapshots
of how things were/are/will be. As we can see in the passage below, Winterson
sees reality as the simultaneous existence of all possible times, events, and selves: 
If all time is eternally present, there is no reason why we should not step
out of one present into another. 
The inward life tells us that we are multiple not single, and that our
existence is really countless existences holding hands like those cut-out
paper dolls, but unlike the dolls never coming to an end. (STC 90)
From Jordan’s musings about Fortunata cited above, we gather that a person’s
consciousness moves through this simultaneity, i.e. the grid, much in the same
way as a particle orbits around a nucleus. Particles circle in steady orbits, yet
sometimes they move one layer closer to or away from the nucleus: a quantum
jump transports the particles to another orbit. Likewise, the human
consciousness experiences a ‘steady orbit’ of continuity and flow; yet sometimes
it is blown off course. When this happens, our experience of spacetime is
ruptured and fragmented. Subjective experiences highlight a highly capricious
path through the grid. This path is not a linear succession of events, as is clear,
for instance, from Jordan’s unexpected time travel (cf. page 118). In chapter 3,
too, we saw that Winterson’s characters were violently transported from one
space to another (cf. page 93). Such shifts often occur in Winterson’s work. In
chapter 5, I shall go into this in more detail, discussing the way in which
Winterson stresses discontinuity in the interplay between spacetime and the self
(cf. page 172). 
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The narrator in Written on the Body, too, experiences bulges and holes in
spacetime that he or she cannot account for. 
But molecules and the human beings they are a part of exist in a universe
of possibility. We touch one another, bond and break, drift away on force-
fields we don’t understand. (WOB 62)
Not only according to Jordan in the passage quoted above, but also according to
this narrator, people move freely and discontinuously through fields of co-
ordinates. They experience non-linear movements through a universe structured
not unlike Deutsch’s ‘block universe’ mentioned earlier. Such movements are
non-linear, and as such they fit perfectly in Winterson’s non-modern politics of
aestheticisation, because they enable her to re-enchant established accounts of
reality. 
The grid is at the same time a model for reality that does away with
boundaries. The grid is comprehensive and infinite. It also comprises those
realities we do not experience in an everyday state of mind. The grid in fact is the
framework that underlies time travel, cyclical movements, wormholes and the
like in Winterson’s work. Such ‘immaterial’ elements of our world as
metaphysical revelations, possible universes, the past and the future, are
considered equivalent to what was formerly seen as ‘actual’, as ‘real’. Fiction is
therefore given an epistemic status equivalent to truth, and vice versa. The fact
that consciousness behaves unpredictably in a grid where all kinds of ontological
layers are equal, allows Winterson to achieve epistemological equivalence among
discourses. As can be concluded from Brian McHale’s Postmodernist Fiction,
postmodern literature foregrounds ontological concerns, and describes amongst
other things ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’ universes, in line with “contemporary
‘possible-worlds’ theorists” (McHale 1987:27). Likewise, Winterson’s idea of
reality parallels the scientific concept of the multiverse. Postmodern literary
writing and postmodern historiography are, thus, in line with what we could call
‘postmodern science’. Postmodern historiography is in fact an epistemological
upgrading of alternative histories; incorporating into history perspectives that
were traditionally regarded as untrue. Postmodern historiography and the new
sciences in fact both assign truth value to the imaginary. Indeed, according to
Deutsch, facts that are mentally construed in our linguistic system with ‘if...then’
constructions, are not just mental constructs but physical actualities. 
Time and History
133
Appealing to imaginary universes does not work, because we can imagine
any universes we like, in any proportions we like. But in the multiverse,
universes are present in definite proportions (...) (Deutsch 1998:276)
In the same way, postmodern writing ‘upgrades’ alternative side-stories,
recognisable by their conditional status, like this passage from The Passion: 
Strange to think that if Bonaparte hadn’t divorced Joséphine, the
geranium might never have come to France. (TP 155) 
Winterson subverts hierarchic historical structures. Traditionally, national and
political history (about Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance) are subsumed under
‘important history’, while the history of quotidian life (about geraniums in the
household, for instance) was considered of marginal importance. Winterson’s
notion of the grid therefore enables her to come up with a complex ontology that
does away with boundaries not only between space and time, but also between
time and possibility, and the ‘actual’ and the ‘fictional’. The latter diffusion of
borders destabilises the hierarchies that dominated traditional historiography.
Fiction or non-fiction – from within the grid, this distinction becomes
meaningless:
I don’t know if other worlds exist in space or time. Perhaps this is the only
one and the rest is rich imaginings. Either way it doesn’t matter. We have
to protect both possibilities. (STC 128)
Postmodernism and Time
He wrote, FUTURE. And then he put a line through it. What did he
mean? His future? My future? I thought back to those sea-salt days when
the sun had turned the grass yellow and men had married mermaids. I
started my little book then, the one I still have and Domino had turned
on me and called the future a dream. There’s only the present, Henri.
He had never talked of what he wanted to do, where he was going, he
never joined in the aimless conversations that clustered round the idea of
something better in another time. He didn’t believe in the future, only the
present, and as our future, our years, had turned so relentlessly into
identical presents, I understood him more. Eight years had passed and I
was still at war, cooking chickens, waiting to go home for good. Eight
years of talking about the future and seeing it turn into the present. Years
of thinking, ‘In another year, I’ll be doing something different,’ and in
another year doing just the same. 
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Future. Crossed out.
That’s what war does. (TP 86)
In The Passion, war kills Henri’s dreams about the future, perhaps even the future
itself. Winterson chose Napoleon here, because it was he who institutionalised a
number of important Enlightenment principles in his Empire. His world was
built on a ruthless rationality, devoid of human feeling. This systematic
rationality presented itself not only on the battlefield, but also when he reshaped
France into a modern nation state. He founded universities, initiated modern
building projects and, important in the context of the novel, straight roads.
Winterson relates this modernity, which was supposedly the era of progress, to
Henri’s inability to dream and feel. All that remains is a bitter disappointment.
The values Winterson deems so highly, the imagination, dreams, are victimised
by a totalitarian regime. 
Gerald James Whitrow, in Time in History, describes how people held on to
the idea of progressive cultural development, and which philosophical texts
sustained this idea. He also shows that a cyclical idea of development instead of
a linear one came in fashion after Blake and Shelley gave voice to “the menace
of time” (Whitrow 1988:179), and after Yeats and Nietzsche argued that cultural
development goes through cycles. He explains how the great wars of the
twentieth century gradually yet unavoidably put and end to the age of optimism.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, when the socio-economic problems
that surrounded the First World War made themselves felt, the perspective on
human thinking and enterprise shifted radically:
And the twentieth-century historians and sociologists Spengler, Pareto
and Toynbee all believed in the cyclical nature of history. (...) Following
the First World War the general climate of opinion, particularly in
Germany, caused the pessimistic world views of Oswald Spengler to
attract considerable attention. His widely read book The Decline of the West
seemed to many British readers more cogent than the old-fashioned
optimism expressed by J.B. Bury in his book The Idea of Progress, published
in 1920. (Whitrow 1988:179)
Stent believes, like Spengler, that scientific progress may be coming to an
end. (Whitrow 1988:180) 
Warfare played a decisive role in the shift from progressivism to cultural
pessimism, and the way to describe this shift is to say that the search for
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continuity was abandoned in favour of the pursuit of discontinuity. As Michel
Foucault puts it in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid,
homogeneous manifestations of a single mind or of a collective mentality,
beneath the stubborn development of a science striving to exist and to
reach completion at the very outset, beneath the persistence of a
particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity, one is now trying
to detect the incidence of interruptions. (Foucault 1997:4) 
Baltimore scholar Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth describes how postmodern
writing and traditional history are opposed to one another in terms of the
expression of temporality: whereas in history, “consciousness is rationalized by
a narrative time that extends from here to eternity”, postmodern writing
recognises “disturbing fractures”. History has traditionally preferred the
technique of “single point perspective”, that was first developed in Renaissance
painting and that posits a “common horizon”. Postmodern writing celebrates
the approach that was also traditional in Medieval painting, the
“quasirepresentational space fractured by competing vanishing points”. There is
no longer “(‘a world’) that remain[s] the same regardless of his or her position
and [that] extend[s] to infinity, thus having the value of universal truth”. Time is
no longer “a neutral homogeneous medium like the space of pictorial realism”
but rather belongs to a “counterintuitive system” that is part of a “culture with
values diametrically opposed to the culture of representation and science”
(Deeds Ermarth 1992:24-27).
The old worldview based on linear progression, that celebrated the notion
of time as accumulation, was replaced by a worldview in which time is
untrustworthy (echoing the theory of relativity) and discontinuous (echoing
quantum mechanics). In the postmodern worldview, time is not deterministic. In
Winterson’s world, it is open-ended, enabling the Romantic soul, filled with
Sehnsucht, to escape from the confining terror of the construct we call ‘everyday
reality’. 
If western thought abandons the idea of progressivism, then the future can
no longer uphold the promise of happiness. The postmodern era brought with
it a rising suspicion towards programmatic promises of a better collective future.
Instead, it affirms the value of the present. We do not live to realise our dreams
in the future: one should seize the present. In The Passion, Winterson affirms her
focus on the present:
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Domino said it was in the present, in the moment only that you could be
free, rarely and unexpectedly. (TP 154) 
Forget about controlling the future, Winterson tells her readers, start accepting
the unexpected. For Winterson, chance – contingency – is the much-needed
antidote for a world of control freaks. By denying the existence of progress
through human action, Winterson eschews the Dialektik des Geistes, that is the
crux not only of Hegel’s philosophy but of modernity as a whole (cf. Welsch
1991). As alternatives to this dialectic, Winterson installs the uncertain and the
accidental as the driving forces of a new worldview. In her work, the notion of
contingency is not confined to its contents alone, it is also embedded in the
structure of her novels. The Passion, for instance, opens with Henri’s narrative. He
is abruptly interrupted when the second chapter starts, which is narrated by
another character, Villanelle. Like the first chapter, the second also portrays part
of the Napoleonic wars. Beyond this, however, the two chapters have little in
common; they do not share a single character, event, or place. The reader’s
expectations of continuity are frustrated, as there seems to be no logical pattern
in the juxtaposition of these two stories. There is no way to link Henri’s and
Villanelle’s narratives until the two of them meet in the third chapter. With the
juxtaposition of the two stories, Winterson expresses the idea that events do not
have a deeper cause or a purpose; they just are. And they are beautiful in
themselves, in the present. In The Passion, for instance, the love affair between
Henri and Villanelle ends without a dramatic leap of the heart, without playing
out a plot as we find it in classical tragedy. The absence of such an apotheosis
will dissatisfy any reader seeking for ‘completion’. Winterson’s repudiation of
linear plot is even more manifest in the structure of The.PowerBook, in which the
narrator, sitting behind her computer screen, sends stories on request, a new one
every night. The separate e-mail sessions generate meaningful moments that
stand on their own, and that are, eventually, lost in cyberspace. Coherence and
continuity are lost, and the locality and temporality of meaning are reaffirmed. 
In Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, we find a passage about the writing of
history and our ability to recapture the past. 
(...) history is a string full of knots, the best you can do is admire it, and
maybe knot it up a bit more. (...) There is a certain seductiveness about
dead things. You can ill treat, alter and recolour what’s dead. It won’t
complain. (OAF 166)
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Winterson argues that trying to make sense of the chaos of remembered and
recorded time is impossible and pointless. She feels we should accept different
explanations of and different perspectives upon the past in the disordered way
that we find them. 
In Gut Symmetries, she expresses doubts about the supposed truth of
logbooks, which in history as well as in science are often seen as faithful
recordings of the past.
Should it daunt me that the things I thought would be important, my list
of singularities and tide marks, is as useless as the inventory of a
demolished house? I no longer recognise the urgency of my old diaries
with their careful recording of what mattered. What I write down is in
another person’s handwriting. What has held me are the things I did not
say, the things I put away. (GS 79)
Winterson questions realist epistemological notions, and proposes a postmodern
acceptance of the erratic way the human mind works. Postmodern notions of the
fragmented self feed her distrust of objective memory. The thinking and
experiencing self may even be so scattered that the notion of coherence in
history or other recordings of reality must necessarily be abandoned as well. How
can maps of the world be standardised and unified if the self, the mind is not?
To Winterson, the mind makes mysterious jumps in the simultaneous structure
of past, present, future and possibility – a structure we have called the ‘grid’. This
activity of the mind corresponds with postmodern notions of fragmentation and
uncertainty. It puts an end to predictability, and undermines realism. As Deeds
Ermarth puts it:
What postmodernism supplants, then, is the discourse of representation
characteristic of the long and productive era that produced historical
thinking, or what Meyer Schapiro calls “the immense, historically
developed capacity to keep the world in mind.” (Deeds Ermarth 1992:5)
Winterson does not believe in this capacity to “keep the world in mind” – the
ability to remember the past as it was. This does not mean, however, that we
should cease to remember. The question is, how to remember. Writing history
does not take place outside of ideology. The past is always a reconstruction
coloured by present preoccupations and present language. Historians have
discussed this problem extensively and have developed different views on it.
Some say that we should try to transport ourselves back to the period under
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research, and absorb as many ideas, facts, thoughts, feelings, intuitions relating
to the time in question as possible. By imaginatively immersing oneself in that
distant paradigm, one would be able to understand and explain what happened
at the time. Others, however, radically discard this method. They doubt the
status of such comprehensive accounts, fluent narratives, gained from today’s
interpretations of a limited number of obscure facts. The modelling of raw
historical material, they say, cannot result in a reliable representation of the past.
The question remains whether the narratives in question, the resulting logical
patterns, are inherent in the past or whether they ‘merely’ are historians’ mental
exercises. Is history science or poetry? Is the act of structuring and explaining a
creative or a mimetic activity?
In “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact”, the third chapter of his
Tropics of Discourse, Essays in Cultural Criticism, the American historian Hayden
White discusses a metahistorical question relevant to the one I just described: 
What is the epistemological status of historical explanations, as compared
with other kinds of explanations that might be offered to account for the
materials with which historians ordinarily deal? What are the possible
forms of historical representation and what are their bases? (White
1978:81) 
He poses the question whether history should be seen as a truthful or a fictional
representation of past sets of events. He argues that there is no real distinction
(as Northrop Frye maintains) between myth (being an invented story of possible
events) and history (as a scientific, objective record of past events).
Consequently, history – like fiction – is the product of invention. For White: 
(...) there has been a reluctance to consider historical narratives as what
they most manifestly are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as
much invented as found and the forms of which have more in common with
their counterparts in literature than they have in common with those in
the sciences. (White 1978:82)
Hayden White says that historical narratives are, unlike those in the sciences, to
a large extent constructed. That makes him an adherer of the ‘two cultures’
philosophy. Thomas Kuhn, as I mentioned in chapter 1, argues that even the
‘facts’ that are produced by the natural sciences, are fictional constructs as well.
He feels that the narrative structures in which science casts all experienced facts,
whether written in mathematical or other languages, are to a large extent
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fictional. White believes that the events of the past are turned into a story by
means of several techniques: highlighting, suppression, but also point of view,
and variation of tone. These are the same techniques that are used in literary
writing, and not methods we would expect in scientific texts. But science is like
history in that it tries to make sense of sets of events, and expresses its
conclusions in narrative form. For instance, when events are regarded as
sequential and causally connected, the structure of the scientific narrative will
stress this continuity. 
Hayden White does not question the linear succession of events. Looking
at it rationally, it may not seem sensible to deny that the wheel was invented
before the car was. However, it cannot be denied that there are other ways to plot
the chronological arrangement of events. To say that the past is always plotted
in the light of the present is to say that the present seems to take prevalence upon
the past. On the one hand, there is our present-day perspective; on the other the
facts that have purportedly taken place in the past. The ordering, writing subject
– the historian – is not a part of that past. His perspective is the looking glass that
shapes the interpretation of the facts observed. Writing history is not a
‘representation’ but an act of ‘presentation’, creating another reality. The present
has become the originating force from which the past derives. 
If we now turn to literature again, we can see that postmodern authors,
too, acknowledge this crisis of historical representation.
Postmodernism transforms the historical construction of temporality that
took shape in the Renaissance and that informs the humanistic tradition,
and it is in this way that postmodernism most radically undermines both
realist and humanist practice. (Deeds Ermarth 1992:xi) 
Much postmodern literature not only questions the historical method but also
erases the boundaries between literature and history. Is it possible to distinguish
between writing fiction and writing history? Linda Hutcheon gives a brief
overview of the different points of view in the chapter on “Historiographic
Metafiction” in A Poetics of Postmodernism. I.A. Richards considered literature to
consist of ‘pseudo-statements’. Frye opined that “art was hypothetical, not real
– that is verbal formulations which imitate real propositions.” (Hutcheon
1988:109). Hutcheon mentions that both Philip Sydney and the structuralists
argue that to discuss truth in relation to literature is meaningless. The modern
idea of history is founded on a belief in truthful representation, whereas in
Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, Winterson writes: 
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History should be a hammock for swinging and a game for playing, the
way cats play. Claw it, chew it, rearrange it and at bedtime it’s still a ball of
string full of knots. Nobody should mind. (OAF 91)
Winterson discards historians’ scientific claims. Her perspective on history – that
it is a game – undermines all serious efforts to achieve truth. She is giving up on
the distinction between history and fiction, like she does on the difference
between science and literature.
Science and Literature Revisited
I opened this chapter with Meyerhoff’s claim that science stresses one kind of
experience and art another (cf. page 107). From what followed, it is clear that the
new sciences seem to be working in tandem with, rather than against the arts
when it comes to conceptualising (that is also to say: to capture in metaphors)
certain experiences of time and space that cannot be rendered by means of the
traditional conceptual models we inherited from modernity and before. The
concept of linear time, on the one hand, and time as an erratic phenomenon on
the other, constitute a bifurcation that cannot be explained by referring to a
distinction between science and the arts. The arts have often expressed the idea
of time as an arrow, and now science moves beyond the common-sense notion
of time. We can explain the concurrence of these two rival concepts of time from
the antithesis between the project of modernity, which stresses the logical and
predictable nature of time, and postmodernity, to which Winterson contributes,
highlighting indeterminate aspects of time. 
Although both the theory of relativity and the theory of possible worlds,
as well as postmodern rewritings of history, deny the notions of absolute time
and absolute history, the Aristotelian worldview is still very much alive. With its
enormous tenacity it still dictates our common sense. One way or the other, it
must have touched or reflected something essential in human nature to be able
to last this long. Perhaps that tenacity causes Winterson’s hammering
perseverance:
Time is not constant. Time in stories least of all. Anyone can fall asleep
and lose generations in their dreams. (TWOP 72)
So the past had gone. I had escaped. Such things are possible. (TP 125)
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The second passage quoted here is very illuminating. Obviously, Winterson feels
the need to spell out to her readers, what she is aiming at. It does not suffice to
make the past disappear and her character escape – she needs to educate her
readers by stressing that “such things are possible”. 
Today, people are often only faintly aware of the theory of relativity, and
its implications. Yet, they continue to behave according to common-sense
notions inherited from the past. For Winterson, two incommensurable ideas of
time exist alongside each other. Winterson’s world seems to be caught between
these binary pairs: linear versus erratic, law versus whim, science versus art.
However, we have seen in this chapter that Winterson not only uses images,
ideas, and theories from science to support the linear and law-like, but that she
also appropriates science to illustrate the erratic and whimsical. Though science
can indeed be an enemy to Winterson, this is not necessarily true for all its
manifestations. Winterson rejects those forms of science based on determinism
and classical empiricism, as well as, as we will see in chapter 6, forms of science
that make use of clinical, distanced methods. She celebrates, however, an open-
ended science that can reunite us with magic, wonder, uncertainty, and the
passionate involvement of human thinking with the world. Jeanette Winterson’s
urge to make the world an enchanted place is therefore not opposed to science
per se, but rather to the rationalist mentality in general, to the project of
modernity, and to the latter’s remnants in our everyday world, such as the
interests of practical management, the administrative concerns of planning and
time control. She has always been dismissive of the world of economic interests,
as in the following passage from Art Objects where science is portrayed as the
accomplice of consumer culture:
I like to live slowly. Modern life is too fast for me. That may be because I
was brought up without the go-faster gadgets of science, and now that I
can afford them, see no virtues in filling the day with car rides, plane rides,
mobile phones, computer communication. (...) The garden I cultivate, (...)
the time it takes to read a book, none of those things can happen in
microwave moments. (...) One of the casualties of progress is peace and
quiet. (AO 158-159)
In Art Objects, Winterson links science and technology to twentieth-century
consumerism. Yet, as we can see from The.PowerBook, her attitude towards
“computer communication” is not consistent at all: it changes according to the
use she can put it to. If computer communication can serve as a vehicle for her
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philosophy of the marvellous, she is happy to allow it into her sacred spaces. Just
like her opinion of science, her opinion of information technology oscillates with
the specific context. She is consistent in one respect, though. Her rejection of the
structures of efficiency, commercial modernity and governmental power, has
always been unconditional. Her dismissal of the rationality that is instrumental
to modernity goes hand in hand with her rejection of many features of late
twentieth-century society, such as supermarkets, central heating, mass media,
office work, and commuter rhythms. 
Winterson’s destabilisation of the common-sense worldview, coupled
with the way she uses relativity theory to outline alternative conceptualisations
of time and history, should be seen as a renunciation of the project of modernity.
Her methods of aestheticisation change the image of the world. They form an
antidote, not necessarily against science as such, but against the dreariness of
institutionalised rationality. This insight into Winterson’s writing demonstrates
the fallacy of thinking that the interests of literature are ultimately different from
those of science. Winterson establishes creative fields of which literature and
science are co-producers. She is able to create a world where the binary
oppositions between science and literature, rationality and emotion, fact versus
fiction, can be overcome. However, we have to be aware that Winterson only
accepts science when it is in accordance with her aesthetic ideals of
indeterminacy and uncertainty, and, as we will see in chapter 6, with her ideal of
passionate involvement and emotional attachment. 
I
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‘SCIENCE HAS NO SEX?’ 
ON GENDER AND RATIONALITY 
“Essentialists have (...) held that science is and should be manly”, says
Londa Schiebinger in The Mind has no Sex? (Schiebinger 1989:273). John
Limon makes a similar observation in The Place of Fiction in the Time of
Science: “Writers, male or female, are taken as the women of the
intellectual world, and science seems the most masculine of disciplines.
The public image of the scientist (...) is first of all masculine, and second
of all, oddly, unsexy” (Limon 1990:26). Genevieve Lloyd’s The Man of
Reason is a study of the Western philosophical tradition and its ideal of
reason as it has been formulated by the ‘great’ philosophers. She shows
that ‘reason’ is not a sexually neutral conception (Lloyd 1995). What are
Winterson’s points of view towards femininity and masculinity, intuition
and rationality? Does she endorse these binary oppositions that have
dominated our thinking for so long? Or is she able to deconstruct
essentialist notions of femininity and masculinity? We will see that
science’s supposed manliness determines her disapproval of it and that
she proposes an alternative kind of science, in which female ways of
knowing are institutionalised. 
Winterson’s novels constantly move in and out of the intellectual discussions
that question ideas of female and male identity. Her novels raise questions of sex
and gender through their use of vocabulary, the characters figuring in them,
opinions that the characters express, narrative structures, and philosophical
statements explicitly made. The nature of Winterson’s feminist viewpoint can be
illustrated by comparing it to the three perspectives that are generally
distinguished within women’s studies. These are sameness feminism, difference
feminism, and deconstruction feminism. Usually, these positions are mutually
exclusive. Paradoxically, however, Winterson’s work expresses opinions that are
derived from each of these positions. In the sections below, I shall therefore
discuss to what extent and in which contexts Winterson aligns herself with these
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three perspectives. We shall see that Winterson does not take a well-defined
stance in the theoretical debate that figures between the lines of her writing.
Winterson’s philosophy of sex and gender will turn out to be changeable and
unstable – she both affirms and deconstructs the ancient opposition between
‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’.
Sameness Feminism
Sameness feminism holds that the sexes do not differ as much as was
traditionally assumed. This position takes the Enlightenment view of rationality
as its starting point. Sameness feminism argues that all people deserve respect
because they are rational. The human capacity for rationality is precisely what
distinguishes us from other creatures in nature, who, not incidentally, are not
treated with proper respect. Women have been unfairly excluded from the
respect that is due to them as human beings on the basis of the assumption that
they are less rational and more ‘natural’ than men (cf. DiStefano 1990). 
In her introduction to Elizabeth Inchbald’s A Simple Story, Winterson
occupies a position close to sameness feminism. According to Winterson,
women are as rational as men, but in the eighteenth century ‘woman’ came to be
constructed as different from ‘man’. 
During the eighteenth century, science and philosophy were working
together to provide a picture of a man as a rational self-controlled
creature, both subject to the winds of fate or any earlier idea of spooks
and spirits. By means of his intellect he was also supposed to be able to
control his emotions, though women of course could not. Dorriforth [a
character in A Simple Story, who is a Catholic priest, A.E.] is a keen
example of this thinking. He struggles against passion, is beaten, but once
hurt closes his heart entirely and grows to despise emotion. The folly of
this and the cruelty it imposes on others is juxtaposed against the
sensitive, ever-patient behaviour of Miss Milner’s daughter and her
companion who constantly expose themselves to love and pain. There’s a
delicate balance between heart and head, a balance that masculine and
feminine polarities have destroyed. Neither sex can be the sole keeper of
either, to teach men to think and women to feel is a recipe for disaster.
The eighteenth century felt they had to prove that the sexes were
different just as their mania for solid ground beneath their feet meant
they had to ‘prove’ that animals couldn’t have souls. Once theology and
prejudice met up with science (of a kind) many more doors were closed
than were opened, especially for women, and the way was paved for those
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ludicrous experiments involving the size of women’s heads, the weight of
their brains, the effect of menstruation on rationality and so on.
(Winterson in Inchbald 1986)
Among those engaged in questions on ‘women and science’ and ‘women in
science’ one can detect a strong preference for sameness feminism. Arguing
from the idea that ‘different means less’, the American science education expert
Sheila Tobias and the Dutch scientific journalist Marianne Offereins argue that
women deserve to be seen as just as intellectual and just as capable of doing
mathematical calculations as men are. They believe that there are no convincing
experiments proving that women’s brains are any different than men’s, and that
women, if they are brought up and educated with the same technical toys as boys,
will overcome their ‘maths anxiety’. The sameness-feminist sentiment Winterson
expresses in this introduction cannot be found in her fiction, where she adheres
both deconstruction feminism (see below) and difference feminism
(cf. page 152).
Deconstruction Feminism
Deconstruction feminism argues that feminism must break with the rationalist
paradigm by detaching itself from the assumptions of the modern project and by
detaching itself from difference feminism (cf. page 152). In this approach,
gender is treated with greater sensibility than in sameness feminism, but with
more suspicion than in difference feminism. Deconstruction feminism fiercely
rejects the linguistic and conceptual frameworks of rationalism. Avoiding a
position either within or outside of that rationalist framework, either for or
against essentialist notions of sex difference, deconstruction feminism seeks to
transcend the discourse of rationalism and to offer new, decentered, and partial
or fractured narratives of opposition. Here, difference is simultaneously upheld
and deconstructed (cf. DiStefano 1990).
Jeanette Winterson aligns herself most notably with the deconstruction
feminist attitude. I will argue that Winterson creates characters that fall outside
the categories of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. Jordan and the Dog-Woman, The
Twelve Dancing Princesses, the narrator in Written on the Body, and Villanelle in
The Passion are all decentered characters, drifting in a no-man’s land, escaping
traditional stereotypes of sex and gender. Winterson creates violent women,
women with masculine bodily parts, cross-dressers and men and women who
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defy traditional gender stereotypes. We shall see that for Winterson men do not
have to be rational per se, but that they can adopt a feminine way of thinking. 
Winterson’s deconstructive practice can be viewed in the light of the
theory of écriture feminine. Hélène Cixous’ and Luce Irigaray’s theory of ‘women’s
writing’ is applicable to Winterson’s deconstructionist practice. The idea of the
subject that is implicit in the écriture feminine amounts to a critique of the idea of
language and of the subject that is expressed in structuralism. This critique
addresses the structuralist idea that meaning is created by means of oppositional
structures. Cixous and Irigaray point out that the semantic oppositions between
such contrasting pairs (male versus female, black versus white, heterosexual
versus homosexual) are not really opposites, because in linguistic practice these
structures are ordered hierarchically. One side of the opposition is always more
powerful than the other. Écriture feminine reverses the consensus about the
meaning of the feminine and the masculine in our culture.
With her écriture feminine, Winterson endows her male characters with non-
stereotype gender identities. Take the following couple of sentences:
There’s a bird here, a tiny bird that has no mother. (...) At night it sleeps in
my room in a collar box. I won’t give it a name. I’m not Adam. (TP 156)
To Henri, the narrator of this passage, naming the bird would not be a neutral
or innocent act, but a definitive, constitutive act. To give a name entails power.
He refers to the Bible, that – displaying an essentialist philosophy – begins with
God’s creation of the world, and continues with Adam’s naming:
19 And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field,
and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he
would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that
was the name thereof.
20 And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to
every beast of the field; but for Adam there was not found an help meet
for him (Genesis 2:19-20)
Seen from the perspective of Austin’s theory of speech acts (Austin 1992) and
Sapir and Whorf’s Linguistic Relativity Thesis (to which I shall return later),
naming is equivalent to creating, making Adam the powerful patriarch of reality.
Adam’s divine right to name is exclusively masculine. Feminists consider naming
– conceptualising – as empowerment. The fact that the Bible does not allow
women the right to name can be seen as a marginalisation of the woman’s voice.
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Winterson, too, regards naming as an act that constitutes reality. In Art Objects,
she repeatedly stresses the power that language holds over the world: 
It is the artist who must apprehend things fully, in their own right,
communicating them not as symbols but as living realities with the power
to move. (AO 145)
Winterson, however, counters the biblical assertion that men have the exclusive
power to create the world linguistically, when she stages Henri as a man who
refuses the power that goes along with naming. Winterson wants to differentiate
between different kinds of masculinity rather than hold on to one single
category. Moreover, the feminine critique of manly empowerment is voiced by a
male character – a strategy that undermines oppositional structures.
Before we ask ourselves to what extent Winterson’s novels must be
regarded as deconstructionist, I shall briefly explain why deconstruction
occupies a special place in feminism. As Mary Poovey explains in her article
“Feminism and Deconstruction” (Poovey 1988), a feminist use of
deconstruction necessarily transforms feminism. To accept the premises of
deconstruction is to accept that although the body is sexed, neither sexuality nor
social identity is determined exclusively by the body. Instead of reflecting a
unitary self, identity is relational; as such, the concept of ‘woman’ only acquires
its meaning from its placement in relation to ‘man’. Earlier feminist movements
were based on stressing difference, defining typically female characteristics
(peacefulness, for instance) and argued that culture would never survive without
these. Or they were politically oriented, emphasising equality and sameness,
stressing similarities between men and women, arguing that women can do the
same things as well as men. Deconstruction feminism, however, calls into
question the binary structure implicit in such feminist movements. So, the
introduction of deconstruction into feminism was to dissolve feminism as we
knew it. 
In her novels, Winterson uses deconstruction as a political strategy aimed
at reformulating male and female identity. She creates characters that fall outside
the traditional categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’. The characters in The Passion and
Sexing the Cherry do not eschew cross-dressing, for instance. Binary structures
fade away. We find no transvestites in Written on the Body, but the androgyny and
the masquerade can be traced in the novel’s structure and in the narrative
perspective. The central character’s sex remains undetermined, which implies
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that the character of Louise might either be bisexual or heterosexual (she was
already married) and that Elgin’s rival could be male, but also female. Just as the
exact relation between Elgin and his opponent remains vague, the sexual
activities taking place between Louise and the narrator are left unspecified. 
Many men in Winterson’s books break away from masculine stereotypes.
She deliberately creates vulnerable and frightened men to empty the set of
characteristics usually associated with the idea of ‘man’ of its meaning (although
she also creates strong men, like the preachers in Sexing the Cherry, and Elgin in
Written on the Body). It would make sense to argue, therefore, that Winterson
pleads to discard worn-out identities and role models; that she favours the idea
that it is the task of (women-) writers to upturn structures of meaning linked to
masculinity and femininity. For the most part, this statement holds up, and
Winterson’s work converges with what is known in philosophy and critical
theory as poststructuralism. But at some points in Winterson’s fiction, we can see
that she deliberately holds on to the binary model. 
Poststructuralist ideas feature in Jeanette Winterson’s novels in several
ways. At this point, I shall focus on the fuzzy gender of Winterson’s masculine
protagonists, taking Jordan in Sexing the Cherry as an example. Marianne
DeKoven defines ‘masculine language’ as objective, orderly, lucid, linear,
mastered, and coherent. Based on this definition, it does not make sense to call
Jordan’s narrative ‘masculine’; to call it feminine would be far more appropriate.
He is constantly and chaotically shifting between real and imaginary situations.
Furthermore, he feels absent from everyday, common-sense reality and refuses
to formulate principles, truths, or other kinds of fixed conclusions. The language
he uses reflects this, and is anything but exact and to the point: 
In the city of words that I have told you about the smell of wild
strawberries was the smell characteristic of the house that I have not yet
told you about. The runners of these plants spread from the beds
bounded by stone tiles and fastened themselves over terracotta pots and
flaking ironwork and hid the big flags that paved the courtyard. (STC 20)
Jordan’s language fits DeKoven’s female kind of language much better than it
does its male equivalent: it is anarchic, indeterminate, and open-ended (cf.
DeKoven 1983). Jordan’s mind does not fit into preconceived moulds of
masculinity – his gender is indefinite. 
Often, Winterson does not distinguish between gender identities. Not only
in Written on the Body, the narrator’s sex is undetermined; in The.PowerBook it also
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remains unclear whether Ali/Alix is a man or a woman. The passage below
shows how Winterson dissolves gender identity: 
A man or a woman sunk in dreams that cannot be spoken, about a life
they do not possess, comes suddenly to a door in the wall. They open it.
Beyond the door is that life and a man or a woman to whom it is already
natural. It may not be possessions they want, it may very well be the lack
of them, but the secret life is suddenly revealed. This is their true home
and this is their beloved. (STC 74) 
Linguistically speaking, ‘a man or a woman’ is a singular subject and not a plural
one. Here however, the singularity of ‘a man or a woman’, is attached to the
plurality of the personal pronoun ‘they’ and the verb ‘do’ but also to the
singularity of the verb ‘comes’. The narrator here is speaking about one person
and about more persons at the same time – there is one partner to whom (singular)
the new life is already natural but they (plural) may not want possessions.
Winterson appears to consider ‘a man or woman’ to be both singular and plural.
The or in ‘A man or a woman’ divides gender categories in two distinct opposites,
but then the two are merged and they become both singular and plural at the
same time. There is no consistent treatment of gender here. 
Another striking application of deconstruction feminism in Winterson’s
work is the representation of women’s violence. Until about 1987, women’s
violence was rarely represented in art. The advent of the feminist movie in the
mid-eighties marks a sudden preoccupation with this phenomenon. As Smelik
indicates in her article “Het stille geweld” [“Silent Violence”] (Smelik 1989),
many feminist movies show women’s violence against men. “Women have now
become terrorists, bank-robbers, guerrilla-warriors and murderers”, she says (cf.
Smelik 1989:235). Reading Sexing the Cherry, we can easily characterise the Dog-
Woman and some of the Twelve Dancing Princesses as violent. The Dog-
Woman, a terrifying giant who owns fifty fighting-dogs and who lives in a hut on
the banks of the stinking Thames, hates to wash, she can put twelve oranges in
her mouth at the same time and at one point bites off a penis like a juicy piece
of cucumber. She strangles her opponents, mostly hypocrite puritans, but also
other men who treat her disparagingly, without the slightest remorse:
‘Mr. Tradescant,’ I said, ‘I am defending the King.’ 
‘A noble cause,’ said he. 
At this, my neighbour claimed he’d never kneel before a king until he
knelt before Jesus. Any time now, he said, the Rule of Saints would begin
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on earth and all the sinners would be burned up and confounded. 
I had no choice but to strangle him, and though I used only one hand and
held him from the ground at arm’s length, he was purple in no time (...)
(STC 27-28)
The novel is partly set in 1649, at the time of the English Civil War, and a group
of Royalists, among whom the Dog-Woman, plans to avenge the King’s murder.
Reminded by one of her enemies, a puritan, of the biblical text ‘an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth’, the Dog-Woman collects one hundred and nineteen eyeballs
(one of her victims had already lost one) and over two thousand teeth of Puritans
she meets in the streets. But what should one do with all these eyeballs? She feeds
them to her dogs. And the teeth make good drainage for her bed of watercress. 
Halfway through the novel, the Twelve Dancing Princesses each tell their
own story of how they got rid of their husbands. One of the Princesses collected
religious items. She owned the body of a saint, wrapped in cloth. When her
husband tried to end her hobby – “She had not minded her husband much more
than any wife does until he had tried to stop her hobby” (STC 49) – by burning
the body of the saint, she wrapped his body in cloth and threw him into the fire
too. Another princess had a husband who was very beautiful, but he never
touched her. He loved a boy instead of her. She pierced him with an arrow.
Another poisoned her husband for no particular reason.
The violent behaviour of these characters urges the reader to rethink the
categories of male and female “from a standpoint outside such received
conceptual oppositions” (cf. Norris 1987:149). A deconstructivist reading of
Sexing the Cherry implies “the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the taking
apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can then be reinscribed within a
different order of textual signification (cf. Norris 1987:19). Geneviève Lloyd
points out the oppositions traditionally identified with ‘male’ and ‘female’
identities. Aggression is placed at the male side of this binary division, as are odd
numbers, aggressive behaviour and reason. Even numbers, nurturing skills and
emotion are regarded as feminine (Lloyd 1995:104). Although the women in this
novel all explode traditional ideas of female identity, some are more dominant
than others, and they resort to violence for different reasons. Whereas the Dog-
Woman is too big a presence, too self-assured to ever become a real victim of
men’s domination or to be overlooked in a world where male language and male
interests rule, the Dancing Princesses are more docile, and have been locked
away in marriage, hampered in their freedom. 
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 The Dancing Princesses used to fly out of the window secretly, to a silver
city where everybody spent their time dancing. Dancing and flying frequently
serve as metaphors for freedom in Winterson’s novels. They seek to be free of
the men who confine them. The princesses had to be back before their “father
came to wake us in the morning”. But “eventually a clever prince caught us flying
through the window” (STC 48). The men are in a position to contain the
women’s freedom; the women have to obey their rules. Men are seen as warders
of the prison in which women are caught. The rules are designed by men and the
women just have to obey. The feminine world is characterised by anarchistic
freedom, humour, art, dance, and love. The masculine world is characterised by
hierarchical structures, confinement, politics, seriousness, and battle. But the
women do not hesitate to battle in order to escape from the world in which they
are trapped. In this novel, Winterson’s female characters never seem to doubt
that the only way to avenge their imprisonment is to murder men. On the one
hand, this exaggeration is bizarre and humorous. On the other hand, the cold
rationality of their killings highlights the bitterness underlying these acts of
violence. 
We are entering the realm of deconstruction in Winterson’s novels at the
same moment when we sense the surreal. When we experience how reality and
fiction both dissolve into a mystical realm, linguistic patterns, categories and
concepts lose their firm basis. There is a pervading sense of the naïve and the
mystical about her work, adding a fairy-tale quality to it. It is this fairy tale quality,
this fictionality, that establishes a new order of textual signification that
transcends oppositional thinking. The Dog-Woman is a case in point: she is such
an astounding creation that she cannot be fitted into any category – she is an
aporia herself. She is masculine in her violence and proportions, and lacks all
sense of empathy. Sometimes, however, she thinks she weighs nothing, she is
extremely helpful to others or says things that conform to the stereotyped role
model: “I would have liked to pour out a child from my body” (STC 11). It is
exactly this kind of oscillation that allows Winterson to create characters that
escape from the confines of worlds organised by oppositional pairs. The Dog-
Woman’s identity is deliberately ambiguous and unstable. For this reason, Sexing
the Cherry can be regarded as expressing the Derridean notion that “no final and
transcendental signified can be fixed”, and that “the meaning of the text is
unstable, undecidable” (Rice and Waugh 1996:174), leaving the reader with a
paradox. This may be true for Sexing the Cherry, but certainly not when we look
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at Winterson’s oeuvre as a whole. Below, I will show that eventually Winterson
does fix the meaning of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’.
Difference Feminism 
Difference feminism acknowledges more differences between men and women
than sameness feminism does. It attempts to revaluate, rather than overcome,
traditional feminine experience, and to redefine the meaning of rationality in a
manner that takes women’s traditional activities into account. Difference
feminism recognises the devaluation of feminine nature by rational discourses
and therefore aims at a re-appreciation of the feminine identity. Significantly, the
terms used to express this valuation are precisely the terms associated with the
excluded ‘other’: difference feminism celebrates the “feminised irrational”, and
sets it against the “gender-neutral pretensions of a rationalist culture” that has,
from its very beginnings, opposed itself to nature, the body, and intuition. This
perspective appreciates women in their own, different, identity, and wants to
realise that they find respect as such, and not as imperfect copies of men (cf.
DiStefano 1990).
Winterson adheres to difference feminism in at least part of her fiction.
She portrays rational men (Elgin, Jove) as evil and artistic women (Sappho,
Picasso) as good. We already reflected upon Winterson’s depiction of men as the
gaolers of women, as rationalist surgeons invading women’s reality and bodies,
and upon the fact that Winterson’s ‘straw man for manhood’ Isaac Newton
created a mechanical, deterministic world where human bodies cannot fly or
perform other fantastic feats. Winterson’s Picasso was sexually harassed by her
brother and revolts against this by seeking refuge in the artistic. She reacts by
painting the house of her parents in all kinds of colours. Her parents correctly
interpret this as a testimony of the masculine violence that has been acted upon
her. 
Winterson equates the difference between the male and the female with
the contrast between scientific narrow-mindedness and artistic open-
mindedness. Antagonist male characters like Jove, Matthew, and Elgin are
representatives of a rationalist culture that rejects subjectivity, intuition, and the
fantastic. Their world is characterised by rationality and dominance. Women, on
the contrary, are identified as emotionally and imaginatively rich. 
Winterson’s difference feminism can best be illustrated by way of the set
of oppositions she elaborates in Sexing the Cherry and in Art & Lies. In both
novels, women are able to dissolve gravity. The Dancing Princesses fly out of the
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window every night, to visit a floating city that does not exist in the minds of
rationalists. Picasso does not hit the ground when she jumps from a roof, which
is literally described as a victory over Newton’s deterministic worldview and its
concomitant rigid natural laws. Women, in other words, are not ‘locked up’ in
the web of natural laws as constructed by Enlightenment science. Because
Winterson mixes fairy tale and myth into everyday reality, her work acquires a
magic realist quality. As Theo D’haen argues in his “Postmodernisms: from
Fantastic to Magic Realist”, “magic realism is a form of resistance” (D’haen
1997:285, cf. page 78). Indeed, Winterson’s Dancing Princesses and Picasso,
magically escaping rationalism’s laws of nature, should be seen as putting up
resistance against the ‘man of reason’ or the reason of men. 
As we can see elsewhere, Winterson says that men deem themselves
weighty and women think they are light (cf. page 46 and page 155). The
dissolution of the laws of gravity then corresponds to women’s lightness. In
Winterson’s novels, men are heavy, and they never fly or dance; they are stuck in
the Newtonian – scientific – paradigm. Women are equated with freedom and
an anarchistic attitude towards science’s fixed laws. There is one instance in
Winterson’s fiction to date where a man feels he is becoming too heavy. He uses
a rational trick to escape gravity: 
Then my heaviness was at its limit and I could not raise myself up from
where I was sitting. But I did look around me and I was one in a long line
of unfortunates sitting like crows on a fallen tree. All were wailing
piteously and none could move on account of their sorrows. 
I was lucky that my hands were free, and reaching down into my fish
basket I took out a red mullet and waved it over my head. 
Soon a flock of sea birds appeared screeching at the sight of the fish. (...)
When they fastened their beaks on my bait I did not let go and the birds,
maddened at any resistance to their feeding, flapped all the harder and
succeeded in pulling me up with them. (STC 33)
It is clear that Winterson favours female philosophical lightness over masculine
conceptual fixity. In Great Moments in Aviation too, flying and femininity are
connected. Here we find Gabriel Angel (a young woman), who explains:
It was in the year 1703 in the country of Portugal. Father Bartolomeu
came up with the idea of flying. He liked to imagine the angels with their
great gold wings cut across the sun and their bodies bright as dragonflies.
(GMA 32)
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Then, the script indicates a flash back:
[Gabriel is a little girl, about eight. She’s naked except for a pair of gold wings
strapped to her. She seems to be flying across the front of Vesuvia’s shack. Back and
forth she flies.] (GMA 32)
It is striking that Cixous uses the idea of flying too. She stresses that women
should try to find and develop a voice of their own with the aid of a strategy she
calls voler which means both ‘stealing’ and ‘flying’. Women must steal a voice
because they are not the owners of any cultural heritage. They are able to fly
because they are not bound by the limits of genre nor by fixed structures of
meaning (Buikema and Smelik 1993:25). 
Masculinity and gravity are linked in Art & Lies as well, when Newton’s
apple is brought up, referring to the legend about Newton’s invention of gravity.
The University of Cambridge was closed due to the plague. Newton had to flee
to his family’s country residence, where he happened to lie down under an apple
tree. When an apple fell on his head, this triggered a line of thought that finally
led to the principle of gravity. In Art & Lies, the apple functions as a symbol of
gravity, and of the pathetic things men believe in: 
He used to come to her, when she had first advertised her credentials, and
he often brought an apple which he never ate. He said it had fallen on his
head, and he gazed at it with all the wonder of a soothsayer into a globe.
Poor man, very often she distracted him, but it was to the apple he
returned. 
He had said ‘This fell on my head. Why?’ 
‘Codling moth,’ said the Doll. She was still fond of him. She was fond in
her work, but in love? Never Never Never. Yet, she liked men, foolish,
boyish, trumpeting men. (AL 130)
The Doll regards Newton’s theory with contempt and sees his scientific findings
as the fiddling of an imbecile. Doll Sneerpiece herself is an obscure old lady who
hangs about in a night club called The Cock and Gun. The night club is an almost
absurd world of theatrical illusion, of costumed tricks: a world where everything
is possible and where appearance and reality fuse. The Doll’s critique of reason
has its roots in an operatic reality. In Winterson’s work, compared to feminine
love, passion, intuition and emotion, men’s rationality is but a pitiful thing.
So we see that the presence of deconstructionist practices in Winterson’s
novels does not necessarily exclude the presence of binary, oppositional
‘Science has no Sex?’ On Gender and Rationality
155
thinking. Winterson’s ideas on gender prove to be quite changeable. The passage
from Sexing the Cherry quoted below provides us with a highly complex situation
with respect to gender relations. 
After my experience in the pen of prostitutes I decided to continue as a
woman for a time and took a job on a fish stall. 
I noticed that women have a private language. A language not dependent
on the constructions of men but structured by signs and expressions, and
that uses ordinary words as code-words meaning something other. (...)
Thinking to teach me about men, worrying that I knew nothing, she
wrote me a rule book of which I will list the first page.
1. Men are easy to please but are not pleased for long before some new 
novelty must delight them.
2. Men are easy to make passionate but are unable to sustain it.
3. Men are always seeking soft women but find their lives in ruins without 
strong women.
4. Men must be occupied at all times otherwise they make mischief.
5. Men deem themselves weighty and women light. Therefore it is simple to 
tie a stone round their necks and drown them should they become too 
troublesome.
6. Men are best left in groups by themselves where they will entirely wear 
themselves out in drunkenness and competition. While this is taking place 
a woman may carry on with her life unhindered.
7. Men are never to be trusted with what is closest to your heart, and if it is 
they who are closest to your heart, do not tell them.
8. If a man asks you for money, do not give it to him.
9. If you ask a man for money and he does not give it to you, sell his richest 
possession and leave at once.
10. Your greatest strength is that every man believes he knows the sum and 
possibility of every woman. 
I was much upset when I read this first page, but observing my own heart
and the behaviour of those around me I conceded it to be true. Then my
heaviness was at its limit and I could not raise myself up from where I was
sitting. (STC 31-33)
This passage describes Jordan’s decision to put on a dress for a while, in order
to try and find out how women act when they are amongst themselves. Dressed
as a girl, he meets some women at the market place. A fanatic difference feminist
instructs Jordan how to treat men, imposing a fixed set of rules.
Jeanette Winterson’s Enchanted Science
156
This passage opens with the idea of cross-dressing. Changing appearances
is in fact a deconstructionist act. Cross-dressing defies sexual classification: male
characteristics are masked and female characteristics are put on. Essentialist
gender divisions are replaced with a constructed identity: being male or female is
not an unchangeable fact in nature but rather a matter of cultural constructs,
open to manipulation. This act is immediately followed by the idea of linguistic
constructivism. Jordan notices that women’s language is different from men’s
language. He finds out that if masculine language simply uses a certain word to
denote an idea, female language uses these words as code-words meaning
something entirely different, thereby subverting masculine semantics. 
So far, all this strongly resembles deconstruction feminism. However, the
set of rules that follows expresses oppositional thinking. So far, the women’s
statements and actions create binary oppositions between masculinity and
femininity, while Jordan’s deconstructs the oppositions. But in his narrative
following the set of rules, we can see that he decides these rules to be true. What
should the reader do with this? There is no authorial intrusion that guides the
reader through the ambiguity presented, as is often the case in Winterson’s
novels. 
We cannot assume without any problem that Winterson advocates the
ideas of difference feminism in this passage. She has obviously added a twist: the
man involved in this situation, Jordan, does not fit the category of ‘all men’ at all.
Jordan is not the typical insensitive macho, nor someone who “cannot be trusted
with what is closest to one’s heart”. He is one of the few male characters in her
work capable of acknowledging genuine feelings. Winterson even takes this one
step further, as it is a man – Jordan – who ultimately accepts the truth of these
feminist ideas. By presenting Jordan doing so, Winterson also ridicules the
difference-feminist ideology. Here, Winterson expresses difference feminism
and deconstruction feminism at the same time. 
Are these feminist axioms merely the whims of a marginal character or
should we take them more seriously? How strongly does essentialist thinking
figure in Winterson’s worldview? Below, I will show that, however often
Winterson deconstructs received notions of masculinity and femininity, in the
end she always aims to affirm those characteristics that are traditionally
conceived as feminine. Central in Sexing the Cherry for instance, is the idea that
women should learn to believe in the strength of their own worldview and in the
power of their imagination to help them shake off the traditional image of
women as weak, small, and sweet. As the female characters are confronted with
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an obvious and indisputable domination by men, they have no choice but to gain
strength and weight, and to adopt a self-assured and radical attitude. 
The set of rules listed in Sexing the Cherry can from the standpoint of
poststructuralism be seen as an instance of over-simplified myth-making in the
vein of American therapist John Gray’s well-known Men Are from Mars, Women
Are from Venus. At the same time, these rules do fit the main political message of
the novel, which is to free the imagination from laws, to liberate women from
male domination, and to liberate mankind from the mistakes men have made
while ruling the world. These mistakes are spelled out at the end of the novel
where the excesses of western capitalism and militarism are addressed.
One could argue that Winterson merely presents a juxtaposition of voices,
pointing out contrasts between the various views of the separate narrators,
including her own. One might even consider Winterson’s staging of both
deconstructionist views and binary oppositions as a way to arrive at a pragmatist
collage, a polyphony of voices, refusing to settle into a single grand narrative. But
Winterson does settle into a single grand narrative. In Gut Symmetries, the women
are victorious in the end, and in Great Moments in Aviation Gabriel Angel is the
only character who is continuously respectable. Indeed, in “The Erupting
Lesbian Body”, Cath Stowers concludes:
Written on the Body can thus provide insights into what a distinctly lesbian
aesthetic may look like, suggesting potential figurations of an enduring
lesbian battle with gender binaries. The main characters in all of
Winterson’s novels remodel themselves more as woman, following
pleasures which are suggested to be more female, pleasures of
palimpsestic representation instead of official exclusionary paradigms; of
fluid multiplicity instead of phallic singularity. (Stowers 1998:99)
In Winterson’s collection of essays, Art Objects, we find additional evidence
of Winterson’s personal binary conception of gender (as opposed to that of her
fictional characters). In the essays, she uses male personal pronouns to describe
weaklings or evildoers, and female personal pronouns when a respected artistic
soul mate is referred to. 
But our poor art-lover in his aesthetic laboratory has not succeeded in
freeing himself from the protection of assumption. What he has found is
that the painting objects to his lack of concentration; his failure to meet
intensity with intensity. He still has not discovered anything about the
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painting but the painting has discovered a lot about him. He is inadequate
and the painting has told him so. (AO 10)
“He” is a man, a scientist, and unable to understand art. The image of the artist
emerging from Art Objects is female:
How much can we imagine? The artist is an imaginer. The artist imagines
the forbidden because to her it is not forbidden. If she is freer than other
people it is the freedom of her single allegiance to her work. (AO 116)
It is clear that Winterson opts for oppositional, essentialist thinking here. “He”
is a pathetic loser, “she” is strong and free. Moreover, the artist is female, and the
scientist is male. The closer we look at Winterson’s work, the stronger
Winterson’s difference feminism – as opposed to her deconstruction feminism
– proves to be. I shall go into the theme of the ‘male gaze’, which reveals more
of oppositional thinking in Winterson’s fiction.
The Male Gaze
The issue of the male gaze and its controlling effects has received a lot of
attention from feminist cultural analysts during the eighties and nineties of the
past century. Paulina Palmer gives a brief overview of a number of novels and
short stories addressing this theme in Contemporary Women’s Fiction (Palmer
1989:34-37). The polarised positions of observer and observed are relevant to
the relations between the sexes, as Coward points out:
In this society, looking has become a crucial aspect of sexual relations, not
because of any natural impulse, but because it is one of the ways in which
domination and subordination are expressed. The relations involved in
looking enmesh with coercive beliefs about appropriate sexual behaviour
for men and women. (Coward 1984:41)
Jeanette Winterson is touching upon this theme too. In Art & Lies the doctor
Handel and Sappho, the Lesbian poet, experience sexual pleasure through
looking. For Sappho, looking produces one of the most powerful sensations of
erotic beauty and the miracle of love. Sappho sees Picasso “on a ledge in the
night” (AL 132) as she is standing on the rooftop ready to jump, and that
moment of visual contact expands into a marvellous connection: “What did I see
when I looked at you?” “I saw your colours in prismatic white, a see-through
angel in unfitting clothes” (AL 132). Here, the act of seeing instantaneously
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constitutes erotic involvement, and admiration. To Handel, looking at women is
a pleasurable experience of a different nature: 
I like to look at women. That is one of the reasons why I became a
doctor. As a priest my contact is necessarily limited. I like to look at
women; they undress before me with a shyness I find touching. (AL 9)
The act of looking in a lesbian relationship expresses and produces a sense of
equality and identification. By contrast, in the heterosexual act of looking, a
woman is on display as a sexual spectacle. Suzanna Danuta Walters speaks of this
in her book Material Girls: Making Sense of Feminist Cultural Theory. She remarks
that much of the early feminist critique concentrated upon the phenomenon of
women being represented as sexual objects, as ‘on display’ (Walters 1995:50). To
describe a woman seeing another woman, functioning as passive object, is less
common. Winterson describes Sappho’s sensations when she looks at Picasso,
her lover. Sappho aestheticises the body, and her perception of the other woman
is erotically tinted. The female body is experienced as a work of art, as an ancient
sculpture. The lesbian gaze is unlike the male gaze, since it does not imply
relations of power. In this way, Winterson criticises masculine attempts at
constructing an image of women through the process of reification. 
In Contemporary Women’s Fiction. Narrative Practice and Feminist Theory, Paulina
Palmer elaborates upon the controlling effects of the male gaze (Palmer 1989:34-
37). She shows how women can become oppressively conscious of the power
that the gaze wields in dictating and controlling not only their appearance but
also their identity and sense of self-value. As John Berger says in his Ways of
Seeing, 
(...) men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch
themselves being looked at. This determines not only most relations
between men and women but also the relation of women to themselves.
The surveyor of woman in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus she
turns herself into an object of vision: a sight. (Berger 1972:46-47) 
In Gut Symmetries, we can discern a similar process. Here, it is Stella who is looked
at with disapproval. The fact that she is looked at this way causes her self-esteem
to evaporate. Then, she looks in the mirror and finds that she not only feels ugly,
but that she really has become ugly. Jove’s disapproval of Stella’s behaviour is felt
in his way of looking at her, which is likened to the way he looks at an irritating
piece of mathematics. The woman feels that his gaze expresses that her
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appearance is inelegant, cumbersome, boring, and dirty. The act of looking itself
is described as “indifferent”. Looking at a beautiful woman, as we can see in the
text, is not boring and not filled with indifference. The fact that this woman is
regarded as something ugly, makes her look into the mirror. At that moment, the
woman looks at herself through the eyes of he masculine surveyor. The person
she looks at is not herself but the surveyed female. Her self-image is dictated by
the way Jove sees her.
He frowned at me as though I were an inelegant equation; necessary but
cumbersome, a bore to manipulate. I was no longer his living beauty of
physical laws. No doubt he was telling her about the poetry of numbers. I
looked in the mirror. Was that my face? I was gargoyled with grief. A
stretched taunted thing. A waterspout of misery. He had poured his
indifference down on me and I had let it out as dirty water. He thought I
was the dirty water not himself. (GS 34) 
A particular kind of male gaze in Winterson’s fiction is what I would call the
‘medical gaze’. 
The eyes, strangely illuminated by the sickly storm, had the look of
operating lights, and he remembered the hideous moment, after the
anaesthetic, when the patient revives, and sees, unfocused, the huge
swimming lights, too close, much too close, and the green mask of the
surgeon staring down. 
She had woken and felt for her breast. (AL 188)
In this passage, the very act of looking is described as an invasion into a private
sphere, as if it becomes a medical intervention. The physical harm caused by the
scalpel is compared to the psychological harm caused by the eyes peering at the
reified woman. 
In our cultural history, the eye, normally a recipient of photons, incapable
of producing particles, is often presented as source of light or even as a powerful
weapon (Donaldson-Evans 1980). In art, eyes are often pictured as the sources
of light beams piercing objects made of hard material, as X-ray beams going
through somebody to see what that person is hiding, or as the cause of certain
events, as in the ‘evil eye’. Likewise, in the quotation above, the eye and the
operating light are interchangeable. The fact that the eye acts; that it penetrates,
is stressed by the image of the lamp. It is hard to understand that looking
involves power when one pictures the eye as a mere receptor: to receive is
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passive and safe. Sending a beam in the direction of someone or something, is
active and possibly harmful. Winterson changes the image of the eye as a
receptor into that of an active penetrator. Here, the narrator’s – Handel’s – belief
that the masculine medical gaze can cause harm, is illustrated by replacing eyes
with operating lights. 
But Handel’s own ‘male gaze’ is not representative of masculine
dominance without remorse. His gaze reveals his conscience and his failure as a
lover. His way of looking often involves frustration and guilt, causing a
masculine superior attitude to melt away into a feeling of inferiority. This feeling
is accompanied by acts of withdrawal. Handel refrains from attempts to enter
into the female sphere, either visually, sexually or medically. By contrast, the
masculine penetrations into the feminine that do occur in the novel, either
visually or medically, become even more suspect. The men who do not withdraw
are depicted as aggressors. In Art & Lies, Handel withdraws from his attempts
to enter the zone of female beauty and sexuality because of severe doubt and
insecurity:
And women? Look at her, slender as the reeds of Solomon, her hair in
Absalom trails. What to do with beauty? I have never been quite sure...
(AL 100)
I looked at her, her hair in a perpetual spray around the sculpting of her
shoulders, her body, a living fountain of red and gold. 
I looked at her and turned away. Turned away from beauty. Turned away
from love. Turned away and closed the door on the unused room. The
next day she caught the train. (AL 112)
Handel merely looks at women, he does not enter into ‘real’ sexual relations. This
does not mean that he regards looking strictly as a strictly neutral activity. He
realises that looking can in itself be an act of power, access, and control. Because
of his enormous empathy and religious conscience, Handel’s medical gaze is
filled with tormented feelings. He is constantly and intensely aware of the impact
of the doctor’s act of looking at a patient. He experiences his own gaze as a
torment to the patient. 
Handel is aware of the brutality of the male, medical eye penetrating into
the female zone: he equates looking at a woman with penetrating a woman and,
being a virgin and suffering from insecurity and fear of failure, he is always
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concerned for the object of his gaze and constantly apologises for the impact this
has upon his female patients. 
How does the idea of the physician’s penetrating and harmful gaze link up
with Winterson’s feminist critique of science? Does Winterson affirm or
deconstruct gender difference when she speaks of medicine? In Winterson’s
novels so far, the medical gaze is manly because there are only two doctors, who
are both male: Handel, the surgeon in Art & Lies, and Elgin, the oncologist in
Written on the Body. Their gaze is (potentially) painful because it is male and
therefore detached and objectifying. Winterson’s feminine alternative to
masculine forms of medicine involves a kinder and more sympathetic type of
observation instead. A more detailed discussion of Winterson’s feminist
medicine, however, will have to wait until chapter 6.
At the beginning of this chapter, we wanted to examine where Winterson
stands in matters of sex and gender. Winterson’s final stance in gender issues
comprises both an oppositional and a deconstructionist philosophy. Although
she changes semantic structures to undermine the stability of gender categories,
she is in fact battling out a war between the sexes. In this battle, Winterson
ultimately sides with the feminine forces, with which we relapse into
oppositional thinking. Winterson does not always concern herself with
deconstructing oppositional thinking between man and woman, and between
science and literature. Although she is engaged in solving the problem of
dichotomy, and as much as she is writing in the nineties of the twentieth century
and obviously practicing deconstructionist techniques in her novels, she often
simply upholds the old binary structures. Even in The Passion, in which cross-
dressing is such an important theme, the ending points at a feminine victory.
Winterson says about it in an interview with Christelle Méplon: “Ik heb willen
eindigen met het beeld van een man in zijn fallische toren en een vrije vrouw.
Vrouwen kunnen makkelijker ontsnappen” [“I wanted to end with the image of
a man in his phallic tower and a free woman. Women can escape more easily”]
(Winterson in Méplon 2000).
My interpretation of Winterson’s overall feminist standpoint is confirmed
by Helena Grice and Tim Woods, who write that the triangular structure of Gut
Symmetries is a means to disrupt binarism, but that “Binary structures are
ultimately left untouched where it suits the book’s sexual ideology” (Grice and
Woods 1998:125). Grice and Woods suggest that “ultimately Winterson leaves
certain gendered stereotypes in place, despite her self-consciousness about the
gender politics of the binary love-plot” (Grice and Woods 1998:10). Indeed,
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Winterson occasionally does deconstruct traditional dichotomies sometimes, but
in the end she does not succeed in breaking through the power of binary
thinking.
Feminine Language, Feminine World
Jeanette Winterson uses a feminine language to create a feminine world. But how
can language be gendered? And what is the relationship between word and
world, to a feminist writer? To answer these questions, I will discuss her work in
the context of the writings of Gertrude Stein and Virginia Woolf, who share
Winterson’s feminist goals.
In A Different Language, Marianne DeKoven distinguishes masculine,
patriarchal language, being objective, ordered, lucid, linear, mastered and
coherent, from feminine language, which is anarchic, indeterminate, multiple,
and open-ended. She specifically discusses Gertrude Stein’s writing, which,
according to DeKoven, is set against the patriarchal character of her culture and
therefore against its patriarchal language.
Reading Stein’s Lectures in America (Stein 1957) or The Autobiography of Alice
B. Toklas (Stein 1960), for example, is an extraordinary experience. Her use of
language ensures an extraordinary reading experience: 
One whom some were certainly following was one who was completely
charming. One whom some were certainly following was one who was
charming. One whom some were following was one who was completely
charming. (Stein 1934:293)
If it describes what it sees how does it do it. If it describes what it knows
how does it do it and what is the difference between what it sees and what
it knows. And then too there is what it feels and then also there is what it
hopes and wishes and then too there is what it would see if it could see
and then there is what it explains. (Stein 1957:14)
I want to elaborate on DeKoven’s idea that Stein’s interests are anti-patriarchal,
and go on to show here that Winterson’s aims are similar to Stein’s. I will argue
that their lesbianism is a force behind their mutual depreciation of masculine
constructions of reality – and that this is why they construct an alternative reality
by using a different language. 
Both Winterson and Stein present themselves as lesbian writers.
Winterson’s plots often involve a triumph of lesbian love and a downgrading of
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masculine roles in the plot, as we find in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, in Written
on the Body and in Gut Symmetries. Gertrude Stein’s Miss Furr and Miss Skeene
cautiously raises a lesbian voice: the book, written in the nineteen twenties,
already associates the phrase “gay” with a homosexual couple, indicating
furthermore that such bonds are “regular” and in fact, something to be
artistically “cultivated”.
Helen Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together then. Georgine Skeene
liked travelling. Helen Furr did not care about travelling, she liked to stay
in one place and be gay there. They were together then and travelled to
another place and stayed there and were gay there. (Stein in Reynolds
1993)
Stein’s and Winterson’s lesbian authorship goes hand in hand with their
difference feminism. Moreover, their belief in feminine values inspires both
authors to write in a way that is directly aimed against the conventions of
language – conventions that had emerged from a past where the male voice was
dominant. A major strategy in both writers’ work consists of undermining
representation by means of linguistic experiment. 
Stein’s prose does not aim to represent a situation, object or idea, but tries
to capture the process of perceiving and understanding itself. Her writing
displays the way in which the world and our cognition form an inseparable
whole. Her rambling and repetitive style refuses coherence and order, and rejects
a final resolve. Stein’s texts owe their effect to repetition, rhythm, and an odd
positioning of words. The tentative nature of the sequence of words conveys a
preference for open-endedness. 
Stein and Winterson both frustrate the need to divide sentences in main
clauses and subordinate clauses. Stein, for instance, hardly ever uses commas. By
doing so she disrupts traditional preconceptions with respect to structure and
syntax. Winterson’s style sometimes resembles Stein’s – in this passage from Gut
Symmetries, for instance:
The sex bed the love bed the afternoon and night bed where I held him
he held her bed the ripe rotting sly bed. (GS 30)
The received notions about the production of meaning are completely ignored.
It is this refusal to acknowledge syntactical hierarchy, that can be interpreted as
a feminist act – as a sign of radical difference feminism. Winterson’s style
resembles Stein’s in the following passage from Art & Lies. Here we see how
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Winterson expresses her message – the necessity of a different language – in a
style of writing that resembles Stein’s rambling and reiterative style:
When all speak the same speak the poet can no longer speak. The
language is rich when it is fed from difference. Where there is no
difference there is no richness. There is no distinguishing among the
dead. 
Eat the same apples, day comes, night falls. Turn on the television, day
comes, night falls. Assert your individuality with one voice. Day comes
night falls. (AL 64)
Generally speaking, Winterson’s style is more conventional than Stein’s: her
sentences usually cohere and follow the rules of grammar. Winterson, however,
does play with word order, with the sex of personal pronouns, and often uses
nouns as verbs. Even more striking is her use of strings of parallel metaphors
that constitute an extremely dense and sometimes even abstract poetic language:
Call the rain. Drops of mercy that revive the burnt earth. Forgiveness that
refills the droughted stream. The rain, in opaque sheets, falls at right-
angles to the sea. Let me lean on the wall of rain, my legs at sea. (AL 93)
Picasso had sometimes gone to church to sit in an empty pew to listen to
the God-fled monotone of the anecdotal vicar. The hail-fellow-well-met-
shallow-hearted-dull-brained-cost-effective-worldly-wise-over-weight-ill-
read-ill-bred-golfing vicar. (AL 84)
Winterson not only fashions cascades of meanings, one tumbling over the other,
gathering meaning as they fall. She also creates new words, like ‘droughted’,
derived from the noun ‘drought’. The effects Winterson uses create original
poetic cataracts that diverge widely from the calm flow of traditional literary
prose. 
Both Stein’s and Winterson’s work raise questions about the nature of
representation and the conventions of realism. Both Winterson’s Oranges Are Not
the Only Fruit and Stein’s The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas have anti-referential
goals. It is because of this goal, that Stein’s book was vehemently criticised when
it first appeared. Stein wrote from the perspective of Alice B. Toklas, a friend of
hers, who narrates from her ‘own’ perspective (‘I’) and that of the things and
persons around her, among whom a character called Gertrude Stein. Traditional
autobiography pictures a person as lifelike as possible. The genre’s conventions
aim at chronology, fact, and explanation: “autobiography is a rigid mould into
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which facts must be poured” (AO 47). Where Stein violates the rules of the pacte
autobiographique early in the twentieth century, later, postmodern writers would
break even more radically with these genre conventions (cf. Den Toonder 1998). 
As Jeanette Winterson points out in her essay “A Testimony against
Gertrude Stein”, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas was most severely criticised
because of its revolutionary way of presenting reality. Stein’s autobiography
refuses to recognise the authority of what realists would call ‘actual life’. The self
is fictionalised and a new form of autobiography disrupts the genre’s
foundations in the principle of mimesis. Twentieth-century literary writers
developed forms that express the idea that the self should be understood as a
fictional construct rather than as a product of facts. 
In her essay, Winterson takes side with Stein’s literary strategy. Winterson
compares the way her own texts play with autobiography to Stein’s
representations of the self by saying that both really amount to fictions
masquerading as memoirs (cf. AO 53). In this respect, Oranges Are Not the Only
Fruit resembles The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas. The fact that in Winterson’s
book, two alter-egos of the same character appear, Jeanette and Winnet,
simultaneously undermines and confirms the factuality of the ‘portrait of the
artist as a young girl’: do these two versions of ‘the self’ adequately represent
reality or do they move away from it? Winterson passionately advocates art’s
alterations, creations, and sublimations of reality. In Art Objects, we clearly see
that she is interested in the poeticising of the self: 
(...) a writer re-ordering his own identity for the purposes of a poem. 
(AO 57) 
and in the heightening rather than the copying of reality: 
(...) creating a heightened reality. (AO 56) 
In Art Objects, Winterson explains what she tried to do in Oranges Are Not the Only
Fruit, when she addresses the bankruptcy of realism and the traditional notion of
autobiography. She rejects the clear correspondence between text and life, which
had been the traditional axiom of (auto)biography: 
We are supposed to know where we are with biography and
autobiography, they are the literary equivalents of the portrait and the
self-portrait (...). One is the representation of someone else’s life, and the
‘Science has no Sex?’ On Gender and Rationality
167
other is the representation of your own. We shouldn’t have to worry
about form and experiment (...) (AO 49)
Stein and Winterson are not only alike in their undermining of mimesis, but they
also share an interest in what is called the ‘Linguistic Relativity Thesis’. The
Linguistic Relativity Thesis was advanced in the nineteen thirties by the
American linguists Edward Sapir and his pupil Benjamin Whorf. It was partially
founded on Whorf’s study of the Hopi Indians of Arizona. The Hopi language
does not distinguish between past, present and future tenses; where in English it
seems natural to make a distinction between ‘I see the bird’, ‘I saw the bird’ and
‘I will see the bird’, this is not possible in Hopi. Whorf concluded that the Hopi
did not just have another language, but that their language caused them to live in
another reality – their linguistic patterns made them understand the world
around them in a different way. Language, according to Sapir and Whorf, helps
shape one’s worldview. The radical version of this thesis maintains that the way
we understand the world is completely conditioned by the structure of our native
language. The world presents itself to us in shapes determined by the patterns in
our language. This would mean that linguistic codes organise the mind.
As Norman Weinstein shows in Gertrude Stein and the Literature of the Modern
Consciousness (Weinstein 1970), Stein was well informed about the Linguistic
Relativity Thesis. Stein’s conviction that feminine linguistic patterns are able to
constitute a feminine (experience of the) world, forms a strong motive for her
literary praxis. Her alternative linguistic praxis goes hand in hand with her
difference feminism: her desire to transform language is an instrument to change
the world. So her feminism hinges on the notion of linguistic relativity.
The Linguistic Relativity Thesis figures in Winterson’s work as well. In her
epigraph to Sexing the Cherry she literally refers to Whorf’s study of the Hopi tribe: 
The Hopi, an Indian tribe, have a language as sophisticated as ours, but
no tenses for past, present and future. The division does not exist. What
does this say about time? (STC 8)
This epigraph summarises one of the main themes in her novel. Through this
reference, Whorf’s scientific research becomes a constitutive part of Winterson’s
book. It returns later, in The.PowerBook:
‘The past is only a way of talking.’ (TPB 54)
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Stein and Winterson both try to create alternative methods of representation by
changing traditional syntactical structures and by neglecting the conventions of
grammatical rules. The motives behind their desire to change the dominant
cultural order through literary form, lie – at least partly – in their feminism and
lesbianism, and are based on the notion that linguistic representations of the
world constitute sets of cultural patterns. They both not merely seek to change
our language but, rather, our perception of the world. Their alternative language
might open up the possibility of entering another, alternative reality.
In Art Objects, Winterson expresses a desire to renew ‘worn out’ words and
dead sentences to make language exciting again. She says her language does not
consist of words for things, but of words that are living things: 
Language is movement, and I do not only mean inevitable development
or deterioration, I mean that words are fleet-footed things and when right
run, escape us at the place where we think we have wrestled them flat.
(AO 166)
My work is rooted in silence. It grows out of deep beds of contemplation,
where words, which are living things, can form and re-form into new
wholes. (AO 169)
As we have seen in chapter 2, in my passage about ‘the language of rapture’,
Winterson wants to bring sensation and eroticism back into language. I will
elaborate upon this below, when I will discuss Winterson’s amorous relationship
to the works of Virginia Woolf and their shared interest in science and language.
For now, it will suffice to say that Winterson’s highly sensuous language conjures
up a more intense reality. This intensity suggests a depth beyond the everyday
world of common sense. Both Stein’s and Winterson’s use of language,
therefore, go beyond the perceptual boundaries inherent in the conventional,
rational use of language. 
As described above, the Linguistic Relativity Thesis suggests that a new
language entails a new reality. Winterson’s and Stein’s linguistic experiments aim
to do exactly that: constitute alternative realities. Look at time, for instance.
Benjamin Whorf concluded from his study of the Hopi Indians that our language
compels us to consider time in terms of three rigidly defined tenses. “Yet our
philosophy and science,” Weinstein says, “our Einsteins, our Bergsons [and our
Wintersons, A.E.], tell us that objective reality can never be considered in such
divisions. The past encroaches upon the present as the present flows into the
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future” (Weinstein 1970:6). To become conscious of true time therefore
demands another language than that of Aristotelean logic. What Winterson and
Stein are looking for, then, is the (linguistic) reinforcement of a paradigm that
opposes rational, masculine forms of reasoning. 
Sapir and Whorf, Einstein, and Heisenberg belong to one and the same
paradigm. Winterson and Stein construct realities that match and run parallel to
the reality offered by the scientists of the twentieth century. Both these two
feminist authors and these scientists present a reality that is neither linear, nor
lucid, neither coherent, nor objective. Alternative languages as construed by art
are therefore interconnected with discoveries in the scientific field. For instance,
as we have seen in chapter 4, a new notion of time has been expressed in both
scientific and literary publications that evidently belong to the same field or
paradigm. Of course, this field or paradigm, spanning most of the twentieth
century, has its own inner evolution. The time that has lapsed between the
ripening of Einstein’s ideas and their surfacing in Winterson’s work, for instance,
may be explained from Erwin Schrödinger’s insight that: 
(...) it takes at least fifty years before a major scientific discovery penetrates
the public consciousness – half a century before people realize what truly
surprising beliefs are held by leading scientists. (Schrödinger in Ferguson
1980:151)
And even though Winterson is decades removed from Stein, I want to argue that
they still belong to one and the same movement as well. The aspects of Stein’s
and Winterson’s work I have discussed – the anti-sensible, the anti-coherent, the
anti-referential and the anti-patriarchal – constitute different sides of that
paradigm. For them, there is a fight to be fought against traditional forms of
representation and traditional cultural assumptions, in which literary form,
gender politics and epistemology are different weapons serving one goal. These
two writers’ anti-patriarchal attitudes express their political battles against culture
as a masculine construction. Winterson’s abandonment of the conventions of
realism uproots the established male culture. As we have seen before, realistic
representation is the core philosophical underpinning of science. In attacking
realist modes, Winterson therefore also – implicitly – undermines science. 
Another woman writer who foregrounds the limits of representation and,
with that, an anti-realist epistemology, is Virginia Woolf. In what follows, I will
concentrate upon some similarities between Woolf and Winterson, and
especially upon their feminist critique of science. Winterson and Woolf both
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want to make us realise that to ‘understand’ something means to impose a
subjective order upon the chaotic world. The project of modernity trusted
human thinking to be able to come to an accurate and coherent knowledge of
the world. This was a masculine form of knowing that was to be shared by all
rational humans. Woolf, however, indicates that human thinking has to take
account of considerable distortions where ‘knowing’ is concerned:
(...) why are we yet surprised in the window corner by a sudden vision that
the young man in the chair is of all things in the world the most real, the
most solid, the best known to us – why indeed? For the moment after we
know nothing about him. 
Such is the manner of our seeing. Such the conditions of our love. 
(Woolf 1992:96)
And Winterson says:
Matter, that thing the most solid and the well-known, which you are
holding in your hands and which makes up your body, is now known to
be mostly empty space. Empty space and points of light. What does this
say about the reality of the world? (STC 8)
Woolf influenced Winterson’s writing not only in its subject matter, but
also linguistically. It is well known that Winterson is a great admirer of Woolf’s
work. Winterson often mentions Woolf’s writings in essays and interviews as a
source of inspiration (AO 92); (AO 65); (Winterson 2002c). She owns a
collection of signed first editions of Modernist literature among which some of
Woolf’s work (AO 120), and Winterson and her partner Margaret Reynolds are
the series editors of the 2000 edition of Woolf’s novels, published by Vintage. 
Both authors question the traditional way in which we know the world and
represent it. Woolf is aware that “one’s imagination jumps to all manner of
hypotheses and conclusions” (Flint 1992:xvi), and tries to capture this internal
process in her writings. By paying minute attention to the intermingling of the
outer world (of objects) with the inner world (of sense impressions, memory and
thought), Woolf “oscillated between abstraction and realism” (Scott 1995:xvii).
Woolf struggles with and finds beauty in what Bonnie Kime Scott calls “the
instability of words”. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the unstable – a
concept that emerged in both the science and the literature of the twentieth
century – plays an important role in Winterson’s world as well. In The Feminist
Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf, Jane Goldman writes that Woolf aimed at “showing
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both the fluid and the fragmentary nature of experience, both the flow of time
and one instant” (Goldman 1998:3). The fluid plays an important part in
Winterson’s work, too: The Passion is largely set in Venice, where water represents
the fleeting, the absence of rigid order, and Jordan, in Sexing the Cherry, was
“named (...) after a river, and in the flood-tide he slipped away” (STC 11). By
juxtaposing the fragmentary and the fluid, Woolf is able to represent the
inextricable confusion of the human epistemic system: the dynamics between
self and world, illusion and truth. To Woolf, our inner impressions and the
objects in the world cannot be separated from each other. She juxtaposes
different subjective impressions of various people, in relation to their versions of
an objective reality. In that way, her novels become a “fragmented fabric” (Flint
1992:xiv). 
In her diary, Virginia Woolf asked herself if life is “very solid, or very
shiftin? [sic]” (cf. Beer 2000:11). This uncertainty returns in Woolf’s novels in
several ways. She refrains from omniscient narration (cf. Flint 1992:xvi) and her
work shows an absence of sequential narrative structures and plot (cf. Flint
1992:xv). Woolf does not attempt to organise chaotic reality into neat
chronology. The reader is absorbed by the narrators’ partial perspectives, and
finds him/herself inside a continuous stream of loosely interconnected
experiences, dreams and fantasies. 
At the opening of Jacob’s Room one is confronted with constant
interruptions in the activities and thoughts of the person depicted. At first, Betty
Flanders is writing. Then she focuses on her pen, when suddenly she is
overwhelmed with emotion. When she looks up, the world suddenly presents
itself in accordance with her emotion. Then she re-reads her writing, after which
she is interrupted by one of her children. Immediately after that her thoughts
briefly wander off to her letter, and then she tells her oldest son, Archer, to go
and find Jacob, and scribbles on. On this first page, many unclear statements are
made: there is something about an accident, about leaving, and about a landlady
– and the reader is left in the dark about their meaning. What we see is a
continuous stream of feelings and mental images, and of objects one does not
yet know anything about: the reader is left without an explicit connection
between all of this. The mind works in ‘waves’ and fragments, and there is no
way of telling how they cohere. 
Winterson, too, creates such fragmented narrative structures (cf. page 96).
The first two pages of Art & Lies, for instance, show the same absence of
explanatory logic as we encounter in Jacob’s Room. First, we are offered a
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description of a train passing through a fantastic, heavenly light, followed by the
story of someone who finds a book never seen before by any one else. Next, we
are presented with a highly poetic description of the pages of that book, a minute
description of the way the light falls on that book, the inner musings of an
unknown narrator about the heart and about the difference between physics and
miracle, and finally, a story about the library of Alexandria, followed by a scrap
of text in Neo-Latin. This succession of unconnected passages seems to have no
structure at all. For one, the fragments are set in different historical periods. The
first passage for instance, describes an event in the twentieth (possibly
nineteenth) century, whereas at other points we move to Antiquity. There are
also differences with respect to precision and perspective: some pieces are utterly
personal, minute descriptions of physical events, and some are fairly impersonal
descriptions of historical situations. Winterson intermingles different voices and
perspectives, stressing discontinuous change: she repeats sentences, cuts off
stories abruptly, changes the names of the characters mid-novel, or forges
unexpected relationships between her characters. Through these narrative gaps
and leaps in perspective, both Winterson and Woolf stress discontinuity in the
interplay between spacetime and the self. This foregrounding of discontinuity
matches both Modernist and postmodern philosophical views.
There are more parallels between Woolf and Winterson. Both writers were
conscious of the fact that since time immemorial, only stories about the world
that were written by men, received attention. The image of woman was
constructed by men, political issues were regarded solely from the perspective of
men, those who had the power to preach and teach were men, and the history of
poetry was predominantly a masculine affair. Both Woolf and Winterson
consciously question male historiography. Woolf puts the question without
much circumlocution in her text: in Jacob’s Room one of Jacob’s essays appears to
be entitled “ ‘Does History consist of the Biographies of Great Men?’ ” (Woolf
1992:48). Woolf was very aware of the prerogatives that only men enjoyed. In
Three Guineas, Woolf pleads for women’s education and independence: “Why are
not females permitted to study physics, divinity, astronomy, etc., etc., with their
attendants, chemistry, botany, logic, mathematics, &c.?” (Woolf 1938:137-138)
and for their recognition – an equal history: “There were no professional
women, except governesses, who had lives written of them” (Woolf 1938:137). 
As we have seen in chapter 4, Jeanette Winterson takes a feminist stance
as well, as she rewrites male historiography. She does that, for instance, by
staging Einstein as a numerologist. She does the same thing when she ridicules
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Napoleon for his presumed passion for chicken, or by mocking the importance
of Napoleon’s life for the development of western culture:
It was Napoleon who had such a passion for chicken that he kept his
chefs working around the clock. What a kitchen that was, with birds in
every state of undress; some still cold and slung over hooks, some turning
slowly on the spit, but most in wasted piles because the Emperor was
busy. (TP 3)
Strange to think that if Bonaparte hadn’t divorced Joséphine, the
geranium might never have come to France. She would have been too
busy with him to develop her undoubted talent for botany. They say she
has already brought us over a hundred kinds of plants and that if you ask
her she will send you seeds for nothing. (TP 155)
The undermining of traditionally male historiography in The Passion is achieved
by blowing up the heroic image of Napoleon, and by delegating the climactic
moments to the fringes of history while positioning marginal events in the
centre. Also, the dates in the text are historically ‘incorrect’. Henri says it is in
1799 that the Napoleonic army landed in Ireland, whereas historians say this
happened in 1797. Is it Winterson who is mistaken or does Henri have the date
wrong? This may be a deliberate act of Winterson’s, meant to suggest that
personal accounts of what happened are distorted by the interference of the
imagination, or simply by failing memory. Tampering with historical material is
common practice in postmodern writing, which justifies the conclusion that this
is yet another of Jeanette Winterson’s attempts at undermining the authority of
teleological history. We also find this kind of rebellion in Sexing the Cherry. In this
account of the English Civil War, history and fairy tale are juxtaposed by a
bizarre narrator who is unreliable in every sense of the word.
A further parallel between Woolf and Winterson lies in the unusual
perceptions of physical phenomena evoked in their fictions and essays, such as
the behaviour of light, the way music works upon our consciousness, the
stimulus of sight, the play of colour, and the obscure terrors evoked by certain
places. Take this passage from the opening of To the Lighthouse: 
The wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees, leaves
whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling –
all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind (...) (Woolf
1994:1) 
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In her essay “The Narrow Bridge of Art”, Woolf put it this way: 
(...) every moment is the centre and meeting-place of an extraordinary
number of perceptions which have not yet been expressed. Life is always
and inevitably much richer than we who try to express it. (...) the effect on
us of the shape of trees or the play of colour, the emotions bred in us by
crowds (...), the delight of movement, the intoxication of wine. (Woolf
1966:229) 
Winterson’s words express a similar sentiment:
A different language is a different reality; what is the language, the world,
of stones? Of atoms? Of microbes? Of colour? Of air? The material
world is closed to those who think of it only as a commodity market. (AO
146)
Both authors feel that the detailed description of the subjective perception of the
material world is very important, because by describing new phenomena a
different reality is constructed. For Winterson this applies especially to the
microscopic material world not directly visible to the human eye, the world of
atoms, light particles, refractions of light, and gravitational fields. From the
perspective of the Linguistic Relativity Thesis, such detailed descriptions of
highly personal and sometimes bizarre phenomena ‘create’ rather than
‘represent’. This would mean that Woolf and Winterson bring into being a
different reality, originating in the mind. Indeed, in Winterson’s work, the belief
in a strict dualism – the inanimate world (res extensa) as opposed to animate
human understanding (res cogitans) – is suspended. The world is a result of the
potency of the mind. That is why at the end of The Passion Henri is able to grow
a garden full of red roses, on a piece of rock in the sea where it is always cold and
windy: because “human beings are capable of powered flight” (AO 116).
Cognition constitutes the world. 
In Woolf’s characters’ impressions of the physical world, they tend to lose
contact with the surface of things, to inhabit a hidden territory just beyond
sensual apprehension. Yet, Woolf never focuses on anything fundamental or
‘hard’ in that hidden realm. Both Woolf and Winterson intensify the experience
of the material world, trying to show us another, hidden ontology. The passages
below illustrate this. These fragments are very intimate, unusually sensitive
descriptions of light, which bring to the reader a heightened perception of the
world, perhaps another world. 
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An inclined plane of light comes accurately through each window, purple
and yellow even in its most diffused dust, while, where it breaks upon
stone, that stone is softly chalked red, yellow, and purple. Neither snow
nor greenery, winter nor summer, has power over the old stained glass.
(Woolf 1992:38)
The extreme definiteness with which they stand, now a brilliant white,
again yellow, and in some lights red, imposes ideas of durability, of the
emergence through the earth of some spiritual energy elsewhere
dissipated in elegant trifles. (Woolf 1992:205)
The light fell out of the seamed sky in halos and cloaks. Squares and
circles of light that dropped through the cut clouds and made single sense
of all the broken pieces of beach, cliff, man and boat. (AL 206)
The book had no cover. While sleeker volumes cowered inside their
jackets, this one lifted its ragged spine to the sun, a winter sun of thin
beams and few hours. A sun that sank red disc of hosannas. 
I untied the waxy string and the book fell over my hands in folds of light.
My hands shook under the weight of the light. Those heavy yellow
squares saturated my palms and spilled down on my trouser legs. My
clothes were soaked in light. (AL 4)
These four quotations from Art & Lies and Jacob’s Room share a delicate
sensibility of sensation, a symbiosis of tangible objects and a spiritual presence,
between the enduring and the fleeting, between what remains and what escapes.
The synaesthesias suggest a symbolic transference of worlds. Both Woolf and
Winterson conceive another reality, where experience is heightened to an
unusual degree. By doing so, they enfeeble the epistemological status of classical
realism.
Is Woolf’s reality linked to the developments of science in her time? And
if so, does her attitude towards science resemble Winterson’s? As Gillian Beer
puts forward in Wave, Atom, Dinosaur. Woolf’s Science (Beer 2000), Woolf read at
least some writings of the English astronomer Eddington and the English
physicist and mathematician James Jeans, who wrote that “we live in a universe
of waves, and nothing but waves” (Beer 2000:9). The work of these scientists,
Beer argues, provided “yet another scale from macro to micro, from infinitely
distant to solid and immediate, out of which her narratives are composed. (Beer
2000:9). The physics of her time was empirical and mathematical – and it was this
aspect of science that Woolf disliked – but the sciences were also emphasising
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what could not be grasped immediately, what could not be predicted – the
miraculous. Scientific ideas and debates provided her with metaphors, questions
and creative energy (cf. Beer 2000:17). But, as Beer aptly fomulates,
Not being herself a scientist Woolf did not need to share the teleology of
science and its search always for new explanation (...). She could skein
ideas across time without embarrassment and draw on Ruskin and
Einstein in a single motion. In that sense the empirical scientific method,
with its unifactorial variations, its controlled experiments, might seem the
‘least like’ to her ideas. (Beer 2000:12)
What Stein, Woolf and Winterson have in common is their aim to evade –
if not emasculate – realism. They need to do this to establish a new reality, a
hidden, secret, reality of their own. These women writers have to escape from
the masculine mapping of a cultural order built on principles of exclusion that
have reigned for ages. Their writing discloses a specifically feminine territory,
inexplicable by reason, open to people who accept feminine ways of knowing,
i.e. anarchic, indeterministic, and subjective. The literary strategies of Stein,
Woolf, and Winterson aim to establish a feminist world. And that world has, as
Geneviève Lloyd argues in The Man of Reason, been excluded from the realm of
reason – and therefore from being taken seriously. It seems that these women
writers have an other “scope of interest”, an interest in other “influences that
play so large a part in life, yet have so far escaped the [male, A.E.] novelist” (cf.
Woolf 1966:229). These influences are disclosed by a fragmentational
perspective on the world, and an indeterministic philosophy of representation.
A Feminist Critique of Science
Science it would seem is not sexless; she is a man, a father and infected
too. (Woolf 1938:x)
The feminist viewpoint Winterson adopts in her cultural criticism is closely
linked to the approval or disapproval of different kinds of science. Winterson
only despises men when they meet the masculine stereotype. Likewise,
Winterson rejects science only when it affirms and institutionalises established
notions of masculinity. 
As we saw in chapter 2, Winterson fiercely rejects the scientific worldview
of the Enlightenment because of its fixity, its rigidity, and its dominance over
discourses that lean towards the subjective. In chapters 3 and 4, I concluded that
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her philosophical approval and imaginative use of modern physics can be
explained from the fact that quantum mechanics and relativity theory uphold the
principles of unpredictability and uncertainty, which opens up new vistas of
literary creation, celebrating the marvellous and the mysterious. 
The new science of the twentieth century, contrary to modern science,
accepts uncertainty, the relative, the local, the partial, the subjective, and the
chaotic. It was the Copenhagen Interpretation, initiated by Niels Bohr and
Werner Heisenberg, that placed the concept of indeterminacy at the very heart
of physics. Until then, physics had always upheld our comfortable, causal world.
Taken to extremes, this interpretation would mean that ultimately there is no
objective reality. This is the philosophical essence of the Copenhagen
Interpretation of quantum theory. But other interpretations emerged as well,
some of which turned against the Copenhagen Interpretation. In a letter to Max
Born, Albert Einstein voices his difficulty to accept this randomness: “Gott
würfelt nicht” [God does not play dice]. Einstein kept on believing in logic,
reason, and order.
Since then the literary world has welcomed the scientific upgrading of
chance and unpredictability. Science now affirmed what writers had always
suggested. In his preface to C.P. Snow’s Two Cultures, Collini writes: 
The so-called ‘new physics’ of the last twenty years has modified this
model in two related ways. First its actual findings about the nature of
matter and the origins of the universe appear to install unpredictability,
open-endedness, (...) into the very heart of our knowledge of the physical
world. Developments in quantum physics and ‘chaos theory’ have been
taken to mark ‘the death of materialism’, that is, of the mechanistic model
of the properties and behaviour of matter which had been dominant since
Newton (...) the very nature of the revolutionary work in theoretical
physics, astronomy, and cosmology has helped to challenge the model of
scientific thinking which represented it as proceeding by a combination of
rigorous deduction and controlled inferences from empirical observation.
The role of imagination, of metaphor and analogy, of category-
transforming speculation, and off-beat intuition has come to the fore
much more. (Collini in Snow 1998:xlvii-xlviii) 
Collini argues that, with the arrival of quantum mechanics, not only the nature
of science has changed; quantum theory has also installed literary modes into our
epistemic hierarchy. A quantum worldview thus changed the ‘two cultures’
debate and the power relations between the disciplines in the academic world. 
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But the quantum revaluation of literature has feminist implications, too.
John Limon’s assertion that literary authors of either sex are taken as the women
of the intellectual world, whereas science seems the most masculine of
disciplines (Limon 1990:26), makes it clear that science, when it does incorporate
literary ways of thinking (metaphor, analogy, the role of consciousness), in fact
takes off its trousers to change them for a skirt. The new sciences, then, have led
to the incorporation of modes of thought usually associated with the feminine. 
Some people even go so far as to argue that the phenomena dealt with in
geometry are masculine and that the natural structures discovered by the new
sciences are feminine. On a New Age website, I found the following
argumentation: 
Let us look at another analogy for the relationship between quantum
fluidity (the feminine) and the geometric templates (the masculine).
Quantum fluidity would be like the amniotic fluid inside a mother’s
womb. Inside the waters of the amniotic fluid we find the beginnings of
another structure, a growing fetus that displays all the perfect principles
of sacred geometry and the holographic matrix of creation itself. This is a
perfect analogy to express the balance of spirit (fluid) and matter (form). 
(http://www.floweroflife.org/holomatrix02.htm)
In The Aquarian Conspiracy we read: 
(...) the new science goes beyond cool, clinical observations to a realm of
shimmering paradox, where our very reason seems endangered.
(Ferguson 1980:148)
New Age thinkers often stress that the new sciences undermine reason’s
privileged position. The fact that quantum mechanics includes ‘soft’ notions
such as uncertainty and indeterminacy, and the idea that relativity theory ‘made
all things relative’ are gladly taken up to conclude that the new sciences radically
corrupt the ‘hard’ foundations of science. Many scientists however, distance
themselves from such assumptions. They argue that the new sciences are just as
rational as any other branch of science, and, sticking to mathematical
explanation, deliberately make no ‘grand’ statements about reality. Other groups
of physicists, taking their lead from The Copenhagen Interpretation and the
Possible Worlds Interpretation, do interpret the conclusions of quantum
mechanics as the source of a profound crisis in epistemology. Scientists do not
agree as to what is going on in the quantum world. 
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In the meantime, the more radical interpretations of quantum theory open
up interesting fields for writers who are looking for synergies between science
and literature. The fascinating results of quantum science can even reveal a
literary triumph over science, because, as David Porush maintains, literature has
always upheld the notions of instability and locality, notions that classical physics
denied. Literature can thus “lay claim to superior epistemological potency” (cf.
page 28). John Limon explains how writers use science for their own goals. He
remarks in The Place of Fiction in the Time of Science, that
A writer with a personal, aesthetic, political, or religious problem is sure
to find at least one version of science that responds to it. (Limon 1990:25)
[Italics A.E.] 
Winterson seeks to upgrade the status of the ‘unstable’ and the ‘feminine’ and,
deploying the strategy Limon describes above, uses the new science to
substantiate her own goals, appropriating the knowledge produced in physics to
gain more respect for her own (literary) project. She needs science to sustain her
ideas because she realises that science is equivalent to power, truth and status.
The enormous aura of credibility that the sciences have obtained with the
development of modernity is still a force to reckon with – and now that aura even
serves the goals of their antagonists – literary writers. 
As we have seen, Winterson’s novels criticise positivist science and
contribute to the postmodern paradigm. As such they deny the exclusive power
reserved for the idealised image of knowledge formulated during the
Enlightenment. This ideal, as we have seen in chapter 2, encompasses the
notions of empiric measurement, mimesis, and fixity, and dismisses those forms
of knowing that do not rest on these notions. Postmodernists, on the other hand,
celebrate perspectivism, which allows for many links between the world and our
consciousnesses, languages, and theories. Postmodernists have no room for
hierarchy as they can no longer establish any valid truth function. Jeanette
Winterson uses the tendency of theoretical physics to study instability as a central
metaphor to describe her postmodern sense of dynamic flux in the universe.
Winterson’s work re-enacts the battle between on the one hand philosophical
modernity (positivism, factuality, stability, and objectivism); and on the other
hand postmodernity, (perspectivism, fictionality, instability, and subjectivism). 
The modern ideal of rationalism, as formulated in the Cartesian
philosophy, presupposes male characteristics. Cartesianism is based on analysis,
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fixity, the absolute, the universal, the objective, the orderly, the mastered and the
coherent; characteristics which have traditionally been associated with
‘masculinity’ in many critical and philosophical works. It was Descartes who laid
a solid basis for the methods of science. In the words of Stephen Toulmin: 
(...) scientific enquiries became ‘rational’- thanks to Galileo in astronomy
and mechanics, and to Descartes in logic and epistemology. (Toulmin
1990:9)
Geneviève Lloyd shows that although Descartes formulated reason as a faculty
shared by both sexes, 
(...) there are aspects of Descartes’ thought which – however
unintentionally – provided a basis for a sexual division of mental labour
whose influence is still very much with us. (Lloyd 1995:49) 
Lloyd argues that some passages in Descartes’ philosophy state that the inferior
senses, when they have been set aside in the search for truth because they can
only deceive, are nevertheless useful faculties for our personal well-being. Lloyd
continues: 
None the less, through his philosophy, Reason took on special
associations with the realm of pure thought, which provides the
foundations of science (...) And the sharpness of his separation of the
ultimate requirements of truth-seeking from the practical affairs of
everyday life reinforced already existing distinctions between male and
female roles, opening the way to the idea of distinctive male and female
consciousness. (Lloyd 1995:49-50)
In western thinking, the role of fixity is associated with masculinity. The vague,
the changing, the formless, are associated with the feminine. As Lloyd indicates, 
In the Pythagorean table of opposites, formulated in the sixth century
BC, femaleness was explicitly linked with the unbounded – the vague, the
indeterminate – as against the bounded – the precise and clearly
determined. (Lloyd 1995:3)
In those days, the world was seen as an amalgam of ideas connected to
determinate form, (we might think of the limited, the regular, the fixed and the
ordered), which was considered good, while other ideas, linked to formlessness
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(among which the unlimited, the irregular, the unstable and the disorderly), were
seen as bad. Lloyd continues that in later Greek thought, 
(...) maleness was aligned with active, determinate form, femaleness with
passive, indeterminate matter. (Lloyd 1995:3) 
This association originated from ideas about human reproduction: the woman
provided formless matter, the man gave shape to it. Women would be associated
with the indeterminate; men with fixation. Modernity, with its ideals of certainty
and fixity, must be associated with male characteristics; the new sciences, then,
are linked to indeterminacy, uncertainty, and instability, and therefore to
femininity. Likewise, postmodernism, celebrating multiple perspectives instead
of a single truth, shares this indeterminacy with the new sciences, and opens up
to feminine discourse, thereby implicitly countering male certainty and fixity as
ideally formulated in the project of modernity.
These opposing worldviews still shape western culture today, and
modernity, masculinity, and the aspiration towards certainty have remained
dominating features. The strong voice of modernity was not reduced to silence
with the advent of postmodern voices. After the rise and decline of hardcore
feminism, rationalism and the oppression of women still make themselves felt,
and women still feel the need to strengthen their position in today’s postfeminist
society – and in science. As we have seen, Winterson takes part in a battle
between several intricately entangled sets of dichotomies: rational versus
imaginative, fixed versus unstable, and modern versus postmodern. But these
dichotomies cannot be separated from the one between the masculine versus the
feminine. 
Obviously, to Winterson, such binary thinking has not yet lost its meaning:
In Art & Lies, Handel says: “It’s a truism that as faith in God has declined, belief
in science, especially medical science, has increased” (AL 8). As can be seen from
utterances like this one, the ‘two cultures’ certainly figure prominently in
Winterson’s work. And even when she appears to deflate the oppositional pairs
– “It is style that makes a nonsense of conventional boundaries between fiction
and fact” (AO 187) – she obviously favours the literary side of the dichotomy. 
Winterson associates the masculine with modernity and science, and the
feminine with Romanticism, postmodernism and the arts. In fact, her feminist
critique of science originates from this very perspective. At the root of this
standpoint lies a political conviction that is at the same time poetical. For
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Winterson, the emancipation of a feminist imagination is an antidote to the
bankruptcy of today’s culture. In “Out of Space” in The Guardian of October 30,
2001, Winterson makes it clear who she thinks is to blame for this bankruptcy:
Everywhere I look, men are running round talking about nuclear capacity,
about germ warfare, about dedicating fifty years to wipe out terrorism.
The Bush administration is delighted not to have to worry about tedious
environmentalists and Kyoto Protocols and World Trade protestors. This
is a war – and the big trousers are back in charge. 
Women will have to take a stand against this male madness. I hate the fact
that war is gendered – with men doing the destroying and women picking
up the pieces. Yes I know women fight in the army, but when I hear
Hawking talking about aggression, and how aggression is the superior
principle of survival, I know he's not talking about women. 
(Winterson 2001)
The cultural pessimism Winterson displays here can also be found in her fiction.
In Sexing the Cherry Winterson signals how cultural values are disappearing, as the
Dog-Woman combats the hypocrisy of politicians and the clergy. In Art & Lies
Handel wonders whether medicine is an honourable profession, while Picasso
voices social criticism in matters of sexual abuse. In this book, Winterson
presents western society as a money-culture without values. But she does not
leave it at that. There is a possibility for escape and improvement.
Yet, Patricia Duncker argues in her article “Jeanette Winterson and the
Aftermath of Feminism”, that 
Her heroines, with the possible exception of Dog-Woman and the odd
dancing princess, were never interested in changing the world. If the
world is full of sin, so be it. (Duncker 1998:83) 
But many of Winterson’s fictional characters have political dreams: Jeanette’s
mother in Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, for instance:
We stood on the hill and my mother said, ‘This world is full of sin.’
We stood on the hill and my mother said, ‘You can change the world.’
(OAF 10)
Some of the Dancing Princesses are politically active in their plans against male
domination, and the Dog-Woman has the power and the mission to criticise the
Pentagon and other political institutions. But there is also Art Objects and its
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vehement polemic against the shallowness of consumer culture. And what about
Winterson’s opinions in her monthly columns published on
www.jeanettewinterson.com:
As the year ends, let’s do what we can to make the world a better place.
We can all do something, however small, and that’s our gift. It may mean
helping a neighbour or a stranger. It may mean giving money or time to a
charity. You’ll know what it is, because there is always an inner prompt;
the voice we often muffle because it isn’t convenient. (Winterson 2002b)
Winterson’s writing is pervaded with a desire to change the world. Winterson’s
novels not only criticise the general ways in which the world is presented to us
by the narratives in power – which is in fact the core of all politics – but they also
call into question, very tangibly, the behaviour of specific institutions. Winterson
literally attacks institutions that can be considered as bulwarks of male power and
guardians of dualistic power structures. At the end of Sexing the Cherry, the
seventeenth-century Dog-Woman changes into a twentieth-century feminist,
protesting against the way in which the ‘men in suits’ treat the third world
problem, against the fact that the Defence Budget is not reduced with the three
percent which it would take to solve the poverty problem in the United States,
and against the creation of a wine lake and a butter mountain in the EU. The
Pentagon and the World Bank are directly criticised. If the decision were hers,
world leaders and ambassadors would have to take compulsory training in
feminism and ecology. 
But Winterson’s real feminist politics surfaces in those novels that end as
feminist fairy tales, conveying an image of lesbian love as a guarantee for a happy
and meaningful life. In Gut Symmetries, for instance, Alice and Stella wander
through New York, remembering, dreaming, talking, experiencing a world of
heightened sensations. Or at the end of The.PowerBook, the two lovers walk the
streets “like a pair of twins” (TPB 231):
Through the streets, you and I, and our footprints seemed to burn in the
water. The steam rose up as we walked, as though our feet had been shod.
Shod or branded? You marked me that day, and nothing can cool the
wound. (TPB 232)
A Feminine Science
We may conclude that Winterson is political in the sense that she does want to
change the way we perceive the world. Her most pressing concern is to heighten
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the epistemological value of artistic thinking. The revaluation of the emotive as
opposed to the rigidity of disciplined thought has important repercussions, also
on political issues, because it locates an epistemology of love, of passion, at the
heart of this society. Love and passion are the key instruments with which a
humane politics is conducted. Winterson’s ‘lexicon of love’ aims to provoke a
more humane attitude in environmental issues and medical ethics. It seeks to
reconfirm the value of ex-centricity, and of fundamental ideas such as the
freedom of opinion and of speech as opposed to national, or business interests. 
Let me, by way of conclusion, turn to the main question we asked
ourselves in this chapter. Is Jeanette Winterson’s rejection of science related to
its masculinity? It is. Winterson rejects Enlightenment science because it can be
seen as the most powerful manifestation of austerity, fixity and determinism,
typically representing manliness as defined in Western culture since Pythagoras.
Winterson rejects science when it is an instrument of the Man of Reason. Only
when manly, positivist science must yield to feminist epistemology and
transforms into a feminine science, does she declare her love for science. Her
approval of twentieth-century physics is a lesbian love: Winterson’s ‘quantum
science’ is feminine because it upholds spirituality, intuition and an
indeterminate, open-ended world.
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A LITERARY CRITIQUE OF MEDICINE
Jeanette Winterson’s fiction often criticises the cultural authority of
medicine and the patterns of reality it produces. At the same time,
Winterson tries to establish an alternative narrativisation of the body, an
intimately personal orientation presented as an improvement in science.
She follows her usual strategy when she initially reinforces the dichotomy
between rational medicine and the intimacy of literature, but ultimately
she aims at transforming the practice of medicine into a praxis of
embodied knowledge. ‘Embodied knowledge’ is a phrase used to present
knowledge as subjective, and therefore situated or located – as opposed
to the disembodied objectivity of science that produced an analytic
invulnerability. The notion of ‘embodiment’ springs from a decidedly
feminist approach arguing for a subjectivity that makes us engage
actively in the world around us. Winterson in fact proposes a kind of
healing not based on analytic invulnerability or notions like clarity and
fixity. Winterson’s feminist medicine rather incorporates a belief in the
necessity of a limited, partial perspective, emotional involvement, a
highly sensuous approach, and a deep experience of beauty.
Scepticisms 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the humanities gradually adopted an
increasingly sceptic attitude towards the idea of scientific progress and especially
towards medicine as a discipline able to adequately comprehend illness. Michel
Foucault published Madness and Unreason: History and Madness in the Classical Age in
1961 and The Birth of the Clinic in 1975. Foucault’s writings study the
interconnection between the idea of madness and the establishment of the clinic
as well as the role of institutionalised power, and – as we saw in chapter 1 –
power as a mechanism of exclusion at work inside society. Instead of being
naturally and objectively ‘given’, he argues, reason and madness are constructs
within historical processes. In the fifteenth century, madness was not considered
an illness but an eccentric source of truth, wisdom and criticism. From the
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seventeenth century onwards, however, madness was equated with illness and
reduced to silence. Articulating his postmodern scepticism, Foucault says:
The years preceding and immediately following the [French, A.E.]
Revolution saw the birth of two great myths with opposing themes and
polarities: the myth of a nationalized medical profession, organized like
the clergy, and invested, at the level of man's bodily health, with powers
similar to those exercised by the clergy over men's souls; and the myth of
a total disappearance of disease in an untroubled, dispassionate society
restored to its original state of health. (Foucault 1975:31-32)
Built on these myths, the clinic became an institution of power and a locus for
the suppression of eccentric others. Instead of valuing the voice of madness, it
was suppressed as irrational. Although writers such as the American Charlotte
Perkins Gilman in “The Yellow Wallpaper” already questioned definitions of
madness from a literary-imaginative point of view as early as the end of the
nineteenth century, Foucault’s analyses were among the first historical and
philosophical studies questioning the foundations of modern medicine. 
Since 1990, the idea of a ‘postmodern medicine’ has rapidly gained
territory. David B. Morris’ Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age is an interesting
landmark in this development. Morris argues that modern medicine traditionally
separates disease, an objectively verified disorder, from illness, a patient’s
subjective experience. According to Morris, postmodern medicine refuses to
make such a distinction. Instead, it situates illness in a seamless web of biology
and culture – in a biocultural model (cf. Morris 1998:12). From a similar starting
point, Jean Shinoda Bolen, in Gods in Everyman and Goddesses in Everywoman,
installs Greek mythology in the heart of personality and relational therapy.
Martha Nussbaum connects a medical ethics with Greek mythology. These
approaches have left behind the conception of the body and the psyche as
natural entities, fully explicable in physiological terms.
If Foucault points out the deficiencies of modern medicine, Bolen and
Nussbaum create alternatives – new forms of psychology and medicine.
Foucault’s perspective is historical, whereas Bolen’s and Nussbaum’s works
attempt to shape future practice. In this chapter we will see that Winterson
presents her readers with both a historical, critical perspective and a visionary
perspective, directed to the future, and that, like Foucault, Winterson questions
the Enlightenment optimism towards the constitution of a better society
through rational thinking. 
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In Gut Symmetries, Winterson questions the authority of medicine when
Jove turns away from his wife’s magical past – when his utterly rational scepsis
urges him to doubt a most exquisite part of her identity. Jove used to believe
Stella’s story about the diamond in her hip – that it got there because her mother
swallowed it when she was pregnant, and that it had made its way into the foetus.
Eventually, when two doctors share Jove’s sceptical attitude, he decides to cut
her up, in order to empirically disprove her magical worldview.
She showed me an X-ray, and sure enough there is a pea-like thing in
there but it looks like shot to me; an air-rifle peppering from a gun-loose
kid. I talked to a couple of doctors about the story and they both
confirmed that it was impossible. I don’t mind my wife telling me stories.
I worry when she can no longer distinguish between the fanciful and the
actual. (GS 193)
Stella’s amazing story and her poetic identity are denied. Jove in fact uses the
doctors’ opinions to suppress Stella’s eccentric tendency towards the mystical.
Their estimation of medical (im)probability in the end leads Jove to violate her
bodily integrity. In this way, Winterson, like Foucault and Perkins Gilman, casts
suspicion on the integrity of medicine – and therefore on its claims to progress. 
In the eighties and nineties, writers such as Jeanette Winterson, but also
Hans Meyer-Hörstgen (cf. Kusters 1995), and theoreticians and philosophers
such as Jan Marta and Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, have questioned the very
possibility of medical progress. In “The Viae Ruptae of Narrative Medicine”, Jan
Marta (Marta 1997) signals that the narrative of medicine hides its shortcomings
underneath an illusionary dialectic of success:
Ruptures, wanderings, routings, doublings back, and discontinuities are
structured into a positivist highway to diagnostic, prognostic, and
therapeutic ‘Truth’. (Marta 1997:45)
Marta suggests that the positivist ideology underlying the activities of physicians
and medical scientists is in need of revision. He argues that physicians should
take leave of realist representations of illness and incorporate into their view of
medicine a receptiveness of less well-worn narrative forms, such as the multi-
layered narrative, which would lead to a more delicate treatment of the patient’s
problem. The idea of reaching diagnostic truth about the patient’s condition
should be revised in the light of postmodern insights on subjectivity and locality. 
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As Kathryn Montgomery Hunter says in her article “Narrative, Literature,
and the Clinical Exercise of Practical Reason” (Montgomery Hunter 1996),
physicians more often than not regard the shortcomings of medicine as merely
temporary or local. They argue individual physicians may make mistakes and –
certainly where the treatment of relatively new diseases is concerned – medical
knowledge may still be unsatisfactory, but in principle everything is knowable,
predictable and quantifiable. Montgomery Hunter’s opinion is that physicians
should stop thinking about their profession in terms of clinical analysis. On the
contrary, they should accept the fact that the knowledge on which medicine is
founded is practical knowledge: scientific knowledge is top down and deductive;
practical knowledge is circular and hermeneutic. The idea that knowledge is – at
least partially – determined by its narrative form, is a point of controversy. This
idea violates the analytic invulnerability of medicine. Yet, Montgomery Hunter
says, physicians should be receptive to the function of narrative in medical
practice. This will result in an open-minded attitude towards comparison and re-
interpretation that will enrich medical knowledge. In the same way, Gerard de
Vries argues that the counterparts of rigid ethical theory and rational
argumentation, such as literature, the documentary, and the results of
sociological research, should not be disregarded when ethical matters in the
clinical environment are discussed. Montgomery Hunter’s and De Vries’ views
concur with the notion that science is embedded in the over-all cultural
development and that “science is one of many coequal discourses” (Greenberg
1989:49). Hunter goes on to argue that the fundamental doubt that characterises
postmodern epistemology is not reflected in physicians’ ways of dealing with
medical knowledge. And Hunter asks herself whether that is a good thing.
That Winterson’s novels are embedded not only in a literary field, but also
in a wider field of cultural criticism becomes clear when we see how the ideas of
researchers like Montgomery Hunter are echoed in metafictional passages of
Winterson’s novels, or in the opinions of her protagonists. Winterson’s
characters often express doubt vis-à-vis the growth of medical knowledge and
the supposed progressive development of medicine. In Art & Lies for example,
Handel condemns genetic engineering. In the following passages he cynically
sketches the possibility of the genetic eradication of lesbians and red-heads. 
Is there a gene we could tag and rub out for that? (...) much more
profitable to ease out redheads or homosexuals. (...) In he fifteenth
century it was well known that red hair was a sign of a consort of the
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Devil. If our ancestors had possessed our technology, this woman
opposite me would certainly be brunette. There would be no red-heads,
and we would justify that loss by saying ‘Ah yes, but thanks to us there are
no witches either.’ Genetic engineering would have taken the credit for
ordinary social change. (AL 107)
You don’t mind the harmless lady with her herb garden and decoction
still, her red hair and her black cat, who lives quietly with her friend, do
you? Do you mind her when I say that she is a mentally ill lesbian? And if
I said I could cure her, wouldn’t you think me a good man? (AL 108)
The fact that Jeanette Winterson is a lesbian herself and that the beauty of red
hair is a theme that frequently emerges in her work, indicates that Handel’s
opinion of genetics echoes her own. Indeed, all through Winterson’s works, red-
headed women have an emblematic function, expressing love and passion. In the
passages above, Winterson fights the equation of homosexuality, or in fact any
other eccentric characteristic, with evil or mental illness. Eccentricity is not
dangerous, she is saying, so why root it out? Genetics nowadays is able to
eradicate such eccentricity – create a race according to a set of preconceived
criteria. Winterson’s deconstructivist strategy aims at the creation of decentered
identities and therefore promotes diversity. Her books contribute to the
emancipation of that eccentricity and it therefore comes as no surprise that the
techniques used to exclude the ‘other’ are perceived as serious threats. 
Foucault also draws a parallel between the role of the clergy and the role
of medicine in the exercise of authority over the body. Winterson, likewise,
suggests that the medical profession and the church are sometimes involved in
similar mechanisms of control:
We strict Catholics won’t flinch from a little medical intervention. We
have made that mistake before. In 1936, when the Catholic hierarchy was
colluding with the Nazis, Hitler was not in favour of Concentration
Camps. He advocated compulsory sterilisation for the ‘hereditarily
diseased’. His advisor, Cardinal Faulhaber, disagreed: ‘From the Church’s
point of view, Herr Chancellor, the State is not forbidden to isolate these
vermin from the community, out of self-defence, and within the
framework of the moral law. But instead of physical mutilation, other
defensive measures must be tried, and there is such a measure; interning
the people with hereditary diseases.’ (Literary remains of Cardinal
Faulhaber.) 
Strict Catholics. Orthodox Jews. The other day I hear an ex-Chief Rabbi
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arguing in support of genetic cleansing for homosexuals. It would be
kinder, he said, than imprisonment. (AL 108)
Here, Handel sarcastically remarks that the cardinal, putting on an appearance of
humanity, in fact advocated the instalment of concentration camps. Winterson
incorporates historical material in Handel’s narrative, staging Cardinal Michael
von Faulhaber (1869-1952) who, according to historians like Ludwig Volk and
Menahem Macina, defended the Old Testament, but “insisted on making a
radical distinction between Judaism and Christianity” (Macina) and who at that
time neglected to pronounce on the Jewish question, as he had done ten years
earlier (cf. Volk 1966:171). Handel’s gloomy interpretation of Catholicism only
adds fuel to the historians’ condemnation of Faulhaber’s conduct. Handel goes
as far as to accuse Faulhaber directly of cooperation. Winterson uses this
historical material and bends it to her will, in order to intensify her presentation
of the parallels between the church and the medical profession and to boost her
presentation of the power that these institutions have exercised. Winterson
wants to make us aware of the fact that all through the history of western culture,
institutions like the church and the clinic have exercised power over people
through systems of binary oppositions such as pious versus sinful, Lord versus
devil, sane versus insane, healthy versus diseased. Jeanette Winterson is not alone
in questioning the power behind these structures. I have already mentioned Mary
Shelley in chapter 1, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Kusters’ article “Operatie
Hersendood” [Operation Braindead, A.E.] interprets Hans Meyer Hörstgen’s
novel Hirntod in relation to Susan Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor, concluding that
doctors’ declarations of war to illness do not necessarily imply the patient’s
benefit – on the contrary: brain surgery, Kusters concludes, can in many cases be
qualified as useless and detrimental. There are other novelists like Perkins
Gilman and Meyer-Hörstgen who disapprove of contemporary medical praxis,
such as the contemporary French novelist Lorette Nobécourt. 
In her novel La démangeaison (Itch), Lorette Nobécourt attacks medicine in
a way like Winterson. The narrator, a woman with a skin disease, suspects
medicine (she literally addresses not a particular individual doctor but the
profession as a whole) of wanting to suppress her. She believes that ‘they’ (‘ils’)
simply want to kill her, and that they planted a preposterous disease onto her:
C’est la médecine qui a omis de me retourner comme il faut. Paralysée
pour la moitié. On ne s’étonnera pas alors qu’ils aient voulu de me
supprimer; à ma naissance je savais tout, j’allais tout voir, tout dire. C’est
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simple: ils me tuaient ou je parlerais. Lutte à mort. (...) ils m’ont collé des
maladies saugrenues comme autant d’excréments de folie à vivre sur ma
peau. La mort ou la démence! (Nobécourt 1994:11)
Similar to Handel’s unfavourable view of medicine, as a science that uses its
authority to justify immorality in the practice of eugenics or during surgery, and
to hide its intolerable crudeness, the narrator of La démangeaison regards medical
people as dictators, or, at least as people in possession of absolute power. The
word ‘they’, (ils) is written in italics almost everywhere, setting the doctors apart
from everybody else. The typographic emphasis stresses the opposition between
‘they’ and ‘me’, the medical profession and the individual, the oppressor and the
oppressed. At the same time it puts so much emphasis on this word that we
come to associate it automatically with anger. Having identified the enmity
towards medicine that is buried in the works of Winterson and Nobécourt, we
need to reflect on the context of their accusations. Or are those texts merely the
vehicles for purely personal vendettas? 
Researchers in the field of ‘technology and society’ have a name for the
general attitude of distrust toward technology: ‘technophobia’, a phenomenon
powered by the idea that cultural development is triggered by technological
advances, that supposedly originate and develop outside the realm of society, in
some ivory tower, where uncontrollable processes are going on. This idea is
called technological determinism:
So the first part of technological determinism is that technical change is in
some sense autonomous, ‘outside’ of society, literally or metaphorically. The
second part is that technical change causes social change. (MacKenzie and
Wajcman 1992:4-5) 
Lord Zuckerman, who according to MacKenzie and Wajcman in The Social
Shaping of Technology, “perhaps the most explicit proponent” of technological
determinism, puts it this way: 
(...) the pure or fundamental science of today inexorably becomes the
applied science and technology of tomorrow, with unforeseeable
consequences, either immediate or remote, flowing from its exploitation.
(MacKenzie and Wajcman 1992:225)
This sentiment can clearly be felt in the following passage from Art & Lies,
where technophobia turns into what we might call ‘medicophobia’: 
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The masses are fobbed off with gadgets, while the real science takes place
behind closed doors, the preserve of the pharmaceuticals and the military.
Genetic control will be the weapon of the future. Doctors will fill the
ranks of the New Model army. And of course you will trust me won’t you,
when I tell you that with my help, your unborn child will be better off?
The white coat will replace that khaki fatigues as the gun gives way to the
syringe. (AL 107)
In this passage, Winterson presents medical science as an extension of military
and suppressive ambitions, a process aptly defined by Frank Barnaby, former
director of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute: “the military technological
tail wags the political dog” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1992:226). Winterson
continues in this caustic vein, when Handel’s inner voice tries to point at
society’s redeeming features, an attempt that is undermined by Winterson’s
sarcasm, which deflates these claims as soon as they are made.
Don’t be narrow minded Handel, with your gloomy science and medical
obsessions. People live longer, our children aren’t slaving down the mines,
we do recognize our global responsibilities, even if our governments
choose to ignore them. Women are not equal, but they are less unequal
than they used to be. We don’t call black men niggers. We are an advanced
civilisation. A democracy. Isn’t that something? (AL 109)
No, it is not, according to Winterson, who on the same page writes that “the
most ardent computer modernist” (AL 109) will be disillusioned when he
discovers that the ancient Greeks had already created a flourishing democracy,
and one more advanced than ours at that.
Progress is not one of these floating comparatives, so beloved of our
friends in advertising, we need a context, a perspective. What are we
better than? Who are we better than? Examine this statement: Most
people are better off. Financially? socially? educationally? medically?
spiritually? 
I dare not ask if you are happy? 
Are you happy? (AL 109)
The rhetorical questions instantly undermine the soothing arguments of that
‘ardently modernist’ voice, which makes Winterson’s medicophobia stand out
even stronger. And, as we have seen, Winterson stands by no means alone in this
critique. 
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Surgery and Ethics
In Art & Lies, the general observations about the shortcomings of medicine are
mirrored by actions and decisions on an individual scale. The pretensions of
medical scientists that claim to have a positive influence upon the quality of life
are undermined by scenes depicting unethical medical practice. Coping with
medical mistakes is one example. When Handel accidentally removes a woman’s
wrong breast (she is a prostitute), he feels a deep empathy and great professional
frustration, as can be seen in the first quotation below. His colleagues, however,
think he is an attitudiniser, as the next passage shows.
My life. What should have been an Ode to Reason has become a few
Fescennine verses...What do you call a doctor who removes the wrong
breast? I don’t know. What do you call a doctor who removes the wrong
breast? 
A surgeon.
‘What difference does it make?’ 
‘She’s a tart. You won’t be struck off for a tart’s tit. We might even manage
compensation from the press. Cheer up.’ 
Of course. I need not have worried. That she was low and that I let her
down lower still is not a matter for concern. (AL 122-123)
In the previous section, Handel gives voice to Winterson’s opinion of medical
science. He is also the only physician with a conscience. By making Handel an
outsider among his colleagues, she succeeds even better in condemning the
medical profession. Looking through his mind’s eye, the reader comes to share
his antipathy towards the discourse of other physicians, whose voices are
exemplary for the whole of medicine. By portraying Handel as a physician with
a consciousness, Winterson is able to present the medical profession as an
immoral praxis. The fact that he is set apart from the group points out that his
sociability and caring attitude are not commonly found among his fellow
doctors, who seem unable to understand the need for ethical behaviour. Elgin
and Handel’s colleagues serve as representatives of the dominant medical order,
characterised by rudeness, a lack of empathy, and an inability to feel or care. The
successful surgeon is often portrayed as a butcher, while the empathic surgeon
lacks success and is looked upon as a pathetic ‘softie’. 
In Written on the Body, we meet this Elgin, a professional cancer specialist
who is confronted with the fact that his wife, Louise, has a lover. The lover’s sex
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remains unknown, leaving room for a lesbian interpretation of the events. A few
months after the shocking announcement of their affair, Elgin confronts Louise
and her lover with his reality, telling his wife that she is suffering from cancer. The
indeterminacy of the text makes it possible to interpret Elgin’s diagnosis as a
reflection of his inability to cope with his wife’s lesbianism. It appears likely that
Elgin wants to put Louise away in a hospital and weaken her by the harsh
chemical treatment for her (possibly non-existent) disease. In my section ‘Two
Physicians’ we will have the occasion to analyse Elgin’s narrative in more detail. 
In Art & Lies, too, we find a passage that explains how lesbianism was
often diagnosed as a (mental) illness: 
I suppose that they [lesbians, A.E.], like other women, will be surprised to
find their new listing from the American Psychiatric Association. It is
‘Mentally Ill’, but only when they are pre-menstrual, of course’ (AL 108) 
Surgeons and psychiatrists alike; they are all lacking in understanding of the
‘other’, whether merely female or specifically lesbian. All patients in Winterson’s
novels are female; and with exception of one flat character in Great Moments in
Aviation, all the doctors are male. This fact reveals Winterson’s attitude towards
the link between medical decision-making and male domination over women.
Often, the official medical narrative oppresses female subjectivity. The absence
of ethics in this male medical narrative can be explained from Winterson’s
difference feminism (cf. chapter 5). Her opinion of medical ethics is therefore
biased. Winterson, being female and lesbian, possibly feels this way about
medicine because it is one of the domains in our culture that exerts great power
over individual lives and is (still) male-dominated.
Paternalism and the Construction of Medical Reality
Winterson’s condemnation of the established medical praxis is closely related to
the paternalist attitude that she feels accompanies it. Rationalists would dismiss
experiences of being oppressed as ignorance or paranoia. Postmodern critics of
medical praxis, on the other hand, would show more understanding, because
they are aware of the role that metaphor plays in conceptual constructions. Or
they would examine the standardisation of information that enables the
constitution of narratives that suppress the patient’s individuality. The metaphor
of warfare against cancer cells, for instance, has been addressed by Susan Sontag
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in Illness as Metaphor (Sontag 1978:64). Following Sontag’s line of reasoning,
Jennifer Willet writes in her article “Imagining the Self”: 
Technological warfare is being waged within the body of the patient. The
dossier in its digitized form becomes the command center, and the
physician is the commander in chief. Here decisions are made, tactics
strategized, and the enemy – the enemy is depersonalized to non-human
status to render warfare more palatable for the offensive line. Only this is
misleading, as in both cases – within the hospital and the battle field – the
targets are human, and both will suffer injuries and sometimes casualties
resulting from the wages of war. Though the clinic has healing intentions,
the patient (the target) is forced to bear excruciating witness to their own
planned invasion, through the observation of specialized medical images
of their body in consultation with the physician. (Willet 2002)
Is the experience of paternalism in medicine rational? Or is the fear evoked by
the experience of paternalism an exaggerated emotion? These are the questions
we have to deal with when we debate the legitimacy of Winterson’s,
Nobécourt’s, and also Willet’s claims. Paternalism has been studied
philosophically, which helps us to shed some light on these questions. In Culver
and Gert’s Philosophy in Medicine, paternalism is defined as follows: 
A is acting paternalistically towards S if and only if (A’s behaviour
correctly indicates that A believes that) 1. His action benefits S; 2. His
action involves violating a moral rule with regard to S; 3. His action does
not have S’s past, present, or immediately forthcoming consent; 4. S is
competent to give consent (simple or valid). (Culver and Gert 1982:130) 
So, paternalism is exercised from the conviction that the patient will benefit from
the action, but it is done without the patient’s consent. Paternalistic behaviour
involves a deprivation of freedom of the person toward whom one is acting
paternalistically. 
As Christine Reynier indicates, one of the values most frequently stressed
in Winterson’s novels is freedom. The doctor is “le figure emblematique de tous
les partisans de violence” and “l’ennemi de la liberté”. Because Winterson wants
to “se libérer des contraintes, maux et préjuges de la société moderne” and her
novels are “ne (...) plus animé que par une seule certitude, l’absence de fixité”
(Reynier 1997:xx). Any form of fixity, even the fixity of being declared ill
‘objectively’, is a form of oppression. And “l’auteur condamne toutes les formes
d’oppression et de repression”. Winterson distrusts the idea of medical invasion
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of the subject since to expose oneself to the medical construction of reality, that
is, medical objectiveness and fixity, comes close to giving up one’s individual
world. Winterson’s desire for (conceptual) freedom rejects being labelled as ill,
as well as being treated paternalistically. Rendered powerless by medical narrative
or by general anaesthetic, the once free subject becomes a possible victim of
medical objectification and of capital mistakes in the operating room. The idea
that patients surrender themselves to the possible generalisations and mistakes
of medical practitioners, and that they run the risk of being treated
paternalistically, violates Winterson’s sense of freedom and of being capable of
deciding over her own life.
As the narrator in Written on the Body shows, to create an individual reality
is the only way out of the medical construction of reality. In his article “Bioethics
and the Construction of Medical Reality” Mark J. Cherry says: 
Medicine as a scientific and social endeavor casts patients and physicians
into nets of social expectations, treatment obligations, duties, rights and
goals. Medical judgment is not simply descriptive or even evaluative, but
performative. (Cherry 1996:357) 
As Robert Pippin indicates in “Medical Practice and Social Authority”, patients
do not only authorise physicians to perform a specific service, but also to
formulate the bounds and characteristics of medical reality. In fact, we authorise
physicians to tell us what we are authorising them to do. In other words, after
having giving away the control over his or her body, a patient’s dependence upon
a physician, is enormous (Pippin 1996). In Winterson’s work this becomes
apparent when Elgin creates Louise’s medical reality. Both Louise and the
narrator – her lover – are confronted with the performative power of medical
judgment, a theme I will discuss in more detail in the next section. 
Two Physicians
In Winterson’s novels we come across two professional physicians. Both are
cancer specialists. But that is where the similarity ends; they have very different
feelings and ethical opinions. Elgin functions as the embodiment of rationality
and objectivity, whereas Handel stands for care, conscience and empathy. This
becomes clear when we compare Elgin’s pretensions to objectivity with Handel’s
views on this matter.
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‘Cancer is an unpredictable condition. It is the body turning upon itself.
We don’t understand that yet. We know what happens but not why it
happens or how to stop it.’
‘Then you have nothing to offer Louise.’ 
‘Except her life.’
‘She won’t come back to you’.
‘Aren’t you both a bit old for the romantic dream?’
‘I love Louise.’
‘Then save her’ (WOB 105)
In the first few lines Elgin appears very honest. His words suggest a humane
openness and a certain sensitivity. Here Elgin does not pretend to know it all; he
admits to the shortcomings of his profession. With this, he inspires the other’s
confidence. But when his words are interpreted as impotence, Elgin starts
bluffing. Suddenly he says that he can offer her her life. The narrator, with whom
he is talking, is not impressed, and states that Louise chooses for love instead of
medical treatment. Elgin denies their passion. In the end, Elgin manages to
persuade the narrator to consent to his plans for treatment. Louise, however,
distrusts Elgin’s ideas. Elgin, in his turn, believes that Louise is incapable of
understanding what is the matter with her. He does not regard her as a person in
full possession of her reason. He doubts the very existence of passion, and
derisively calls it a “dream” – a fiction. Elgin’s idea of love means to sustain
someone’s existence. To make it possible for someone to live. The narrator,
however, wants to believe that love matters more than life. The narrator is led to
agree with the violation of Louise’s explicit wish not to undergo treatment
against a possibly non-existent disease, for Louise herself does not feel ill. All of
this happens on the basis of the verdict that Louise is acting irrationally and the
narrator is naive, since she/he believes in love. Irrationality and naiveté are
opposed to rationality and the power of ‘objective knowledge’.
That love, too, can heal, that their relationship could cure Louise just as
well, is something the narrator does not realise when Elgin still is in control.
Later on, when the narrator experiences a meditative, more intense and closer
compassionate involvement with Louise’s body, she/he feels that, “despite its
destructive effect, passion is (...) life-enhancing since it is capable of transforming
the individual’s powers of perception and bringing an element of magic into an
otherwise drab world” (Palmer 1997:166). Although Elgin scorns love, and
stresses passion’s destructive side, the book’s eventual message matches what
Palmer says about The Passion: that love not only disrupts but also generates life.
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The idea that Elgin’s opinion should be regarded with suspicion, is
reinforced by references in the text to unreliable scientists. When the narrator
enters Elgin’s study, Elgin is playing a computer game in which a good scientist
(played by the operator) and a mad scientist (played by the computer) are each
other’s opponents. In fact, Louise explicitly expresses her distrust of Elgin: 
‘Cancer’s not serious?’
‘I’m asymptomatic.’
‘Why didn’t you tell me? Couldn’t you have told me?’
‘It’s not serious.’(...)
‘I was waiting for the results. I’ve had some more tests done. I haven’t got
the results yet.’ 
‘Elgin has, he says you don’t want to know.’ 
‘I don’t trust Elgin. I’m having a second opinion.’ (WOB 103)
So, Winterson’s text displays the same scepticism towards medical science that
we find in Willet’s or Nobécourt’s. It shows how Elgin uses the power of
seemingly objective and rational arguments in order to achieve a personal goal;
it warns for the possibility that rationality could be a mere façade hiding a less
noble identity. Those to whom we surrender, who should guard our physical and
psychological well-being, might not have our best interest in mind. In short: the
image of the disinterested, objective doctor is ready for rethinking.
In Written on the Body and Art & Lies, Winterson creates situations where
physicians’ personal interests and value judgements determine their diagnoses.
Their attitude towards patients is disrespectful and paternalistic. The antagonist
voices are representative of a specific discursive form of medicine, a form based
on the ideas of uniform diagnostic and prescriptive statements. Not only
Handel’s colleagues and Elgin, but the church too, possesses this prescriptive
voice, interestingly enough. Both the medical and religious spheres possess the
authoritative voice that can declare people healthy or ill, sane or mad. In all the
novels where illness plays a part, the voice of the patient is weak. Winterson thus
presents the relationship between doctor and patient as one of dominance and
subjection: strong medicine versus the weak patient. This bifurcation expresses
a profound critique of the powerful paternalism in medicine. 
However, in the end, Winterson never lets the rational clinical voice get
away with it. The plots of her novels propagate escape and freedom. Victimised
patients, characters that are considered mad, or that seem to have died, all create
their own reality, moving away from the constraints of objectivity or of a
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particular reality constructed by a paternalist voice. The patients are always able
to resist the rational construction of their disease by the construction of an
alternative reality. Freed from the performative power of diagnostic instruments
and from the constructive workings of medical jargon, the patient discovers that
she is not a ‘patient’ but a different ‘person’. Winterson therefore maintains the
dichotomy between the cold view of science and the warm, affectionate
knowledge of subjectivity.
A Medicine of Love
Winterson does not stop at the critique of male medical praxis, but in fact tries
to create an alternative way of understanding the body. Ultimately, Winterson
attempts to establish a mode of thinking that integrates the experience of beauty
into the very heart of medical conceptualisation. This type of medicine, capable
of incorporating the subjective sphere, is way removed from the discursive form
of medicine discussed above; it is a form of medicine that does not rely on
uniform diagnostic and prescriptive statements, but is built instead on
compassionate narrative, empathic dialogue and emotional attachment. So,
although Winterson often stresses the bifurcation between medicine and
literature, other crucial passages in her work indicate a one-culture approach.
From heaven the spear-light vertical in its fewter. The well-aimed light
and the dark heart. The light at rest against the heart. Light surgery for
cardiac arrest. The operation of light upon the heart is simple; the aortic
valves open like trumpets, a brassy euphonic of high C driving the blood
through tunnels, red rush of pleasure, excitement, energy of feeling (...) 
(AL 121-122)
Here, music and surgery unite. Heaven and hospital become a single creative
sphere. The beauty of the body exposed by the surgeon’s knife is celebrated.
External light touches the vital organs. Sounds of brass instruments accompany
the viewer’s excitement about the patient’s beautiful body. Essentialist notions
of the character of medicine and of the arts are undermined: medicine can be
artistic just like art can be healing. 
Similarly, in Written on the Body, we witness the fusion of anatomy and
poetry. Uncertain of Louise’s condition, the narrator writes a set of love prose-
poems using excerpts from an anatomic atlas. Opposing the clinical
narrativisation of the body and emphasising the paternalistic power implicit in
these discourses, Winterson constructs a poetic, mythic as well as anatomical
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narrative of caring. The different sections in Written on the Body (“The Cells,
Tissues, Systems and Cavities of the Body” and “The Skeleton”) describe in
minute detail how some parts of the body are built. It is the gaze of the
passionate lover studying the body of the lover, while at the same time this study
is intertwined with sexual arousal and amorous wonder: 
THE CLAVICLE OR COLLAR BONE: THE CLAVICLE IS A LONG
BONE WHICH HAS A DOUBLE CURVE. THE SHAFT OF THE
BONE IS ROUGHENED FOR THE ATTACHMENT OF THE
MUSCLES. THE CLAVICLE PROVIDES THE ONLY BONY LINK
BETWEEN THE UPPER EXTREMITY AND THE AXIAL
SKELETON.
I cannot think of the double curve lithe and flowing with movement as a
bony ridge, I think of it as the musical instrument that bears the same
root. Clavis. Key. Clavichord. The first stringed instrument with a
keyboard. Your clavicle is both keyboard and key. If I push my fingers
into the recesses behind the bone I find you like a soft shell crab. I find
the openings between the springs of muscle where I can press myself into
the chords of your neck. The bone runs in perfect scale from sternum to
scapula. It feels lathe-turned. Why should a bone be balletic? (WOB 129)
Such pieces of text deviate from medical texts in that they violate the norm of
clinical distance. At the same time these texts do appear to produce a minute and
exact study of the body. A less detached epistemology, Winterson appears to say,
should be incorporated in the corpus of intellectual achievement that humans are
trying to build. 
Similar to Martha Nussbaum’s ethic of care as expressed in Love’s Knowledge
(Nussbaum 1990), Jeanette Winterson proposes an alternative way of knowing.
A humane cognition of the human condition should be caring, loving and
passionate. Nussbaum says: “practical reasoning unaccompanied by emotion is
not sufficient for practical wisdom” (Nussbaum 1990:40), and “because the
emotions have this cognitive dimension in their very structure, it is very natural
to view them as intelligent parts of our ethical agency” (Nussbaum 1990:41).
Winterson writes: “Myself in your skin, myself lodged in your bones, myself
floating in the cavities that decorate every surgeon’s wall. That is how I know
you. You are what I know” (WOB 120). The narrator’s mind creates the object
of its love – thus cognition and reality, subject and object, merge. But emotion
and the intellect fuse as well. In her works, Nussbaum is interested in proving
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the inadequacy of clinical detachment by showing “the richness of the
connections between emotion and judgment” (Nussbaum 1990:42). According
to Winterson, healing can also be a matter of linguistic construction. She argues
for an approach of illness that is more sensitive to the power of narrative and
metaphor. Illness, or even death, might not be the trying confrontations we
know them for, if we would be able to use another approach than the warfare
perspective that Susan Sontag pointed out earlier. 
Frederick Turner indicates in Beauty that “our paradigms of ugliness”
determine the ideas of illness and death. Turner argues that we should not merely
see illness and death as the failure of life, a confirmation of the inferiority of
humans to bacteria. He proposes to see death in another sense, as 
the boundary and formal edge in time of a life, (as) one of the most
beautiful things we know. We make room by our death for other lives, for
a sharing of the world with them, and an enrichment of the world by the
multi-leveled structure of our relations with them. The only human cell
that is immortal is a cancer cell; all others give up their lives of the good
of the whole body (...) (Turner 1991:13) 
The philosophy of empathic understanding is not new. One of its
strongest manifestations surfaced in the Romantic era. The Romantic natural
philosophers replaced a mechanical notion of nature with an image of nature as
a living entity. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe thought that Newton “tormented”
light by dividing it into parts. This philosophy is not limited to the field of
literature either; it is also an element in New Age thinking. Again we see that
Winterson’s worldview echoes New Age ideas. In Ferguson’s The Aquarian
Conspiracy, there is a section on medicine. It contains images of “holistic health”
(Ferguson 1980:259) – “ a humanistic medicine” that deals with the “bodymind”
(260) and “psychic healing (261), enabling the rise of a “changing image of man”
(260). Ferguson describes a new paradigm in medicine, led by “an awareness of
wholeness in a broken society” (261). 
In chapter 2, I have discussed the fact that Winterson’s work expresses
both a sense of wholeness and a love of fragmentation. Her longing for
unification through love and care corresponds with her utopian visions. The
significant role of language in the constitution of that alternative, superior reality
sometimes shows considerable correspondences with New Age ideology: “The
Conspiracy also recognises the importance of semantics to bridge the old and the
new” (Ferguson 1980:263). If words are endowed with new meanings by poets
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and other literary writers, what was ill could become healthy, the finite can be
reinterpreted as infinite, and what appeared dead can come alive again. This is
one of the ways we might read Written on the Body: that the linguistic rites in the
parts on anatomy function as semantic mantras or constructionist prayers with
which Louise’s condition is linguistically altered. In Winterson’s world, the
imagination and language are life-saving powers, because ideas and words alter
the nature of physical reality – tissue, bones, and blood – to give new life.
It is in Jeanette Winterson’s conception of life and death where her
medicine of love clearly takes shape. Her world, as we have seen in earlier
chapters, is infinite, and her fiction, life sometimes appears infinite as well. The
most interesting case in point is the death of Jove’s father in Gut Symmetries. A
physicist like his son, he worked together with Heisenberg and other quantum
theorists, and Jove is repeatedly pondering over the idea that his father “may
simply have shifted to an alternative point of his wave function” (GS 161). Jove
explains: “At the sub-atomic level, our seeming-solid material world dissolves
into wave-like patterns of probabilities” (GS 161). He rehearses the idea that,
maybe, life and death are just two different possible states in the electronic wave
cloud. Jove’s grandmother believes that her son is in heaven. Jove hopes that “he
has found the energy to continue along his own possibility” (GS 162). It is just a
difference in terminology, he says. Magical, mythical, and metaphysical
connections to science occur all through Winterson’s work. The body, its life and
death, are not the result of mere chemical processes. The energy within the body
is described as a magical phenomenon more than once. We already saw how a
body came into existence in Fortunata’s dancing school (cf. page 104); here we
see how death is no longer linked with what Turner calls “the paradigm of
ugliness”. Moreover, birth and death have become supernatural phenomena
that, when witnessed, produce sensations of fantastic beauty.
Turner says about such beauty: “The indescribably beautiful is always, I
believe, partially describable” (Turner 1991:10). Winterson’s fragmented
narrative form might indeed be the only way for her to describe such moments
of meaning, such a deep love or such thorough understanding. Donna Haraway’s
notion of a female science (or medicine) also has as its prerequisite the locality,
the fragmentation, of narrative – producing what she calls ‘situated knowledge’.
“Feminism loves another science: the science and politics of interpretation,
translation, stuttering, and the partly understood. (...) feminist embodiment
resists fixation and is insatiably curious about the webs of differential
positioning”(Haraway 1991:195-196). Perhaps it is only through such a partial
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perspective as described by Haraway and as encountered in Winterson’s novels,
that this deep sense of beauty, a feminist ethics, and a medicine of love can really
come to the fore. 
The Role of Literature in Medical Ethics and Medical Theory
By staging physicians and patients, and by questioning the validity of diagnosis
and treatment, Winterson’s fiction engages in the issue of medical development
and medical ethics. We could ask ourselves why writers in general, or Jeanette
Winterson in particular, wish to express their opinion in this way. Isn’t it strange
that these literati do not leave these matters to physicians and ethicists? Taking
up the perspectives formulated by Jan Marta (Marta 1997) and Gerard de Vries
(Vries, De 1993), it can be explained that writers like Winterson not only feel the
need to criticise the practice of medicine, but also have the urge to plead for the
importance of literature in matters of ethics and morality. 
At the end of Gerede twijfel. Over de rol van de medische ethiek in Nederland
[Justified Doubt; On the Role of Medical Ethics in the Netherlands], the Dutch
philosopher Gerard de Vries discusses the way in which medical tragedies should
be represented. He argues that not only philosophy but also the humanities as a
whole, should consider it their task to create a vocabulary in which both the
particular individual case and principles of a more general kind are formulated;
in which both the highly subjective experience of a tragedy and medical-ethical
theory can be attuned. I would like to quote his plea for the role of the
humanities in the analysis of medical practice.
Op dit punt is een belangrijke taak weggelegd voor filosofen en andere
beoefenaren van de zogenaamde geesteswetenschappen en voor de
kunsten. Een belangrijk deel van hun metier bestaat immers uit de analyse
van het conceptuele apparaat waarmee mensen zich oriënteren, zowel
hun taal als de visuele kaders waarvan zij gebruik maken. Van hen mag
gevraagd worden de ruimte te scheppen voor zulke vormen van
getuigenis. Dat brengt onder meer kritiek met zich mee op de
basiscategorieën die – via lange en respectabele tradities – ertoe aanzetten
om wat zich als een tragedie aandient te reconstrueren als heldere,
overzichtelijke en daardoor snel-beslisbare problemen. Een aantal
daarvan, met name enkele filosofische basisbegrippen, zijn (...) reeds ter
sprake gekomen: de opdeling van ‘subject’ en ‘object’ en het tegenover
elkaar stellen van gevoel en verstand, bijvoorbeeld.
[In this respect an important task is reserved for philosophers and other
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researchers in the humanities, and for the arts. A significant part of their
profession does consist of the analysis of the conceptual apparatus with
which people orient themselves: both their language and the visual
frameworks they use. They should be asked to create a space for such
forms of testimony. This will lead to, for instance, a critique upon the
basic categories that – through long and respectable traditions – urge to
reconstruct what presents itself as a tragedy, into clear, ordered and
therefore quickly decidable problems. A number of those, especially some
basic concepts of philosophy, have already been discussed (...): the split
between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and the bifurcation of feeling and intellect,
for instance. [Transl. A.E.] (Vries, De 1993)
De Vries argues that literary scholars should occupy themselves with tragedies in
medical ethics and question traditional ways of dealing with them. Not only in
the case of medical tragedy, but also when scientific, ethnic or imperialist
tragedies occur, an important, maybe even crucial role is reserved for the literary
field, and indeed for the arts and the humanities as a whole.
Perhaps postmodern literature is the best kind of literature to fill this role.
As Jan Marta argues in “The Viae Ruptae of Narrative Medicine”, 
The value of postmodern literary texts to the theory and practice of
medicine, and to the literature-and-medicine-canon, lies in their power to
disconcert and rout the reader from well-worn narrative paths and to
engage the reader in an experiential process of inquiry. (Marta 1997:65) 
Through its anti-traditional form, postmodern literature questions settled
patterns of thinking. It defamiliarises the familiar and challenges narrative and
philosophical convention. Under the influence of postmodern analyses of the
relationship between linear narrative patterns and the aura of universal truth, the
narrative emphasis shifts to ruptures and discontinuities, or fragmentation, and
an awareness of the linguistic construction of reality emerges. Because of these
characteristics, postmodern novels play a special role in the critical function of
the arts. Postmodern literature deconstructs binary oppositions such as subject
versus object and emotion versus reason. A critique of medicine can therefore
very well be formulated through postmodern literary narrative strategies, since
this type of narrative demands a legitimation of the very patterns that once
shaped this discipline. 
Winterson’s novels subscribe to and repeat oppositions between on the
one hand medicine as a diagnostic and therapeutic economy, and on the other
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hand the arts where narratives are set free and where the subject is intimately
understood. Yet, in the end, Winterson always escapes from this bifurcation by
establishing an imaginatively rich and undisciplined alternative reality; a reality
where the subjective and the objective elements of our understanding of the
human body fuse in an experience of beauty. At that point, a cynical postmodern
attitude makes way for a Romantic experience of the Whole, expressing the idea
that reason and emotion do not necessarily have to exclude one another. From
this fusion a new medical ethics can emerge. An ethics, to be sure, that can hardly
be called postmodern, although the literary strategies it employs often are. We
find polyphonic narrative structures, metafiction, a confusion within the concept
of the self and a perturbation of autobiography, a violation of ontological
spheres, a playful attitude with respect to historical fact and so forth. However,
Winterson’s utopian visions of beauty provide a basis for an ethics of love that
certainly does away with postmodernism’s much vaunted ‘crisis of knowledge’. 
By experimenting with the type of narrative that emerged with the
postmodern crisis of knowledge, and by criticising the types of medical
knowledge produced by powerful institutions such as the church or psychiatry,
Winterson situates herself within a wider cultural discourse. The voices in her
work echo Foucault, and postmodern medical philosophy, and parallel other
contemporary authors’ critiques of late twentieth-century medical praxis.
However, with her aesthetic ideals, Winterson overcomes the conceptual
limitations within medical research. Instead, Winterson is able to produce a
transcendent image of meaning that supersedes the postmodern sense of a flat
and finite reality. For her, the body no longer is mortal and life is not
meaningless. And the body is, more than anything else, the object and subject of
love. Moreover, she parallels the contemporary calls for a new feminist medicine
(cf. Haraway 1991). But Winterson is not writing a cultural analysis in the form
of a philosophical treatise. Her literary value surfaces when she produces
visionary imaginings of a reality beyond everyday understanding. It is only
through a heightened sensitivity that this new realm of pure beauty can be
experienced, where the body can be really understood not only through the
faculty of reason, but also by the cognitive dimension that is reached by way of
the emotions. 
I
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CONCLUSION
In the intellectual history of the west, science has institutionalised itself as the
exclusive domain of rational analysis and rational language, while literature and
the arts remained the domain of fiction and fabulation. In this tradition, science
became a synonym for truth, and literature for lies. Jeanette Winterson
challenges this epistemological hierarchy. She rejects the Enlightenment belief in
the mechanical (and therefore predictable) nature of the world, and the
subsequent faith in scientific method. She uses her writing to show us that the
imagination enables us to reach a higher reality, a world more meaningful than
the one we have come to understand through the faculty of reason. The world
that art opens up is a world more true. That is why the aesthetic must be
acknowledged as a mentality that takes us beyond the dreary fabrication we call
‘real life’ – i.e. the world of managerial economy. Her work is firmly rooted in
the anti-modern tradition and thereby places itself right at the heart of the ‘two
cultures’ debate. By fighting contemporary manifestations of reason and
empiricism, Winterson re-enacts the ancient quarrel between the two cultures. 
But Winterson does not reject science categorically. In her fiction, she
often uses scientific concepts as vehicles for the expression of a miraculous
reality. Winterson’s enchantment of space and time in fact openly draws on the
ideas and vocabulary of the new sciences. Winterson’s ‘quantum tales’ must be
regarded as antidotes to the shallowness of the modern world. These antidotes
are presented not as mere fairy tales, but as alternative realities, as utopias.
Winterson’s texts therefore are also environments where different subcultures
intersect. 
Her creative interpretations of science are not directed against science as
such, but rather against a specific kind of science – classical empiricism. Still,
although she seems to accomplish a fertile connection between the two cultures,
her ‘quantum politics’ is only geared towards the fortification of values that have
always been literary to begin with: physics is only accepted in Winterson’s spaces
when it underwrites ideas that long since have been put forward by literature.
Winterson fuses science and literature only when they can be combined to
express the miraculous, and when they match her ideal of passionate
involvement.
Jeanette Winterson’s Enchanted Science
208
Winterson’s attitude towards science cannot be separated from her
feminist standpoint. If Jeanette Winterson rejects science, she does so because
of its masculinity. Her rejection of Enlightenment science is so fierce because it
can be seen as the most powerful manifestation of austerity, fixity and
determinism, typically representing manliness as defined in western culture since
Pythagoras. Winterson rejects science when it is an instrument of the ‘Man of
Reason’. Winterson’s ‘quantum science’ is feminine because it upholds
spirituality, intuition and an indeterminate, open-ended world.
Winterson presents knowledge not as fixed, objective or analytically
invulnerable, but as subjective and situated – as ‘embodied’. The notion of
‘embodiment’ stems from a feminist approach arguing for a subjectivity that is
actively engaged in the world. Winterson in fact proposes a kind of
understanding of the world and of the other, that incorporates emotional
involvement, a highly sensuous approach, and a deep experience of beauty.
At the opening of this book, I wrote that anyone interested in the contrasts
and synergies between the sciences and the humanities should read Jeanette
Winterson’s work. I hope that those who do, will agree with me, that Winterson’s
writing not only makes us aware of the complexity of the ‘two cultures’ debate,
but that her work also opens up new vistas in this confusing debate. Winterson’s
stories tell us that any narrative that prides itself on objectivity and universality,
and that guarantees economic progress, is not innocent. Scientific knowledge is
culturally conditioned. Rationality is permeated with opinions, stories, histories,
and agendas, and what counts as progress is therefore suspect. Winterson does
not argue against science and technology per se; her aim is to reveal that
technology and science have been dominated by masculine ways of thinking that
favour reason and fixity. Scientific theories, practices and institutions, like their
truths, have been caught in a rational harness. Winterson’s Romantic and
postmodern ideal of knowledge, that includes the subjective, the aesthetic, the
miraculous, the erratic and the emotional, serves as an antidote to the
authoritative power that has held science – and our world – in place for so long.
This ideal of knowledge reinstalls literature and the arts as valid intellectual
discourses, resulting in a type of knowledge that claims to surpass traditional
scientific knowledge. Winterson complains: “We are hardheaded, ruthless,
computer types, who don’t leave time to dream”. It is time we should begin to
“trust the imagination”. She aims to revalue the “hidden mysterious dreamy part
of us that is not ruled by logic or commonsense” (Winterson, 2003b). 
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Winterson’s ultimate preference for literature arises from the fact that in
literature, the world is free from restraints. Her enchanted world can be shaped
in forms that defy any law, any rigid order. Winterson’s position in the field of
science and literature crosses disciplinary boundaries: she ‘borrows’ the aura of
power that has always accompanied science – in order to strengthen the
epistemological prestige of the literary world. She ‘borrows’ scientific ideas as
well; and incorporates them in a world of fairy tale and myth. She exploits the
imaginative potentials of these scientific ideas, without caring about the fact that
in the scientific domain, these concepts are bound by disciplinary conventions
or other limitations of scientific praxis. These limitations are no concern of
Jeanette Winterson because “It is the poet who goes further than any human
scientist” (AO 115).
I
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APPENDIX I:
OVERVIEW OF MAIN CHARACTERS
YEAR OF 
PUBLI-
CATION
TITLE NAME IDEA REPRESENTED FUNCTION
1985 OAF Jeanette Quest
Uncertainty
Heroine
Jeanette’s mother Rock-solid principle
Certainty
Adversary
Pastor Finch Judgement
Power
Adversary
Winnet Quest 
Uncertainty
Heroine
The Sorcerer Visionary Helper
1985 BFB Noah Capitalism Comic
Bunny Mix Romance Comic
Mrs. Munde Romance Comic
1987 TP Henri Devotion Hero
Villanelle Exuberance
The fleeting
Advocate of JW
Napoleon Deadening grip of 
modernity
Villain
Salvadore Greed Villain
1989 STC Jordan Journey 
Quest
Companion
Advocate of JW
The Dog-Woman Justice
Transformation
Heroine
Fortunata Freedom Helper
Advocate of JW
The Twelve 
Dancing Princesses
Freedom Helper
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1992 WOB I Infinite love Hero/Heroine 
Advocate of JW
Louise Beauty Heroine
Elgin Power Villain
1994 GMA Gabriel Angel Quest Heroine
Duncan Stewart Hidden Companion
Rex Goodyear Fixity Villain
1994 AL Picasso Escape Heroine
Handel Sensitivity Companion
Sappho Poetry
Sex
Heroine
Advocate of JW
Doll Sneerpiece
Miss Mangle
Ruggiero 
Diversion
Theatre
Illusion
Helpers
1997 GS Alice Completeness Heroine
Jove Selfishness Villain
Stella Mysticism Heroine
2000 TPB Ali or Alix Dynamic Heroine
Advocate of JW
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APPENDIX II:
OVERVIEW OF WINTERSON’S NOVELS
In Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985), a semi-autobiographical novel in seven
chapters named after the books of the Old Testament, the main character is
Jeanette, a girl adopted by a working class couple active in a Pentecostal
community. Jeanette is a naïve and yet very determined, self-assured girl. The
mixture of early wisdom and childhood innocence is quite charming. In the
course of the novel we see how Jeanette is trying to come to terms with what she
herself experiences as good and that which her mother and Pastor Finch believe
is virtuous. In that sense, it is a Bildungsroman. One of the themes in this book is
the feeling of uncertainty Jeanette experiences, that she is trying to come to terms
with: “I wasn’t quite certain what was happening myself, it was the second time
in my life I had experienced uncertainty”(OAF 98). At the end of the novel, she
opts for a life that embraces that feeling, leaving behind the certainties of the
black-and-white world created by her mother. Interestingly enough, Jordan, a
boy that appears in Sexing the Cherry, is confronted with exactly the same turning
point in his teens: “Running away from uncertainty and confusion but most of
all running away from myself. (…) And then I saw that the running away was a
running towards” (STC 80). Different characters seem to converge, sharing
identical insights, which makes them not so much owners of separate and
personal identities, but rather, allegorical archetypes. Oranges Are Not the Only
Fruit also stages her alter ego, Winnet Stonejar, an anagram of Jeanet* Wint*rson,
turning up in a second plot line that has the feel of a fairy tale. Other characters
are Jeanette's mother, a confirmed believer in the power of the Lord, an
extremely determined evangelist and a ruthlessly principled person. We also
encounter Jeanette's girlfriend Melanie, which whom she has her first lesbian
experience. Pastor Finch is empowered to judge other people’s behaviour, and
Jeanette’s mother is the representative of the notion of ‘rock-solid principle’ and
of the belief in certainties. They are both adversaries of the worldview that the
book in the end brings forward. These two characters also embody the total
absence of playfulness and doubt. Jeanette and Winnet, young protagonists
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trying to find out who they want to be and whom they should regard as role
models, represent the idea of the quest, and the notion of uncertainty. 
Boating for Beginners (1985) is a book that Jeanette Winterson was not too proud
of for a while. Winterson only commented on it years afterwards, saying that
publishing it three months after her fist novel certainly proves it was not meant
as a second novel, and that she wrote it in six weeks for money. For a while, it
did not appear in her publication listings, and now it is labelled as a comic book.
The interesting thing about this novel is the juxtaposition of ontological realms
– biblical times and the postmodern age of consumerism. These realms are
mixed in such a bizarre way that the book actually should be seen as innovative.
The characters are all quite flat and naïve. There is Noah, running a little boating
company, writing a book “showing how the Lord had always been there, always
would be there and what a good thing this was. They were anxious to make the
book dignified but popular, and had decided to issue it by instalments starting
with Genesis or How I did it” (BFB 14). Helped by the Unpronounceable, Noah
and his friends start promoting the book in the ‘Glory Crusade’. Things get
complicated when Noah accidentally creates the Unpronounceable’s incarnation
when he spills some Black Forest Gateau on a toaster. Then there is Mrs. Munde,
a hopeless romantic, who has a daughter who gets stuck in the Hallelujah
Hamburger Machine, and who is fond of Northrop Frye, who passes by the ark
all of the sudden. We also come across Bunny Mix, a novelist that can be classed
among writers like Maeve Binchy. An interesting character is the orange demon,
who is able to travel through all the eras of literature, from book to book, and
who, when he pops up, comments not only on the characters’ lives but also on
the novel’s plot structure. He is a metafictional intruder, viewing all times
simultaneously, merely playing about with time, criticising everything. Noah
represents capitalism, Bunny Mix and Mrs. Munde stand for romance. The other
characters are less pronounced and are mainly there to for comic effect. 
The Passion (1987) is and is not an historical novel, both reproducing and
manipulating the past. It is divided in four parts, The Emperor, The Queen of
Spades, The Zero Winter, and The Rock. The book begins with the Napoleonic
wars where Henri, a young Frenchman, decides to join Napoleon’s army, to
become a cook for Napoleon’s and satisfy his insatiable lust for chicken meat.
His friends are Domino, a midget, and Patrick, the eagle-eyed priest. The second
part of the book at first seems totally unconnected to the first part. We meet
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Villanelle, a cross-dressing Venetian woman who once decided to get married to
a cook called Salvadore, who immediately sold her to the army to become a
vivandière, a playmate for the soldiers. Together with her, Henri leaves for
Venice. Villanelle’s husband returns to demand her back. Henri kills him and is
declared mentally ill. He is locked up on an island for madmen, called San
Servelo. Henri’s heart is broken. He has lost both passions – his admiration for
Napoleon and his love for Villanelle. This hurts him so much that Henri
becomes a disillusioned and lonely man. In the end he starts appreciating
Voltaire’s words – “il faut cultiver son jardin” – and Henri turns to gardening.
Henri represents passionate devotion and fidelity. Villanelle represents
exuberance, Napoleon is the emblem of the deadening grip of modernity and
Salvadore represents greed. Despite the tragedy, The Passion leaves behind hope:
Patrick’s wonderful all-seeing eye is a marvellous source of images and stories;
Henri’s desire to grow roses endures, just like the continuous though impossible
passion between Henri and Villanelle.
Sexing the Cherry (1989) has a dual narrative pattern. There is Jordan, a pensive
boy who likes to travel (like many other of Winterson’s characters, he loves
journeys over water), and who often reflects on the nature of time, the structure
of reality and about all the new scientific theories that emerge in his seventeenth
century world. Like his narrative counterpart, the Dog-Woman, who adopts him
when she finds him somewhere at the banks of the Thames, he is presented not
only in a seventeenth-century setting, but also placed in our late twentieth-
century capitalist society. The Dog-Woman is a woman of outrageous
proportion. She is ugly, covered in dirt, and she smells terribly. In all her
unfortunate naïveté she is taken advantage of, and because she is so often
appalled by the things men do, she gets to hate puritans and men, against whom
she acts with an overdose of violence. Other important characters are the Twelve
Dancing Princesses, one of which is Fortunata. The Dancing Princesses are kept
in captivity, but at night, they fly out through the window, visiting a city where
everybody dances. Fortunata is Jordan's soul mate and functions as his guide into
a transcendent reality. Unhindered by principle or any natural law, she moves in
wonderful worlds of fascinating magic. Jordan, who dreams of becoming an
explorer, represents the journey. Fortunata is the ambassador of freedom, and
the Dog-Woman, continually revenging the misdeeds of modern society,
represents justice. 
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Written on the Body (1992) tells the love story between an unnamed narrator and
Louise, who is married to Elgin. Louise is a beautiful redhead; the narrator is a
Romeo (whose gender remains undeclared). The relationship between the
narrator and Louise could be both hetero- and homosexual. Elgin certainly is not
a sympathetic man. We read that “he feels put upon and superior at the same
time” (WOB 32) and “Elgin grew up thinking the world ought to serve him”
(WOB 33). “His colleagues were mostly the young men he had been taught with
and inwardly despised” (WOB 35). “Elgin’s best friend whose name he couldn’t
remember. Elgin in a hired morning suit just a size too tight” (WOB 34). Elgin is
a cancer specialist who diagnoses his wife Louise as having blood cancer. Louise
does not trust him, but Elgin’s persuasion has such force that the two lovers give
in – Louise must be treated and the lovers separate. In the end it is uncertain
whether Louise is alive or dead. In the middle of all the pain of abandonment
and uncertainty, the narrator writes a series of violently passionate prose poems
inspired by passages from an anatomy book. The narrator represents never-
ending, transcendental love. Louise appears as the incarnation of beauty. Elgin,
repressed and frustrated by his childhood friends and later striving to win
competitive computer games, represents the concept of power. 
Great Moments in Aviation (1994) is set, like a part of Gut Symmetries, on a boat
sailing across the Atlantic. This film script was filmed under the name Shades of
Fear, directed by Beeban Kidron. In this dissertation, I have stuck to the script.
We are introduced to Gabriel Angel, a beautiful young black woman from the
Caribbean, named after St. Gabriel the Archangel, angel of incarnation and
consolation. She is the granddaughter of Vesuvia, a wise old lady. On the boat,
she meets Duncan Stewart, a handsome and charming man who appears to have
some secrets, that, by the end of the story, do indeed come to the surface. The
ending of the book presents him as a beautiful person capable of love. His
counterforce, Rex Goodyear, the art dealer from Great Moments in Aviation, is
an unsympathetic character. He mistakes beauty for truth and confuses art with
money. He says he is an art lover but, unmasking forgeries for his profession, he
explains that “We need certainties in this life, I’m sure we can agree on that”.
Anyone knowing Jeanette Winterson’s work will immediately recognise that
characters searching for certainties are diametrically opposed to the idea of
“what you risk reveals what you value” (TP 91 and TWOP 207). Indeed, in her
introduction to the film script of Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit, Winterson states
that “nothing is final, (…) there is no last word, no summing up, there are only
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guesses and conjectures and games”(GMA 77) and that art is “showing up the
nonsense of objectivity” (GMA 77). But that objectivity is exactly what Rex
Goodyear is interested in. He wants to get rid of uncertainty, to end all doubt as
to the authenticity of a work of art. Gabriel stands for the quest, Duncan for
mystery, and Rex for what I would call ‘insurance culture’ – the drive in people
to eliminate risk, to ensure safety and stability, to fixate the world.
Art & Lies, A Piece for Three Voices and a Bawd (1994), is a polyphony containing
the voices of three main characters, Picasso, Sappho and Handel, and of several
minor ones like Picasso’s family members, Handel’s colleagues and patients and
Sappho’s lovers. Three marginal, but special characters – Doll Sneerpiece,
Ruggiero and Miss Mangle – serve as a chorus in a tragedy, they are eccentrics in
a night club who comment on the events that are unfolding. Picasso is a young
woman who wants to be a painter, and who is maltreated by her brother. When
she tries to commit suicide by jumping off a roof, she is saved by a dissolution
of gravity. Sappho is a poet living both in 66 BC and also a squatter in the present
age, and Handel is a sensitive, insecure surgeon who once was a Catholic priest.
Their narratives are stories of violence and repression, and they need to escape
from their environment. In the end, they meet in a train leaving for a utopian
world. The book ends with some sheet music from Strauss’ Der Rosenkavalier,
stressing the operatic, polyphonic quality of the book. Winterson writes on her
website: “I’m looking for an e-version of Art & Lies, so that readers can hear the
music.” The book has a fragmented structure that breaks with traditional ideas
of plot even more radically than her earlier books. The city that the characters
live in is controlled by a system aiming for control, forcing individuals into line.
The three protagonists are sympathetic figures, Sappho being an emblem of
poetry and sex. Picasso stands for escape, while Handel represents sensitivity. 
Gut Symmetries (1997) begins on a boat, the QE2, where Alice, Jove and Stella
meet. Alice is a British physicist, born in a tugboat, who lectures about the nature
of time. Jove, short for Giovanni, but also a Latin conjugation of Jupiter, is a
respected American quantum physicist. He and Alice are having an affair. Stella,
Jove’s wife, is a Jewish poet who was raised by a New York bookshop owner
who used to quote from the Kaballah, thus awakening young Stella’s love for
mysticism. Jove and Alice’s adulterous relationship transforms into a triangle
when Alice and Stella fall in love with each other as well. Both Jove and Alice are
trying to cope with their fathers’ deaths. At the end of the book, Stella and Jove
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shipwreck on their pleasure boat, and Jove eats a part of Stella’s body to ensure
his own survival. His motives are very selfish. Stella, however, is not yet dead.
They both survive. In the end, Stella and Alice leave together, agreeing that men
are but weak creatures. Gut Symmetries contains many passages that have all the
appearance of popular science. Alice’s and Jove’s education as theoretical
physicists stands in close relation to their spiritual life. Therefore, explanatory
passages on physics are integrated in the larger story about love, fidelity, respect,
and death. Through Alice, Winterson also ventilates her love for the dark, occult
corners in the history of science. Alice and Stella in the end exceed what is
perceived as their male-centered heterosexual weakness, becoming self-assured
lesbians, Stella representing mysticism and Alice representing completeness:
“..time (…) now flowing together, and joined with the floods and cries of men
and women I have never met, places and years that snag their movement in mine
and choose me, for a moment, as a conscious depot of history” (GS 218).
The.PowerBook (2000) comprises several stories situated in the more than virtual
world of the internet, the mythical world of Lancelot and Guinevere, and the
world outside, although the distinctions between these worlds are not always
clear. The book plays with the virtual right from the start, lacking a table of
contents, but presenting the reader with a software menu that lists amongst other
items ‘OPEN HARD DRIVE’, ‘NEW DOCUMENT’, ‘SEARCH’ and ‘VIEW’.
Its main character is Alix or Ali, an e-writer, who stages him/herself in various
stories as a person balancing truth and untruth, fact and fiction. He/she is the
emblem of the dynamic of life and the instability of representation. It starts with
a story of how precious tulip bulbs were transported from Turkey to the west.
The mother of the female persona attaches them to her body as if they were her
testicles. A tulip added on to it serves as a penis. The theme of fuzzy gender again
plays a significant role, as does the theme of the (lesbian?) love affair with a
married woman. Ali or Alix meets this woman in Paris and Capri. The book ends
undecidedly, allowing the reader to choose whether they separate or not. The
ending suggests a lesbian plot, bringing out the victory of a dynamic, ‘new’
woman.
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SAMENVATTING
De westerse cultuur is gevormd door een spanning tussen ten minste twee
subculturen: de humaniora aan de ene kant en de natuurwetenschappen en
technologie aan de andere. Deze tweedeling heeft haar wortels in de zeventiende
eeuw, toen de eenheid van wetenschap en cultuur die eerder nog bestond ter
discussie werd gesteld door een andere manier van denken. Deze denkwijze ging
er van uit dat het universum systematisch en rationeel kan worden ontleed, en
dat alle vormen van begrip die door culturele vooronderstellingen waren
beïnvloed, konden worden ‘gezuiverd’. Zo moesten de invloeden van religieus
denken strikt worden gescheiden van fundamenteel onderzoek naar de natuur.
Deze Verlichte filosofie heeft langzamerhand aan prestige gewonnen, en is dat
prestige eigenlijk nooit meer kwijtgeraakt; de hedendaagse wetenschap
modelleert zich nog steeds naar dit ideaal. De klassieke filosofie is uiteengevallen
in enerzijds de geest van het rationalisme, en anderzijds een humanistisch
classicisme. De spanning tussen deze twee is vandaag de dag nog steeds
aanwezig, en heeft geleid tot het bekende debat van de ‘twee culturen’, en later,
de ‘Science Wars’. De Engelse schrijfster Jeanette Winterson (1959-) begeeft zich
met haar literaire werk op dit strijdtoneel. Dit proefschrift beschrijft wat haar
aandeel is in deze strijd.
Wintersons romans en korte verhalen worden in dit proefschrift
geïnterpreteerd vanuit het paradigma dat ‘science and literature’ wordt genoemd.
Dit paradigma is gestoeld op het inzicht dat de verhoudingen tussen de
disciplines en wetenschappelijke specialismen niet alleen te typeren zijn als
vijandschap, maar dat er ook verschillende vormen van creatieve interactie
bestaan die variëren van beïnvloeding tot symbiose. Tegelijk onderzoekt men in
dit paradigma wat daarbij de bepalende factoren zijn. Zo wordt er onderzoek
gedaan naar concepten als schoonheid, waarheid en fictionaliteit. Omdat dit
paradigma een brede manier van kijken behelst, en er vele disciplines en
specialismen bestaan, zijn er binnen het paradigma ontelbare, stuk voor stuk
fascinerende studieterreinen, variërend van ‘chaostheorie en beeldende kunst’ of
‘genetica en moderne dans’ tot ‘cybernetica en Afrikaanse weefmotieven’. Ik heb
mij moeten beperken tot denkers die onderwerpen aansnijden die relevant zijn
voor Wintersons literaire werk – denkers die uitspraken doen over de
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onderzoeksmethoden in het veld van ‘science and literature’, en denkers die zich
begeven op terreinen van de fysica en de geneeskunde waarop ook Winterson
zich begeeft. Daarbij heb ik mij geconcentreerd op de jaren tachtig en negentig
van de twintigste eeuw – de tijd dat Winterson de werken schreef die hier worden
onderzocht.
C.P. Snow gaf in 1959 met zijn lezing “The Two Cultures and the
Scientific Revolution” het ‘twee culturen’-debat zijn naam. Snow merkte op dat
er tussen natuurwetenschappers en literatuurwetenschappers steeds meer
onbegrip ontstond. Zo veel onbegrip, vond hij, dat er vijandigheid dreigde te
ontstaan. Deze vijandigheid betreurde hij ten zeerste, want met een
uiteengroeien van de disciplines zouden de problemen in de wereld nooit
kunnen worden opgelost. Nu kan er tegen een bewering als deze verschillend
worden aangekeken, en dat is dan ook te zien aan de verschillende posities die
voor en na Snow zijn ingenomen. Drie decennia vóór de lezing van Snow
publiceerde I.A. Richards een studie met daarin ongeveer dezelfde ideeën over
onbegrip en radicaal verschil. Maar in tegenstelling tot Snow achtte Richards de
scheiding terecht. Hij vond de literatuur niet helder en te weinig rationeel. Om
die reden kon de literatuur, zo vond hij, geen aanspraak maken op waarheid. De
natuurwetenschappen konden dat volgens hem wel. Recentere onderzoekers in
de ‘science and literature studies’ zijn van mening dat er helemaal geen kloof is
tussen de humaniora en de wetenschap – tenminste: die is er alleen als je die
graag wílt zien. Volgens hen zijn er evenzovele situaties waarbij de twee culturen
wél vruchtbaar samenwerken. Toch waart de geest van Richards nog steeds in
onze academiegebouwen rond. Een bewijs daarvan is de Sokal-affaire, waarbij de
natuurkundige Alan Sokal de ‘cultural studies’ onwetenschappelijkheid verweet,
omdat ze maar wat zouden aanrommelen met ideeën die lukraak uit de
natuurwetenschappen waren geplukt.
Dit roept de vraag op of geleerden in de humaniora
natuurwetenschappelijke teksten wel kunnen begrijpen. En of
natuurwetenschappers wel begrijpen wat de beoefenaars der humaniora onder
waardevolle kennis verstaan. Tussen beide kampen ligt wellicht een grijs gebied.
Een grijs gebied waar de New Age-beweging en Skeptische Verenigingen van
over de hele wereld felle discussies voeren. Dit debat over wetenschappelijkheid
en waarheid kan soms hoog oplaaien. Het is de vraag of deze strijd ooit kan
worden beslecht, zolang het denken in tegenstellingen hoogtij blijft vieren. Een
filosoof als Bruno Latour biedt een alternatief model, waarbij subjectiviteit en
objectiviteit elkaar in het midden tegenkomen, en hybridisering niet langer wordt
Samenvatting
237
beschouwd als vies of onzuiver. Een dergelijke manier van denken kan ook de
problemen uit de weg ruimen die worden opgeroepen door het zogenaamde
‘invloedsdenken’. Zolang men namelijk blijft denken in termen van ‘wetenschap
beïnvloedt literatuur’ of het meer revolutionaire ‘literatuur beïnvloedt
wetenschap’, blijft de vraag bestaan welke van de twee de ander navolgt. Een
theoretica als Katherine Hayles lost dit op met een model dat gebaseerd is op het
bestaan van ‘turbulence’ en ‘feedback cycles’, waarin literatuur en wetenschap
elkaar voortdurend kruisbestuiven. Toch lijkt dit model niet echt een oplossing
te bieden voor het probleem van de twee culturen. Dit geldt ook voor het
overigens interessante inzicht van John Limon, die beweert dat de literatuur
wetenschappelijke concepten vaak zó gebruikt, dat de literaire interpretatie
fungeert als een spaak in het wiel der wetenschap. Maar de tijd is nog niet rijp
voor een studie naar de effecten van Wintersons werk.
Een andere manier van denken over wetenschap en literatuur hangt samen
met het deconstructiedenken. Vanuit dit gedachtengoed, dat onder andere
voortkomt uit de opvattingen van Jacques Derrida, wordt de vraag gesteld of de
verhouding tussen wetenschap en literatuur eigenlijk wel zo dualistisch is als die
al zo lang wordt voorgesteld. Het deconstructivisme zoekt en analyseert
concepten die als axioma’s hebben gediend voor intellectuele bewegingen, of als
regels voor het denken. Deconstructivisme wantrouwt elk concept dat zichzelf
presenteert als samenhangend of overkoepelend. Derrida’s filosofie en
leespraktijk wil traditionele tegenstellingen in het denken uit hun vastgeroeste
positie wrikken. De oppositie tussen de twee culturen is er daar één van. De
deconstructivistische manier van denken past goed bij de houding die Jeanette
Winterson aanneemt in haar romans. Zij legt bijvoorbeeld inzichten uit de
quantummechanica in de mond van haar sprookjesfiguren, of stelt
natuurwetenschappers voor als zweverige New Agers. Naast de ideeën van
Derrida speelt ook het gedachtengoed van Michel Foucault een rol in
Wintersons denken. Terwijl Derrida meer geïnteresseerd is in denkstructuren in
het algemeen, heeft Foucault het juist over de hiërarchie die bestaat tussen
verschillende vormen van denken. Hij brengt het idee naar voren dat er
uitsluitingsmechanismen bestaan tussen de verschillende disciplines.
Interdisciplinaire vormen van macht en onderdrukking leiden tot een
epistemologische rangorde. Als we het werk van Winterson lezen vanuit dit
perspectief, wordt duidelijk dat dit idee eigenlijk de motivatie is voor haar
schrijven. Haar werk kan namelijk worden gezien als een aanklacht tegen de
onderdrukking van de literatuur en tegen het epistemologische prestige van het
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empirisme en het objectivisme. Haar waardering voor het wonderbaarlijke is
tegelijk haar verzet tegen de dominantie van de rede. Zo bestrijdt zij de
cognitieve onderwaardering van de kunsten. Door eerdere ideeën over het
wonderbaarlijke, zoals bijvoorbeeld die van Paracelsus of die van William Blake,
in haar werk te vervlechten, neemt zij stelling in het debat over de moderniteit
en de bijbehorende antimoderne bewegingen. Om hier meer over te kunnen
zeggen is een korte cultuurhistorische inleiding noodzakelijk.
In de laatste twee eeuwen heeft de moderniteit zich als dominante cultuur
gemanifesteerd. In deze tijd hebben ook enkele tegenbewegingen van zich laten
horen. Deze tegenbewegingen zijn gestoeld op precies de tegengestelde
begrippen als die waar de moderniteit zich op beroept. In het moderne denken
staan concepten centraal als rationaliteit, verstand en controle, terwijl in de
antagonistische stromingen de emotie, de intuïtie en het grillige of spontane
worden benadrukt. De westerse cultuur wordt gekenmerkt door een
conjunctuurbeweging waarbij deze geestesgesteldheden elkaar afwisselen.
Achtereenvolgens zouden kunnen worden onderscheiden: de Verlichting, de
Romantiek, de moderniteit van de twintigste eeuw (positivisme), en het
postmodernisme. Wintersons werk is heel goed te verstaan vanuit deze optiek op
de cultuurgeschiedenis. Zij verkiest steeds het gedachtengoed van die
stromingen die zich als tegenbewegingen tegen de dominante cultuur hebben
gemanifesteerd. 
Jos de Mul en Patricia Waugh argumenteren dat het tijd is om de
tegenbewegingen, net als de dominante bewegingen, te gaan beschouwen als een
continue lijn in plaats van incidentele oprispingen. Bezien vanuit het werk van
Winterson is er voor deze mening veel te zeggen: Winterson positioneert zich als
een cultuurcritica temidden van deze episoden uit de intellectuele geschiedenis
en schaart de geschutslinies van de premoderne tijd, de Romantiek en de
postmoderniteit bijeen, als één afweerbataljon dat de mens van de
onderdrukking door Verlichting en positivisme zou moeten bevrijden.
Wintersons poëticale opvattingen zijn vergelijkbaar met die van Romantici als
Novalis, Friedrich von Schiller, William Blake, en postmoderne schrijvers als
Angela Carter. Zij is dan ook niet te ‘vangen’ als een puur postmodern schrijver
of als een Romantica pur sang. Als zij íets is, dan is zij een voorvechter van wat ik
de ‘esthetische traditie’ noem. Zij poneert immers het esthetische als een
antidotum tegen de verstenende en objectiverende werking van het moderne
denken. Toch keert zij zich niet volledig van de wetenschap af.
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Begrippen als ruimte en plaats, tijd en geschiedenis, spelen een belangrijke
rol in het wereldbeeld van Jeanette Winterson. Winterson speelt in haar literaire
analyse van deze begrippen met natuurkundige theorieën, vermengt deze met
allerlei echo’s van stemmen uit de cultuurgeschiedenis, en laat zo de grenzen
tussen literatuur en wetenschap vervagen. 
Het begrip ‘ruimte’ wordt door Winterson op verschillende manieren
geëxploreerd. Zo vinden we in haar werk verschillende ideeën over de kosmos,
bijvoorbeeld over een oneindig universum, astronomen met telescopen, en de
wet van de zwaartekracht. Ook refereert ze aan de Euclidische meetkunde,
‘parallel worlds’ en het quantummechanisch vacuüm. Winterson verbindt met
deze ideeën allerlei sprookjesachtige werelden, waarbij ze de mentale producten
van een rationalistisch wereldbeeld ‘besmet’ met culturele connotaties. Het is
mijn stellige overtuiging dat zij deze besmetting met opzet creëert, daarmee haar
mening ventilerend dat de ratio an sich kennis oplevert die op cognitief of
wetenschappelijk niveau veel minder betekenisvol is dan wanneer die in
samenspel met een kunstzinnig denken wordt verrijkt. De pure
wetenschappelijke gedachte – als die al bestaat – zou volgens Winterson, als ze
vrijer zou kunnen worden geëxploreerd, rijker en betekenisvoller worden voor
het kennissysteem dat de westerse mens aan het bouwen is. Zij wil dat de hoeders
van dat epistemologische systeem die ‘andere’, ‘zachte’ zijde van het denken
eindelijk gaan waarderen. 
Het begrip ‘ruimte’ is voor Winterson ook een psychologisch fenomeen.
De menselijke omgeving en de menselijke psyche werken in haar werk op bizarre
manieren op elkaar in. Huizen, kamers, straten, steden, en zelfs de ruimte van het
innerlijke ik nemen vormen aan die, beïnvloed door emoties en buitenissige
natuurfenomenen, allesbehalve voorspelbaar zijn. Wintersons opvatting van
ruimte laat zien dat voor haar op epistemologisch niveau de objectwereld en de
subjectwereld samengaan. Dit is een opvatting over kennis die ook in de
Platonische traditie en in de Romantiek duidelijk naar voren is gekomen – een
opvatting die kennelijk ook in deze tijd nog veel betekenis heeft. Het is mijns
inziens juist in dit post-postmoderne tijdperk dat een dergelijke zoektocht naar
het samengaan van subject en object noodzakelijk wordt. Filosofen als Bruno
Latour, Richard J. Bernstein en Hans-Georg Gadamer zoeken in hun werk naar
een manier om dit binaire paar van zijn kracht te ontdoen, om zo een middenweg
te vinden. 
Ook Wintersons omgang met het fenomeen ‘tijd’ staat in verbinding met
wetenschappelijke theorieën. Zij appelleert aan oude noties van verstrijkende
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tijd, maar betreurt de uitsluitende en vergankelijke betekenissen die dit met zich
meebrengt, en stelt daartegen enkele denkbeelden over tijd in het geweer die
sterk doen denken aan Einsteins relativiteitstheorie en de ‘parallel universes’-
interpretatie van de quantummechanica. Deze twee theorieën zijn allesbehalve
compatibel. Maar dat hoeft in Wintersons wetenschap helemaal geen probleem
te zijn – compatibiliteit is in haar wetenschap geen norm. 
De geschiedenis, de gebeurtenissen die zich in het verleden hebben
voltrokken, is voor haar nog een springlevende realiteit. Zo worden ook
gebeurtenissen in de toekomst voorgesteld als semi-gerealiseerde feiten die
ergens liggen te wachten op een bewustzijn dat ze wakker schudt. Situaties
worden ook wel door haar beschreven als kruispunten van gebeurtenissen in een
soort raster van coördinaten die samen een lappendeken van tijd-ruimtepunten
vormen. Wintersons omgang met de geschiedenis ligt in het verlengde hiervan.
Haar werk kan postmodern worden genoemd vanwege de manier waarop zij
dingen uit het verleden hergebruikt, omvormt en naar haar eigen hand zet. Zij
neemt in haar omgang met historisch materiaal, net als in haar omgang met
wetenschappelijk materiaal, een epistemologische vrijheid, waarmee zij duidelijk
maakt dat met hiërarchieën in de ladder der epistemologie niet strikt hoeft te
worden omgegaan. Winterson gooit kennis, uit welke discipline dan ook, op een
hoop, waarbij een relativistische houding lijkt door te klinken die doet denken
aan de ideeën van Paul Feyerabend. Ik zeg ‘lijkt’, want uiteindelijk blijkt
Winterson allesbehalve een relativist te zijn. Er rijzen wel degelijk perspectieven
en houdingen uit deze hoop naar boven, die epistemologische
ordeningsprincipes blijken te zijn. Winterson is dus geen succesvolle
deconstructivist – door nieuwe regels voor het denken te poneren lijkt zij zelf in
de valkuil te vallen waarvoor deconstructivisten waarschuwen. 
In Wintersons werk gedragen ruimten als steden en kamers, maar ook de
tijd en de geschiedenis, zich allesbehalve voorspelbaar. Zo is het bijvoorbeeld
mogelijk dat voor een personage elementen uit het verleden helemaal niet achter
haar liggen, maar vóór haar. Ook komt het vaak voor dat gebeurtenissen zich
herhalen of dat personages en dingen opduiken op plaatsen waar je ze – op grond
van logica en natuurwetten – helemaal niet verwacht. Waar de Verlichting, het
positivisme en de hedendaagse bètafaculteiten de natuur te lijf gaan met het idee
dat zij met de ratio te begrijpen is, en een van de axioma’s in het moderne denken
is dat alle geheimen van de natuur uiteindelijk aan de onderzoeker zullen worden
prijsgegeven, gedraagt de natuur zich in Wintersons wereld uiterst grillig. Haar
wereldbeeld is instabiel, op momenten metafysisch en fantastisch, en de loop van
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processen is volledig onbepaald. Dit kan worden gezien als een postmoderne
strategie, gericht op het ondermijnen van de macht van wat Jean-François
Lyotard de Grote Verhalen noemt. Linda Hutcheon noemt een dergelijke
strategie de-doxificatie – ont-wetmatiging of ont-normalisering. Winterson stelt,
geholpen door de relativiteitstheorie en de quantummechanica, een andere
werkelijkheid voor. Deze werkelijkheid is gefundeerd op de instandhouding van
binaire paren als bijvoorbeeld vrijheid versus wetmatigheid, en subjectiviteit
versus objectiviteit. Daarbij wordt telkens het eerste begrip in de tegenstelling
boven het andere gesteld. Er ontstaat zo een werkelijkheid die – niet vanuit de
natuurwetenschappelijke, mannelijke wereld – maar vanuit een literair-
kunstzinnige en vrouwelijke sfeer als ‘de ware wereld’ wordt voorgesteld. Deze
alternatieve wetenschappelijke methode levert volgens Winterson een hogere
vorm van kennis op. Met behulp van ideeën uit de twintigste-eeuwse wetenschap
bestrijdt Winterson vormen van wetenschap die aan de bron staan van de
moderne wetenschap – zoals het klassiek empirisme. Daarmee trekt ze ook ten
strijde tegen de totaliserende macht en ordening van de moderniteit. 
Met het instandhouden van de bovengenoemde binaire paren wordt ook
een positie ingenomen op het gebied van mannelijkheid en vrouwelijkheid.
Terwijl een onderzoeker als Londa Schiebinger opmerkt dat essentialisten
beargumenteren dat wetenschap mannelijk is en moet zijn, zegt John Limon dat
literaire schrijvers als de vrouwen van de intellectuele wereld worden gezien, en
dat de natuurwetenschappers worden beschouwd als mannelijk. Deze
tweedeling wordt in Wintersons werk bevestigd: ze slaat typisch vrouwelijke
waarden duidelijk hoger aan dan waarden die traditioneel werden geassocieerd
met het mannelijke. Zo stelt Winterson bijvoorbeeld passie en emotie boven
verstand en rede en associeert zij begrippen als ‘lichtheid’ en ‘vliegen’ met de
vrouw, en ‘zwaartekracht’ met de man. Wintersons vrouwelijke personages zijn
doorgaans sterk, en de mannelijke zwak. Vrouwen kunnen gemakkelijk nieuwe
wendingen aan hun leven geven, terwijl mannen in Wintersons werk over het
algemeen vast zitten in allerlei constructen. Toch gebruikt Winterson op het
gebied van gender ook vaak postmoderne strategieën, waardoor haar
antirationalistische vorm van feminisme ook wel eens op losse schroeven lijkt te
staan. Haar deconstructie van de begrippen ‘mannelijk’ en ‘vrouwelijk’ leidt wel
tot bloemrijke personages, maar heeft inhoudelijk nauwelijks een functie.
Vermenging van droom en fantasie met de werkelijkheid wordt gezien als goed,
en objectivisme als fout. Het instabiele heeft een hogere status dan het stabiele,
en analogieën en metaforen zijn in Wintersons epistemologie meer waard dan
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alles wat met meten en berekenen wordt verkregen. Het is niet
verbazingwekkend dat Winterson juist de quantummechanica als vehikel
gebruikt voor het uitdragen van een vrouwelijke manier van denken: New-Age
denkers zien quantummechanica als een vrouwelijke wetenschap. Volgens hen
zou quantumfluctuatie vrouwelijk zijn, en de geometrie mannelijk. Ook wordt de
quantummechanica, vanwege haar paradoxale aard, gezien als een bedreiging
voor de (mannelijke) rede.
In Wintersons werk wordt de westerse, klinische geneeskunde met
argusogen bekeken. Winterson staat in de schoenen van Michel Foucault,
wanneer zij het heeft over ‘krankzinnigheid’ in het licht van categorieën als
‘normaal’ en ‘abnormaal’. Literaire schrijvers hebben vaker deze categorieën ter
discussie gesteld, uit verweer tegen de positivistische ideologie die excentriciteit
en het mystieke uitsluit. Foucault heeft deze uitsluitingsmechanismen filosofisch
en geschiedkundig onderzocht, en Winterson sluit zich op haar manier bij zijn
ideeën aan. Winterson laat in enkele van haar romans zien dat de geneeskunde
zich zo sterk beroept op helderheid en wetmatigheid, en een zodanige mate van
autoriteit heeft, dat er een welhaast analytische onkwetsbaarheid ontstaat. Maar
zij acht de geneeskunde in deze vorm zielloos, en daarom inhumaan. De
geneeskunde zou moeten toegeven dat objectieve kennis niet bestaat, en zou van
de idée fixe af moeten stappen dat persoonlijke, emotionele betrokkenheid
betrouwbare kennis in de weg staat. Volgens Winterson opent deze
betrokkenheid juist wegen die leiden tot een begrip van het menselijk lichaam dat
nabijer en intiemer – en daarom beter – is dan het klinische ideaalbeeld met zijn
objectiverende distantie. Ook de ervaring van schoonheid zou volgens
Winterson deel uit moeten gaan maken van een nieuwe medische wetenschap.
Deze wetenschap zou ook het narratieve aspect van gezondheid en genezing
moeten onderkennen. Als de geneeskunde zou accepteren dat niet alle aspecten
van leven en dood meetbaar en kwantificeerbaar zijn, dan zou er bijvoorbeeld
een begrip van de dood kunnen ontstaan dat ontsnapt aan wat Frederick Turner
het ‘paradigma van de lelijkheid’ noemt. Dan kunnen dood en leven worden
begrepen vanuit een ‘wereld van het onbeschrijflijk mooie’. Ook hierbij
weerklinken in Wintersons werk stemmen uit het niet-literaire veld van
onderzoek. Zij lijkt net als Donna Haraway een pleidooi te houden voor een
feministische geneeskunde. Wintersons werk is een poëtische zoektocht naar een
vorm van wetenschap die ruimte biedt aan een vrouwelijke, gevoelsmatige wijze
van denken. Het resultaat van deze zoektocht zou je ‘betoverende wetenschap’
kunnen noemen.
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